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Although the new architecture of experimentalist governance has been influential in academic 
scholarship as well as in policy debates over the last two decades, its actual impact on 
policymaking is still largely unclear. Specifically, questions about whether, under what 
conditions and how it influences policymaking processes remain largely unsolved. Without an 
adequate analysis of experimentalist policymaking, the current scholarship confines our 
understanding to the diffusion of experimentalist architectures, ultimately resulting in a poor 
understanding of their effects on policymaking processes. Thus, this thesis seeks to contribute 
to closing the knowledge gap by identifying conditions in which the Commission engages in 
experimentalist policymaking. To this end, it makes a number of inductive claims by further 
developing arguments found in experimentalist and shadow of hierarchy theories and using 
empirical analysis to follow them through. It studies the case of European Union energy 
regulation from the beginning of its liberalization and re-regulation in the late 1990s to the 
present day. The central argument of the thesis is that, when the Commission finds itself in 
conditions of greater uncertainty, even though the shadow of hierarchy is weaker or the 
distribution of power is less polyarchic, it engages in experimentalist policymaking by granting 
discretion to Member States and/or regulated companies to pursue common goals through 
distinct means, stimulating the comparison of their approaches and providing a basis for 
agreements on reforms to be developed with high stakeholder participation. Besides extending 
empirical research on EU energy regulation and contributing to the literature on modes of 
regulation, this thesis contributes to advancing the study of experimentalist governance in a 
number of respects. First, it clearly distinguishes experimentalist and hierarchical institutional 
architectures from policymaking processes by developing a set of indicators which are widely 
applicable. Second, by identifying patterns of policymaking that are not based on polyarchy, 
shadow of hierarchy, time or sector, but rather, are consistent with uncertainty, it suggests that 
uncertainty is an individually sufficient condition for experimentalist policymaking. More 
broadly, by identifying patterns of policymaking that are not based on specific institutional 
architectures, it shows that the type of policymaking can vary even if institutional architectures 
do not change, and hence warns scholars of the need to look beyond institutional design to the 
ways in which decision-making actually occurs. 
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Introduction 
Experimentalist governance has been emerging in recent years. Its advocates argue that this is 
a widespread response to turbulent environments where pervasive uncertainty about the nature 
of current and emerging problems means that policymakers cannot define ex ante their precise 
goals and how best to achieve them, while a multipolar distribution of power means that no 
single actor can impose a preferred solution without taking into account the views of others. 
These two scope conditions and the experimentalist governance they supposedly encourage are 
by no means confined to the EU. However, because the EU has faced problems of increasing 
strategic uncertainty under conditions of firm polyarchic constraints, experimentalists suggest 
that it appears to have more quickly and consistently found its way to experimentalist solutions. 
Through variously called fora, networked agencies, councils of regulators, open methods of 
coordination or more generally processes, experimentalist architectures have become perva-
sively institutionalised in the EU across a broad range of policy domains including regulation 
of competition, energy, telecommunications and finance; food, drug, chemicals and maritime 
safety; environmental protection; employment promotion and social inclusion; justice, security 
and crisis management; and data privacy, anti-discrimination and fundamental rights.1 
Yet, most of the literature thus far has focused on tracing the emergence and diffusion of ex-
perimentalist architecture, with much less attention paid to how such institutional architecture 
operates in practice. The issue is that policymakers can and indeed often favour different poli-
cymaking processes by using institutional structures differently. As a consequence, although 
experimentalist governance has attracted considerable attention in recent years, the actual im-
pact of experimentalist architecture on policymaking remains largely unclear. Without ade-
quate analysis of experimentalist policymaking, the current scholarship confines our under-
standing to the diffusion of experimentalist architecture, ultimately resulting in a poor under-
standing of its effects on policymaking processes.  
Hence, rather than the diffusion of experimentalist architecture, this thesis seeks to examine its 
effects on policymaking processes. To this end, it primarily focuses on a key actor in the EU, 
                                                
1Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327; C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (Eds.) 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP, 2010; C.F. 
Sabel and J. Zeitlin (2012) ‘Experimentalist Governance’. In D. Levy-Faur (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance. Oxford: OUP, pp.170–184; De Burca, G. (2010) ‘New Governance and Experimentalism: An 
Introduction-Symposium: New Governance and the Transformation of Law’. Wisconsin Law Review, 2: 227–
238.	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namely, the European Commission. During the course of regulatory policymaking, the Com-
mission may opt for different forms of policymaking, which raises the important research ques-
tion about the conditions under which the Commission engages in experimentalist policymak-
ing. This thesis draws a clear line between institutional architectures and policymaking pro-
cesses by developing a number of indicators that reflect the key elements of experimentalist 
architecture as set out by its proponents, while shifting the attention from institutional design 
to actual operation. Thereafter, it inductively develops a number of claims about conditions 
under which the Commission engages in experimentalist policymaking, by developing argu-
ments proposed in experimentalist and shadow of hierarchy theories. It then follows them 
through in the empirical analysis, which focuses on EU regulation of energy, an important 
sector in which both experimentalist and hierarchical decision-making procedures and institu-
tional arrangements have been ongoing for significant periods and which therefore has been 
used as major example in the literature on both experimentalist governance and the shadow of 
hierarchy.2 EU energy regulation offers a particularly strong case for studying under which 
conditions the Commission engages in experimentalist or hierarchical policymaking processes, 
because the Commission operates under the same general institutional architecture. The case 
study is analysed through a double methodology –	  process tracing and the comparative method 
–	  and by relying predominantly on primary sources of evidence.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter One reviews the literature on experimentalist 
governance and identifies the knowledge gap. To contribute to mitigating this gap, the question 
is raised about under which conditions the Commission engages in experimentalist policymak-
ing. To address this research question, indicators are elaborated upon that distinguish experi-
mentalist and hierarchical institutional architectures from policymaking processes; a number 
of claims are made about the conditions under which the Commission engages in experimen-
talist policymaking, by further developing arguments put forward in experimentalist and 
shadow of hierarchy theories; and case and subcases are selected in which the Commission can 
                                                
2Cfr. Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327; Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2010) 
‘Learning from Difference: the New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In C.F. Sabel and 
J. Zeitlin (Eds.) Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: 
OUP, pp.1–28; Eberlein, B. (2005) ‘Regulation by cooperation: the ‘third way’	  in making rules for the internal 
energy market’. In P.D. Cameron (Ed.) Legal aspects of EU energy regulation: implementing the new Directives 
on Electricity and Gas across Europe. Oxford: OUP; Eberlein, B. (2008) ‘The Making of the European Energy 
Market: The Interplay of Governance and Government’. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 73–92; Eberlein, B. 
(2010) ‘Experimentalist Governance in the Energy Sector’. In Sabel, C.F. and Zeitlin, J. (Eds.) Experimentalist 
Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP.	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engage in both experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking, but which offer distinct combi-
nations of conditions. The objectives of Chapter Two are twofold. First, it demonstrates that in 
the course of its regulatory policymaking, the Commission could engage in both experimental-
ist and hierarchical policymaking in all subcases, due to experimentalist and hierarchical ar-
chitectures that developed in parallel. Second, it shows that the Commission could do so under 
distinct combinations of polyarchy (and shadow of hierarchy) and uncertainty offered by the 
selected subcases. Chapters Three to Six contain the empirical analyses of policymaking, which 
are organised into two broad phases. Phase One (Chapters Three and Four) comprises the pe-
riod from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, when uncertainty was similar across issue areas 
and domains. Phase Two (Chapters Five and Six) encompasses the period from the mid-2000s 
to the present day, during which time differences in uncertainty emerged across issue areas and 
domains. Each empirical chapter identifies the types of regulatory policymaking that the Com-
mission engaged in, as well as the conditions under which it did so. The final Chapter presents 
the Conclusions. It begins by summarising the main findings and answering the research ques-
tion raised, after which it compares and contrasts the findings to the experimentalist and 














Chapter One: Analysing Experimentalist Policymaking in 
Internal Market Regulation by the Commission 
This chapter reviews the literature on experimentalist governance, by describing why it is im-
portant, noting how experimentalist governance is defined and showing that experimentalist 
architectures mainly spread in the European Union (EU). Then it identifies a current gap, 
namely, whether and under what conditions experimentalist architectures and policymaking 
processes differ, thereby raising the valuable research question about the conditions under 
which the European Commission engages in experimentalist policymaking. To address this 
research question, it develops indicators for more clearly distinguishing institutional architec-
tures from policymaking processes. Thereafter, it elaborates claims about conditions under 
which the Commission engages in experimentalist policymaking, by further developing argu-
ments proposed in experimentalist and shadow of hierarchy theories. Finally, it selects a case 
study and breaks it down into subcases in which the Commission could engage in both exper-
imentalist and hierarchical policymaking under different conditions.  
Reviewing the literature on experimentalist governance  
“New modes of governance”	   that diverge in various respects from standard hierarchical or 
“command and control”	  models have attracted considerable attention over the last two decades, 
both in academic debates and practical applications.3 This is an important phenomenon that, as 
suggested by its name, tends to be primarily identified by comparison with what it is not, in 
contrast with some conception of traditional or “old”	  regulatory approaches. Although it results 
from a sharing of experience by scholars across a wide variety of policy domains that are quite 
diverse and disparate in institutional and political terms and in terms of the concrete problem 
to be addressed, some common features have been identified. These involve a shift in emphasis 
                                                
3For academic discussions of new modes of governance see, for example, Eberlein, B. and Kerwer, D. (2004) 
‘New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical Perspective’. JCMS, 42(1): 121–42; De Burca, G. and 
Scott, J. (2006) Law and New Governance in the EU and the US. Oxford: Hart Publishing; and the forum on the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC), often considered the archetypal examples of new governance in the EU. 
Available at: http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/index.htm. Accessed on 2 July 2016. 
For policy documents on OMC, see the website of the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm. 
Accessed on 5 July 2016. 	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away from command and control in favour of “regulatory”	  approaches that are less rigid, less 
prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes and less hierarchical in nature.4 
New modes of governance can be conceptualised through the theory of “experimentalist gov-
ernance”, which identifies a precise, clearly distinguishable logic of governance.5 This theory 
was originally built upon the interpretation, proposed notably in an influential book by Michael 
J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel (1984), of the Toyota production systems that broke with stand-
ardised mass production as exemplification of decentralised flexible specialization.6 This the-
ory has subsequently been extended to democratic governance.7 In experimentalist regimes, 
“central”	  institutions give autonomy to “local”	  ones to pursue generally declared goals. Then 
the centre monitors local performance, pools information in disciplined comparisons and cre-
ates pressures and opportunities for continuous improvement.8 This form of governance is 
thought of as experimentalist “because of the way it systematically provokes doubt about its 
own assumptions and practices, while unrelentingly treating its solutions as provisional and 
corrigible”.9   
Defined in general terms, “experimentalist governance is a recursive process of provisional 
goal-setting and revision based on the comparison of alternative approaches to advancing them 
                                                
4De Burca, G. and Scott, J. ‘New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’. In de Burca, G. and Scott, J. (Eds.) 
Law and New Governance in the EU and the US. Hart Publishing, 2006. Draft available at: 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/clge/docs/govlawconst.pdf Accessed 21st August 2014.	  
5For an assessment of new governance in the light of the theory of democratic experimentalism, see Eberlein, B. 
and Kerwer, D. (2004) ‘New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical Perspective’. JCMS, 42(1): 
121–42.	  
6Piore, M.J. and Sabel, C.F. (1984) The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities For Prosperity. New York: 
Basic books.	  
7See, in particular, Cohen, J. and Sabel, C.F. (1997) ‘Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy’. European Law Journal, 
3(4):313–42; Dorf, M.C. and Sabel, C.F. (1998) ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’. Columbia 
Law Review, 98(2): 267–473. See also Sabel, C. F. (1994) ‘Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of 
Economic Development’. In N. Smelser and R. Swedberg (Eds.) Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, and New York: Russell Sage Foundation.	  
8Sabel, C.F. and Simon, W.H. (2011) ‘Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State’. 
Georgetown Law Journal, 100(1): 55.	  
9Experimentalists use the terms ‘experimentalist governance’, ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’	  and ‘learning 
from difference’	  interchangeably. The thesis uses only the term ‘experimentalist governance’. See Sabel, C. F. 
and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist governance in the 
European Union. European Law Journal 14: 276–7.	  
13	  
in different contexts”.10 In its most developed form, experimentalist architecture is said to be 
multilevel and to involve key elements linked in an iterative cycle.11  
First, broad framework goals and metrics for gauging achievement are provisionally 
established by some combination of “central”	  and “local”	  units, in consultation with the 
relevant civil society stakeholders. Examples of such framework goals are ‘good water 
quality’	  or ‘safe food’. In regulatory systems, the local units are typically private actors 
such as firms and/or territorial authorities to whom they immediately respond (state 
regulators in the United States (US) or Member State authorities in the EU), while the 
centre can be the national government in the US or EU authorities in the EU. In service-
providing organisations, the local units are typically front-line workers, such as teach-
ers, police, or social welfare workers or the district or regional entities supervising 
them, while the centre can be a government agency or organization. Second, local units 
are given broad discretion to pursue these goals in their own way. Third, as a condition 
of this autonomy, these units must regularly report their performance and participate in 
a peer review in which their results are compared with those of others employing dif-
ferent means to the same ends. Where they are not making good progress against the 
agreed indicators, the local units are expected to show that they are taking appropriate 
corrective measures, informed by the experience of their peers. Fourth and finally, the 
goals, metrics and decision-making procedures themselves are periodically revised by 
a widening circle of actors in response to the problems and possibilities revealed by the 
review process, after which the cycle repeats.12 
Experimentalists argue that the scope conditions for experimentalist governance are distinct 
and much broader than the historical contexts from which the new architecture emerged in the 
EU. Indeed, they suggest that these scope conditions are arguably quite minimal. The first 
                                                
10C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (2012) ‘Experimentalist Governance’. In D. Levy-Faur (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook 
of Governance. Oxford: OUP, p.170. 	  
11Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327; Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2010) 
‘Learning From Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In (Eds.) 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP; Sabel, C.F. 
and Simon, W.H. (2011) ‘Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State’. Georgetown Law 
Journal, 100(1): 53–93; C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (2012) ‘Experimentalist Governance’. In D. Levy-Faur (Ed.) 
The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford: OUP, pp.170–184.	  
12	  C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (2012) ‘Experimentalist Governance’. In D. Levy-Faur (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook 
of Governance. Oxford: OUP, pp.168-169.	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condition is strategic uncertainty, meaning that policy makers recognise that they cannot rely 
on their strategic dispositions (e.g., more market versus more plan) to guide action in a partic-
ular domain (or equivalently that they do not know how to achieve their declared goals). The 
second is a multipolar or polyarchic distribution of power in which no single actor has the 
capacity to impose his or her own preferred solution without taking into account the views of 
others.13 
Experimentalists have found experimentalist architectures in the US and other developed de-
mocracies, both in the provision of social welfare services, such as education and child welfare, 
and in the regulation of health and safety risks such as nuclear power, food processing and 
environmental pollution.14 Furthermore, they argue that transnational experimentalist regimes 
likewise appear to be emerging across a number of major issue areas such as disability rights, 
data privacy, food safety, and the environmental sustainability of forests and fisheries.15 Be-
cause the EU has had to face problems of rising strategic uncertainty under conditions of firm 
polyarchic constraints, experimentalists suggest that it appears to have found its way more 
quickly and consistently than other polities to experimentalist solutions.16  
Experimentalists clarify that the four key elements of experimentalist architecture listed should 
be understood as a set of necessary functions, which can be performed through a variety of 
                                                
13Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 280; see also Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2010) 
‘Learning From Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In (Eds.) 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP, p.9; OUP; 
Sabel, C.F. and Simon, W.H. (2011) ‘Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State’. 
Georgetown Law Journal, 100(1): 56, 80; Sabel, C.F. and Zeitlin, J. (2012) ‘Experimentalism in the EU: 
Common ground and persistent differences’. Regulation & Governance, 6(3): 412.	  
14See, for example, Sabel, C.F. and Simon, W. (2004) ‘Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds’. Harvard Law Review, 17 (4): 1015; and Sabel, C.F. and Simon, W. (2011) ‘Minimalism and 
Experimentalism in the Administrative State’. Georgetown Law Journal, 100 (1): 53.	  
15See, for instance, de Burca, G., Keohane, R.O. and Sabel, C.F. (2013) ‘New Modes of Pluralist Global 
Governance’. Journal of International Law and Politics, 45 (1); de Burca, G., Keohane, R.O. and Sabel, C.F. 
(2014) ‘Global Experimentalist Governance’. British Journal of Political Science, 44 (03); and J. Zeitlin, Ed. 
(2015) Extending experimentalist governance? The European Union and transnational regulation. Oxford: 
OUP.	  
16Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327; C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (Eds.) 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP; C.F. Sabel 
and J. Zeitlin (2012) ‘Experimentalist Governance’. In D. Levy-Faur (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance. Oxford: OUP, pp.170-184; de Burca, G. (2010) ‘New Governance and Experimentalism: An 
Introduction Symposium: New Governance and the Transformation of Law’. Wisconsin Law Review, 2: 227–
238.	  
15	  
possible institutional arrangements.17 With this qualification, through variously called fora, 
networked agencies, councils of regulators, open methods of coordination or more general pro-
cesses, experimentalists have found the architecture of decision making described in a broad 
array of policy domains in the EU. These domains include re-regulation of privatised network 
infrastructure in sectors such as electricity, gas and telecommunications; regulation of public 
health and safety such as drug authorisation, occupational health and safety, environmental 
protection, food safety, maritime, rail and aviation safety; and social solidarity in employment 
and social protection. They also encompass regulation in response to catastrophe such as food 
and maritime safety/pollution; prudential regulation in advance of failure, namely, financial 
services; rationalisation of existing centralised regulation, specifically competition policy and 
state aid; and fundamental rights against, for example, discrimination on grounds of race, gen-
der or disability.18 
Identifying a current gap 
Experimentalists themselves recognise that “we present the new governance institutions as they 
were designed to be. We are aware that in the life of society and the law nothing works precisely 
as designed”.19 A prominent illustration is offered by the open methods of coordination, which 
are said to most clearly display the EU’s new experimentalist governance architecture.20 Inau-
gurated at the extraordinary Lisbon European socio-economic summit in March 2000 and sub-
sequently extended to cover an enormous range of policy fields, it was defined as involving 
the following elements: fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for 
achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; establishing, where 
appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the 
world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing 
best practices; translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by set-
                                                
17Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 274.	  
18Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327; C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, Eds. (2010) 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP.	  
19Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 280–281.	  
20Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 289.	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ting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differ-
ences; and periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning pro-
cesses.21 By reviewing evidence about the open method of coordination, however, experimen-
talists highlight significant practical limitations that, in actuality, inhibit the realisation of the 
theoretical promise of the open method of coordination.22 They point out that actual open 
method of coordination processes, as they have evolved since Lisbon, vary considerably in 
their modalities and procedures depending upon the specific characteristics of the policy field 
in question, the Treaty basis of EU competence and the willingness of the Member States to 
take joint action.23  
Likewise, scholars attracted to experimentalist theory suggest that systems with all the ele-
ments of the new governance architecture in place will only remain architectures if they do not 
also operate in an experimentalist way, in particular, if stakeholder participation is limited and 
if problems are not identified by accurate data and supplemented by effective ongoing moni-
toring.24 Similarly, sceptical scholars point to case studies from air transport regulation, trans-
boundary water management and immigration to highlight the fact that network governance, 
commonly presented as an alternative to the hierarchical “Community method”, is not void of 
hegemonic traits.25 By comparing evidence from the most mature open method of coordination 
processes, some have found little evidence of learning, and instead, have discovered that its 
relationship with policy change can break down at several points due to deficiencies in the 
design of the open method of coordination, a lack of participation, and the political/institutional 
complexities in the EU context.26  
                                                
21Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000. Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 37. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm. Accessed on 7 September 2016.	  
22Zeitlin, J. (2005) ‘Conclusion’. In Zeitlin, J. and Pochet. P. (Eds.) The Open Method of Coordination in 
Action. Brussels: PIE –	  Peter Lang, pp. 447–503.	  
23Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 289–92.	  
24de Burca, G. (2010) ‘New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction - Symposium: New 
Governance and the Transformation of Law’. Wisconsin Law Review, 2: 235.	  
25Lavenex, S. (2008) ‘A governance perspective on the European neighborhood policy: integration beyond 
conditionality?’	  Journal of European Public Policy, 15(6): 938–955.	  
26Radaelli, C. (2008) ‘Europeanization, policy learning and new modes of governance’. Journal of Comparative 
Policy Analysis, 10 (3): 239–254.	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Others do not deny that new and experimentalist modes of governance are entirely workable,27 
but claim that, in and of themselves, they do not contribute to the ‘efficacy’	  of policymaking, 
defined as “the successful production and enactment of rules and standards necessary to 
achieve the given policy goal”.28 Instead, they argue that new forms of governance require the 
“shadow of hierarchy”.29 The argument is that legislators can threaten to enact adverse legisla-
tion unless parties alter their behaviour to accommodate the legislators’	  demands. Whether or 
not parties respond by complying depends on how likely it is that legislators will implement 
their threat and by what means they would do so.30 Parties are endowed with authority to bar-
gain with one another, but are also under the “Damocles sword of threatened direct state inter-
vention”.31 Thus, the shadow of hierarchy is important for governance without government, 
because it generates incentives for cooperation for non-state actors.32 According to shadow of 
hierarchy scholars, examples from domains, such as the European social dialogue, competition 
policy, regulation of energy, telecommunications and financial markets and environmental 
self-regulation, document that effective societal self-coordination is rarely found without the 
involvement of state actors that have the capacity to make and enforce collective decisions.33  
                                                
27For examples of such harsh critiques, see Lowi, T.J. (2000) ‘Frontyard Propaganda’. In C.F. Sabel, A. Fung 
and B. Karkkainen (Eds.) Beyond Backyard Environmentalism. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 70–76; Savitz, J. 
(2000) ‘Compensating Citizens’. In C.F. Sabel, A. Fung and B. Karkkainen (Eds.) Beyond Backyard 
Environmentalism. Boston: Beacon Press, pp.65–69.	  
28Eberlein, B. (2008) ‘The Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance and 
Government’. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 74.	  
29Heritier, A. (2002) ‘New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-Making without Legislating?’. In A. 
Heritier (ed.) Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance. Rowman & Littlefield; 
Heritier, A. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2008) ‘The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance’. Journal of 
Public Policy, 28: 1–17; Borzel, T.A. and Risse, T. (2010) ‘Governance without a state: Can it work?’. 
Regulation & Governance, 4(2): 116; Borzel, T.A. (2012) ‘Experimentalist governance in the EU: The 
emperor's new clothes?’. Regulation & Governance, 6: 378–384. The argument derives notably from Mayntz. R 
and Scharpf, F.W. (eds) (1995a) Gesellschaftliche Selbstregulierung Und Politische Steuerung. Campus, 
Frankfurt; and F.W. Scharpf (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy 
Research. Westview Press.	  
30Heritier, A. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2008) ‘The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance’. Journal of 
Public Policy, 28: 1–17.	  
31Schmitter, P.C. and Streeck, W. (1985) ‘Community, Market and the State –	  and Associations? The 
Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order.’	  European Sociological Review, 1: 131.	  
32Borzel, T.A. and Risse, T. (2010) ‘Governance without a state: Can it work?’. Regulation & Governance, 
4(2): 116.	  
33Heritier, A. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2008) ‘The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance’. Journal of 
Public Policy, 28: 1–17; De Visscher, C., Maiscocq, O. and Varone, F. (2008) ‘The Lamfalussy Reform in the 
EU Securities Markets: Fiduciary Relationships, Policy Effectiveness and Balance of Power’. Journal of 
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Thus, although new and experimentalist governance has been influential in academic scholar-
ship as well as in policy debates, its actual impact on policymaking processes is still largely 
unclear. Specifically, questions about whether and under what conditions theory and practice, 
design and operation, structure and behaviour, proposed architecture and actual developments 
and institutional architectures and policymaking processes differ remain largely unresolved.  
Defining the research question and design 
The thesis seeks to contribute to mitigating this knowledge gap in the literature on 
experimentalist governance by exploring, rather than the diffusion, the effects of 
experimentalist architectures on policymaking processes, by focusing on a key actor in the EU, 
namely, the European Commission. 34  In the course of regulatory policymaking, the 
Commission can favour distinct types of policymaking processes, thereby raising the valuable 
research question about the conditions under which the Commission engages in experimentalist 
policymaking.  
                                                
Public Policy, 28: 19–47; Eberlein, B. (2008) ‘The Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay of 
Governance and Government’. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 73-92; Soriano, M.L. (2008) ‘New Modes of 
Governance in the Spanish Electricity and Gas Sectors’. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 93–111; Heritier, A. and 
Eckert, S. (2008) ‘New Modes of Governance in the Shadow of Hierarchy: Self-regulation by Industry in 
Europe’. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 113–138; Lehmkuhl, D. (2008) ‘On Government, Governance and 
Judicial Review: The Case of European Competition Policy’. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 139–159; Smismans, 
S. (2008) ‘The European Social Dialogue in the Shadow of Hierarchy’. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 161-180; 
Heritier, A. and Rhodes, M. Eds. (2010) New Modes of Governance in Europe: Governing in the Shadow of 
Hierarchy. Palgrave Macmillan.  	  
34The Commission found itself facing a surge of academic interest especially since the mid-1990s. A central 
debate concerned its role in European integration, with some seeing it as an ‘agent under control’	  of Member 
States while others as an ‘autonomous engine’	  of European integration. Cfr. Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences 
and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach’. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 31: 473–524; Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, Cornell University Press; Pollack, M.A. (1997) ‘Delegation, Agency, and 
Agenda Setting in the European Community’. International Organization, 51: 99–134; Pollack, M. A. (2003): 
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the EU. Oxford: OUP; 
Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (Eds.) (1998) European Integration and Supranational Governance. 
Oxford: OUP. 
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Distinguishing architectures from policymaking 
Experimentalists do not explicitly distinguish among institutional architecture, policymaking 
process and more general governance. Instead, when defining experimentalist architecture, 
they identify four key elements that constitute the “architecture of experimentalist govern-
ance”.35 Similarly, when documenting and exploring experimentalist governance in its various 
institutional forms across a broad range of EU governance regimes, experimentalists do not 
explicitly distinguish between institutional architectures and policymaking processes. Instead, 
they “assess the goodness of fit between the architecture of deliberative rulemaking proposed 
                                                
In spite of these very different views, the importance of the Commission to the development of European 
policies and polity has been widely acknowledged in the academic literature, with a growing number of scholars 
considering it central to the understanding of the EU as a political system. See, for example, Ludlow, P. (1991) 
‘The European Commission’. In R. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds.) The New European Community. Decision 
making and Institutional Change. Boulder, Westview Press: 85–132; Christiansen, T. (1996) ‘A maturing 
bureaucracy? The role of the Commission in the Policy Process’. In J. Richardson (ed.) European Union Power 
and Policy-Making. 1st ed. London, Routledge: 77–95; Christiansen, T. (1997) ‘Tensions of European 
governance: politicized bureaucracy and multiple accountability in the European Commission’. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 4(1): 73–90; Christiansen, T. (2001) ‘The European Commission: Administration in 
Turbulent Times’, in J. Richardson (ed.) European Union Power and Policy-Making. London, Routledge: 95–
114; Cram, L. (1994) ‘The European Commission as a multi-organization: social policy and IT policy in the 
EU’, Journal of European Public Policy, 1(2): 195–217; Cram, L. (1997) Policy-Making in the European 
Union: Conceptual Lenses and the Integration Process. London, Routledge; Laffan, B. (1997) ‘From policy 
entrepreneur to policy manager: the challenge facing the European Commission’. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 3(3): 422-38; Morth, U. (2000) ‘Competing frames in the European Commission - the case of the 
defence industry and equipment issue’, Journal of European Public Policy, (7) 2: 173–89; N. Nugent, ed., 
(2000) At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission. 2nd ed. London, Macmillan; Peters, 
B.G. (1994) ‘Agenda-Setting in the European Community’. Journal of European Public Policy, 1(1): 9–24; 
Peters, B.G. (2001) ‘Agenda-setting in the European Union’. In J. Richardson (ed.) European Union Power and 
Policy-Making. 2nd edition. London, Routledge: 77–93; Peterson, J. (1995) ‘Decision-making in the European 
Union: towards a framework of analysis’. Journal of European Public Policy, 2(1): 69–93; Peterson, J. (1999) 
‘The Santer era: the European Commission in normative, historical and theoretical perspective’. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 6(1): 46-65; Richardson, J. (ed.) (2001) European Union: Power and Policy-Making. 
London, Routledge; Kampp, M. (2005) ‘Fragmentation and Policy Coordination in the European Commission: 
The Cases of Audiovisual and Telecommunications Policy’. Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy to the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science; Hix, S. 
and Hoyland, B. (2011) The Political System of the European Union. 3rd edition, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Within this large body of literature, a 1998 article by Susanne K. Schmidt is particularly useful. Its point of 
departure is that, under European competition law, in those cases where Member State governments have 
endowed undertakings with rights conflicting with the Treaty's rules, the Commission has the right to issue 
Directives by itself, rather than by proposing legislation to Member States. The article hence asks about the 
conditions under which the Commission may use these rights against Member States. To address this question, 
it compares the telecommunications and electricity domains. It finds that in European telecommunications 
policy the Commission used this competence very successfully, with all liberalization Directives being based on 
Article 90, while for European electricity policy the Commission shrunk away from using these powers in favor 
of initiating Council legislation. The thesis applies an analogous approach to experimentalist policymaking. See 
Schmidt, S.K. (1998) ‘Commission activism: subsuming telecommunications and electricity under European 
competition law’. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1): 169–184.	  
35Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327.	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[…] and actual institutional developments”.36 The reason might be that, to date, their primary 
goal has been to “establish the deep similarity of architectural outcomes in diverse domains of 
decision making”	  in order to “demonstrate a striking and consistent design innovation, and for 
that purpose what the designers formally intend certainly counts”.37 In accordance with exper-
imentalist theory, this thesis assesses institutional architectures as experimentalist based on the 
extent to which the elements of experimentalist architecture are in place. 
However, as experimentalists themselves have observed, “ideally, of course, we would assess 
the effectiveness of the new institutions as well”.38 Indeed, the primary aim of this thesis is to 
explore the operation rather than demonstrate the diffusion of experimentalist architecture. 
Thus, the presence of experimentalist architectures will not be a concluding finding, but rather, 
will be a starting point. This thesis begins by acknowledging the diffusion of experimentalist 
architecture, after which it explores conditions under which such architecture is actually em-
ployed. To address the question about the conditions under which the Commission engages in 
experimentalist policymaking, this thesis distinguishes instances in which experimentalist ar-
chitectures are present but not employed, from those in which they are both present and em-
ployed. In other words, it determines whether systems with all elements of the new governance 
architecture in place are only architectures, or rather, also operate in an experimentalist way.39 
For this purpose, it draws a clearer line between institutional architectures and policymaking 
processes.  
The thesis assesses policymaking processes as experimentalist based on a set of indicators, 
which it develops by looking at the key elements of experimentalist architecture as set forth by 
its proponents, but shifting the emphasis from institutional design to actual operation. The the-
sis defines a first indicator of experimentalist policymaking as whether Member State public 
authorities and regulated companies are actually granted discretion to adopt distinct approaches 
to pursue common goals. This indicator reflects, in terms of policymaking process, the second 
key element of experimentalist architecture, namely, that “local units are given broad discretion 
                                                
36Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2010) ‘Learning From Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist 
Governance in the EU’. In (Eds.) Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New 
Architecture. Oxford: OUP, p.7.	  
37Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 277, 280–281.	  
38Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 280–281.	  
39This is a paraphrase of de Burca, G. (2010) ‘New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction - 
Symposium: New Governance and the Transformation of Law’. Wisconsin Law Review, 2: 235.	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to pursue these goals in their own way”. Therefore, in experimentalist policymaking, policies 
can be implemented by governments, private sector actors or both. This thesis contrasts the 
experimentalist grant of discretion with the obligation for Member States and regulated com-
panies to adopt uniform solutions, typical of hierarchical policymaking.  
The thesis defines a second indicator as whether the different approaches pursued by Member 
States and/or regulated companies are indeed compared. Although experimentalist compari-
sons might be performed through a variety of arrangements, including public consultations, 
they are not ‘simply consultation’, however extensive this might be. Instead such comparisons 
reflect, in practice, the third element of experimentalist architecture, namely, that “as a condi-
tion of this autonomy, these units must report regularly on their performance and participate in 
a peer review in which their results are compared with those of others employing different 
means to the same ends”. This differs from the hierarchical monitoring of compliance of Mem-
ber States and regulated companies with the implementation of uniform solutions.   
A third indicator is defined as whether agreements on reforms are actually developed based on 
these comparisons, evidenced for example by explicit references. This indicator reflects aspects 
of the first and fourth elements of experimentalist architecture, namely, that “broad framework 
goals and metrics for gauging their achievement are provisionally established”	  and “periodi-
cally revised in response to the problems and possibilities revealed by the review process”. 
This thesis contrasts it with the hierarchical development of reforms, not underpinned by com-
parisons of distinct approaches.  
The thesis defines a fourth and last indicator as whether agreements on reforms are effectively 
developed with high stakeholder participation. This indicator reflects another aspect of the first 
and fourth elements of experimentalist architecture, namely, that “broad framework goals and 
metrics for gauging their achievement are provisionally established by some combination of 
central and local units, in consultation with the relevant civil society stakeholders”; and that 
“the goals, metrics and decision-making procedures themselves are periodically revised by a 
widening circle of actors”. Even if high stakeholder participation does not necessarily imply 
that governments and stakeholders have the same influence on policymaking, this contrasts 
with the low stakeholder participation that is characteristic of hierarchical policymaking.  
In summary, this thesis develops a number of indicators that reflect key elements of experi-
mentalist architecture as set forth by its proponents, while shifting the attention from institu-
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tional design to effective operation. Hence, it defines and assesses experimentalist policymak-
ing as a process whereby Member State public authorities and/or regulated companies are 
granted discretion to adopt distinct approaches, their different approaches are compared and on 
this basis agreements on reforms are developed with high stakeholder participation. It contrasts 
experimentalist policymaking with hierarchical policymaking, with the understanding that they 
are processes whereby compliance with uniform solutions is monitored and reforms are devel-
oped without conducting comparisons of different approaches and with low stakeholder par-
ticipation, thereby making uniform solutions binding on all Member States and regulated com-
panies. Table 1 shows the indicators that are developed and used for distinguishing experimen-
talist from hierarchical policymaking. 
Table 1. Indicators for distinguishing experimentalist from hierarchical policymaking 
Experimentalist policymaking  Hierarchical policymaking 
1.  Member States and/or regulated companies 
grant discretion to adopt different approaches  
Member States and regulated 
companies are obligated to adopt 
uniform solutions 
1.  Different approaches are compared Compliance with uniform solutions is 
monitored 
3.  Agreements on reforms are developed based on 
comparisons  
Reforms are not developed on the basis 
of comparisons 
4.  Agreement on reforms are developed with high 
stakeholder participation 
Agreement on reforms is developed 






Developing claims about conditions under which the Commission 
engages in experimentalist policymaking  
After defining indicators for more clearly distinguishing institutional architectures from 
policymaking processes, this thesis inductively develops a number of claims about conditions 
under which the Commission engages in experimentalist policymaking, and then uses 
empirical analysis to follow them through. For this purpose, it further develops arguments put 
forward in experimentalist and shadow of hierarchy theories. Table 2 shows the claims about 
conditions under which the Commission engages in experimentalist policymaking, the 
arguments supporting them, the theories from which they are drawn and how they are 
empirically assessed. 
This thesis develops the initial claim by using the argument, found in the shadow of hierarchy 
theory, that the threat of adverse legislation can induce conflicting parties to cooperate.40 The 
core of this argument is that new modes of governance, in and of themselves, do not contribute 
to the efficacy of policymaking, but rather, require the shadow of hierarchy where hierarchy is 
used to describe legislative and executive decisions.41 Since the shadow of hierarchy provides 
an important incentive for non-state actors to cooperate in the provision of rules and collective 
goods, the willingness of non-state actors to engage in governance should increase to the degree 
that state actors can resort to hierarchical modes of governance.42 The thesis applies this im-
portant critique of new and experimentalist governance to policymaking processes, and in do-
ing so, elaborates upon the first claim that the stronger the shadow of hierarchy, the more the 
Commission will engage in experimentalist policymaking, and vice versa.  
 
                                                
40Heritier, A. (2002) ‘New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-Making without Legislating?’	  In A. Heritier 
(ed.) Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance. Rowman & Littlefield; Heritier, A. 
and Lehmkuhl, D. (2008) ‘The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance’. Journal of 
Public Policy, 28: 1–17. The argument largely builds on Mayntz. R and Scharpf, F.W. (Eds.) (1995a) 
Gesellschaftliche Selbstregulierung Und Politische Steuerung. Campus, Frankfurt; F.W. Scharpf (1997) Games 
Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Westview Press.	  
41Heritier, A. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2008) ‘The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance’. Journal of 
Public Policy, 28: 1–17; F.W. Scharpf (1997) Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in 
Policy Research. Westview Press.	  
42Borzel, T.A. and Risse, T. (2010) ‘Governance without a state: Can it work?’	  Regulation & Governance, 4(2): 
117.	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Table 2. Claims about conditions under which the Commission engages in 
experimentalist policymaking  
Theory Argument  Claim Assessment 
Shadow of 
hierarchy   
The threat of adverse 
legislation can induce 
conflicting parties to 
cooperate 
The stronger the 
shadow of hierarchy, 




policymaking, and vice 
versa 
Shadow of hierarchy 






In the absence of 
polyarchy, one actor is 
dominant or there is a 
struggle for dominance, 
and the powerful prefer 
to impose outcomes, 
rather than cooperatively 
pursue them with others  
The more polyarchic 
the distribution of 














In the absence of 
strategic uncertainty, 
actors are convinced that 
they know how to 
pursue their goals, so the 
joint exploration of 
possibilities is 
superfluous 
The higher the 
uncertainty, the more 
the Commission will 
engage in 
experimentalist 




based on the 
specificity of the 
Commission’s policy 
preferences about 




To be sure, conceptually, the debate between experimentalists and their major critics is in fact 
more sophisticated. Experimentalists suggest that “there is no disagreement that there are many 
situations where conflicts over potential divisions of returns obstruct experimentalist coopera-
tion; nor is there that the actors in these situations can be, and often are, induced to cooperate 
by threatening to impose an outcome that puts them in a situation far less desirable than the 
one that could be achieved through joint efforts”. However, they point out that where their 
critics invoke “the idea of the shadow of hierarchy to describe this threat and its origin, we 
speak of the imposition of a penalty default”.43 While penalty defaults also draw on official 
authority, they do so in a way that, according to experimentalists, is crucially different from 
the use of state power that occurs in the shadow of hierarchy.44 The key difference is that, in 
experimentalist governance, “the hierarchical authorities are no longer credibly able to take 
over the regulatory functions directly. They can in effect promise only to make things unwork-
able: the penalty default is a warning, in terrorem, of an incalculable harm. Nor can the regu-
lated parties precisely calculate the payoff they may eventually achieve through mutual en-
gagement”.45 Therefore, “the best ‘solution’	  available to authorities acting themselves is so 
manifestly unworkable to the parties as to count as a draconian penalty […]. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely the patent unworkability of official solutions –	  the failures, if you like, of rules made by 
anything like traditional means –	  which makes the mere threat of imposing them so effective a 
device for inducing the parties to deliberate in good faith”.46  
However, this thesis considers the shadow of hierarchy and penalty default as concepts that are 
very hard to distinguish by the evidence. Thus, while acknowledging that it constitutes a sim-
plification, it makes a first claim solely based on the shadow of hierarchy theory, namely, that 
the threat of adverse legislation can induce conflicting parties to cooperate. Empirically, the 
                                                
43Sabel, C.F. and Zeitlin, J. (2012) ‘Experimentalism in the EU: Common ground and persistent differences’. 
Regulation & Governance, 6: 413.	  
44Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 308.	  
45C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (2012) ‘Experimentalist Governance’. In D. Levy-Faur (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook 
of Governance. Oxford: OUP, p.177.	  
46Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 308.	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literature on the shadow of hierarchy literature largely covers explicit threats of traditional leg-
islation, as evidenced, for example, by the public initiation of draft pieces of legislation.47 Yet, 
this approach leads to the risk of encountering the methodological challenge of “observational 
equivalence”, which is familiar to principal-agent theory from which the shadow of hierarchy 
was built.48 The issue is that “agents”	  may rationally anticipate reactions from “principals”	  and 
adjust their behaviour accordingly. As such, the absence of any overt sanction or threat would 
not reveal much about the actual autonomy enjoyed by agents, and for the purpose of this thesis, 
about the actual influence of the shadow of hierarchy. To address this methodological chal-
lenge, this thesis assesses the shadow of hierarchy based on the formal rulemaking powers 
available to the Commission, regardless of whether explicit threats to use these powers are 
observed. 
The thesis draws a second and third claim from experimentalist theory, which identifies “two 
very general scope conditions for the emergence of experimentalist institutions”.49 Experimen-
talists argue that “the possibility conditions for experimentalist governance are arguably quite 
minimal: strategic uncertainty, meaning that policymakers recognise that they cannot rely on 
their strategic dispositions (e.g., more market vs. more plan) to guide action in a particular 
domain (or equivalently that they do not know how to achieve their declared goals); and a 
multipolar or polyarchic distribution of power, in which no single actor has the capacity to 
impose her own preferred solution without taking into account the views of the others”.50  
Although not explicitly defined, experimentalists present the two scope conditions together, 
which suggests that they understand them jointly rather than individually. Furthermore, exper-
imentalists do not explicitly clarify whether these are necessary or sufficient conditions. In 
                                                
47See, for instance, Heritier, A. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2008) ‘The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of 
Governance’. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 1-17; Héritier, A. and Eckert, S. (2008) ‘New Modes of Governance 
in the Shadow of Hierarchy: Self-regulation by Industry in Europe’. Journal of Public Policy 28, 113–138; 
Eberlein, B. (2008) ‘The Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance and 
Government’. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 73–92.	  
48See, for example, Weingast, B.R. and Moran, M. (1983) ‘Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? 
Regulatory Policy-Making by the Federal Trade Commission’. Journal of Political Economy, 91: 765–800; 
Pollack, M.A. (1998) ‘The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European 
Union’. In Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (Eds.) European Integration and Supranational Governance. 
Oxford: OUP, pp. 217–47; Pollack, M.A. (2003) The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, 
and Agenda Setting in the EU. Oxford: OUP.	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some instances, they argue that “together, these conditions open up the possibility for trans-
forming distributive bargaining into deliberative problem solving through the institutional 
mechanisms of experimentalist governance”,51 indicating that these are jointly necessary con-
ditions. In other cases, they argue that “in the most straightforward case, where the two condi-
tions are fully met, we should find experimentalism arising spontaneously when actors in a 
polyarchy anticipate the joint gains from collaborative problem-solving under uncertainty”,52 
which suggests that these are jointly sufficient conditions. Finally, experimentalists argue that 
the EU has had to face problems of rising strategic uncertainty under conditions of firm poly-
archic constraints.53 
This thesis elaborates upon a second claim based on the argument, found in experimentalist 
theory, that “in the absence of polyarchy, one actor is dominant, or there is a struggle for dom-
inance, and the powerful prefer to impose outcomes, rather than pursue them cooperatively 
with others”.54 Experimentalists argue that “in the European Union and in many international 
regimes, experimentalist institutions have arisen from the realisation that mutual evaluation 
and learning from diverse national practices is sometimes the only feasible way of coordination 
in the absence of a conventional national sovereign with presumptive authority to fix common 
goals”.55 Indeed, the importance of a multipolar or polyarchic distribution of power for exper-
imentalist governance has been consistently emphasised in the experimentalist literature, from 
the earliest essays developed in the late 1990s to the latest works that have only recently been 
                                                
51Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
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published.56 This thesis applies this argument to policymaking processes rather than to institu-
tional architectures or governance, hence developing the second claim that the more polyarchic 
the distribution of power, the more the Commission will engage in experimentalist policymak-
ing, and vice versa. 
As anticipated, experimentalists suggest that the EU has maintained firm polyarchic con-
straints.57 It is certainly hard to imagine a situation in which the distribution of power in the 
EU is not polyarchic, but rather, is completely hierarchical. However, the distributions of 
power might be more or less polyarchic (or its obverse i.e., hierarchical), which in turn, allows 
the assessment of whether the argument supporting the claim is empirically corroborated.58 
The thesis empirically distinguishes more or less polyarchic distributions of power based on 
the Commission’s formal rulemaking power. Therefore it uses the same indicator to assess 
polyarchy and shadow of hierarchy, and considers that the greater the Commission’s powers, 
the stronger the shadow of hierarchy while the less polyarchic the distribution of power. Fur-
thermore, the proposed shadow of hierarchy and polyarchy-based claims precisely oppose ex-
pectations. Specifically, the more polyarchic the distribution of power, the less the Commission 
will engage in experimentalist policymaking, according to the shadow of hierarchy claim, but 
the more it will engage in experimentalist policymaking, according to the polyarchy-based 
claim. 
The third and last claim is derived from experimentalist theory and specifically its emphasis 
on uncertainty, defined as when policymakers “do not know how to achieve their declared 
goals”.59 The argument is that “in the absence of strategic uncertainty, actors are convinced 
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‘Learning from Difference: the New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In C.F. Sabel and 
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‘Learning from Difference: the New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In C.F. Sabel and 
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that they know how to pursue their ends, so joint exploration of possibilities is superfluous”.60 
In contrast, under conditions of uncertainty, “the official decision maker does not know how 
to respond to current or emergent situations, but neither do the primary actors. The response, 
correspondingly, is […] to organise joint exploration of the situation and possibilities for re-
sponding to it”. Experimentalists claim that experimentalist forms of organisation in making 
regulatory rules arise and diffuse as actors and the state face uncertainty.61 Indeed, they under-
stand the emergence and success of experimentalist governance as a response to a secular rise 
in uncertainty that has overwhelmed the capacities of hierarchical governance.62 By applying 
this argument to policymaking processes rather than institutions or governance, the thesis de-
velops a third claim that the higher the uncertainty, the more the Commission will engage in 
experimentalist policymaking, and vice versa.  
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As anticipated, experimentalists argue that the EU has had to face problems of rising strategic 
uncertainty.63 This thesis does not assume what uncertainty should be, but rather, identifies 
what it is and traces whether it changes, and if so how these changes occur. Yet, assessing 
uncertainty as being when “actors by definition have to learn what their goals should be, and 
while learning determine how to achieve them”, as proposed by some,64 might risk conflating 
uncertainty and experimentalist policymaking. On the other hand, assessing uncertainty as “the 
need to address complex policy problems which have not shown themselves to be readily 
amenable to resolution whether through hierarchy, market, or otherwise”, as suggested by 
others,65 might raise the issue of what observable implications could be used to distinguish 
between policy problems that are readily amenable to resolution and otherwise. 
In line with the conceptual definition provided by experimentalists, this thesis assesses 
uncertainty by looking at the specificity of the Commission’s policy preferences, namely, how 
to achieve its policy goals. Based on publicly available regulatory policy documents and 
interviews, the thesis assesses uncertainty as being higher when the Commission’s policy 
preferences about how to achieve its goals are more general, while it assesses uncertainty as 
being lower when the Commission’s policy preferences are more specific. This approach is 
valuable because it allows the “operationalisation”	  of uncertainty, and hence, the ability to 
falsify arguments based on such an important concept.  
Selecting cases 
This thesis focuses on the EU, which is precisely where experimentalist architectures have been 
the most widespread. Experimentalists suggest that, because the EU has had to face problems 
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of rising strategic uncertainty under firm polyarchic constraints, it is the polity where experi-
mentalist architectures have become most institutionalised.66 At the same time, the EU has also 
progressively seen much delegation of hierarchical powers from Member States to the EU, 
offering a major domain for applying shadow of hierarchy theory.67 This thesis concentrates 
on regulation, which is the EU’s core activity.68  
Within EU regulation, the focus is on the energy sector, from the beginning of its liberalisation 
and re-regulation in the late 1990s to the present day (i.e., November 2016). This is a major 
sector in which both experimentalist and hierarchical architectures have been ongoing for sig-
nificant periods, and accordingly, which has been used as an important example by both the 
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experimentalist and the shadow of hierarchy literatures.69 Thus, EU energy regulation offers a 
particularly strong case to study experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking processes, par-
ticularly the conditions under which the Commission engages in one or the other.  
Interestingly, while making competing theoretical claims, both sets of literature in the energy 
sector have only empirically analysed the same, single case study, which solely focuses on the 
issue area of “tarification”, exclusively in the power domain and only until the early 2000s.70 
This thesis significantly expands upon the currently limited empirical research on this topic by 
studying the issue areas of “tarification”	  and “congestion management”	  in both the power and 
gas domains, from the beginning of EU energy liberalisation and re-regulation in the late 1990s 
to the present day (i.e., November 2016).  
The aforementioned case study is broken down into subcases in which the Commission could 
engage in both experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking, due to the experimentalist and 
hierarchical architectures that developed in parallel and very similarly across domains and is-
sue areas. At the same time, these subcases offer different combinations of factors crucial to 
the proposed claims of polyarchy (and the shadow of hierarchy) and uncertainty. Table 3 shows 
the selected subcases in terms of uncertainty and polyarchy (and shadow of hierarchy). 
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Table 3. Polyarchy (and shadow of hierarchy) and uncertainty in the selected subcases    
 Polyarchy (and shadow of hierarchy)	  





All issue areas and domains 
from the late 1990s to the 
early 2000s	  
Congestion management in power and 
tarification in gas from the mid-2000s 
to the present day	  
 
Lower	  
All issue areas and domains 
during the early 2000s	  
Congestion management in gas and 
tarification in power from the mid-
2000s to the present day	  
 
In all subcases, in the course of its regulatory policymaking, the Commission could engage in 
hierarchical policymaking by using hierarchical powers that developed almost identically 
across domains. From the late 1990s onwards, in both the power and gas domains, the Com-
mission could propose legislation to the European Parliament and the Council.71 Since the mid-
2000s in both domains, and specifically since 2003 in the power domain and 2005 in the gas 
domain, the Commission has also been able to adopt “implementing acts”	  subject to the ap-
proval of “comitology”	  committees, in the specific issue areas of congestion management and 
tarification.72 Because neither the legislative nor comitology procedure reflects the key ele-
ments of experimentalist architecture, this thesis considers them hierarchical architectures. 
In all subcases, nonetheless, the Commission could also engage in experimentalist policymak-
ing, by employing experimentalist architectures that developed in parallel to hierarchical ar-
chitectures analogously if not identically across domains. A significant, albeit not exclusive, 
illustration is the Florence Forum for Electricity Regulation, also known as the Florence Pro-
                                                
71See for example http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq#q6. Accessed on 21 March 
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72Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
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cess, which was organised by the Commission immediately after the first round of liberalisa-
tion legislation. Since 1998, its key task has been to provide a “neutral and informal framework 
for discussion of issues and exchange of experiences concerning the implementation of EU 
legislation and the creation of the internal market”, by biannually bringing together the Com-
mission, European regulatory networks and EU agencies, Member State governments and na-
tional regulatory agencies, distinct types of regulated companies (e.g., transmission network 
operators, network users such as power generators or gas importers), consumers and other 
stakeholders such as outside commercial and academic experts.73 Immediately after the Flor-
ence Forum was created, the Commission also organised the Madrid Forum for Gas in 1999. 
The two fora have equivalent compositions, working arrangements and tasks. Since their con-
ception, both have been meeting twice a year with a particular focusing on the issue areas of 
congestion management and tarification.74  
While in all subcases the Commission could engage in both experimentalist and hierarchical 
policymaking, it could do so under different conditions of polyarchy (and shadow of hierarchy) 
and uncertainty. Initially, similarly across all issue areas and domains, the Commission faced 
higher uncertainty under a more polyarchic distribution of power and weaker shadow of hier-
archy. From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, the distribution of power was more polyarchic 
and the shadow of hierarchy was weaker, because in order to develop rules, the Commission 
could only propose legislation. Although its right of initiative is exclusive, its proposals must 
be adopted by both the European Parliament and the Council.75 Furthermore, at the very be-
ginning of the liberalisation and re-regulation of European energy markets, the Commission 
did not have precise preferences in the power or gas domains on how to regulate congestion 
management and tarification in order achieve the broad goal of non-discriminatory access. 
Therefore, uncertainty was higher across all subcases. 
However, by the early 2000s, the Commission had developed much more precise policy pref-
erences with regard to the regulation of both congestion management and tarification in both 
domains, resulting in a decline in uncertainty across all issue areas and domains. In contrast, 
the distribution of power remained more polyarchic and the shadow of hierarchy was weaker, 
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because the Commission’s powers had not yet been strengthened. Thus, a second combination 
of conditions saw, in all issue areas and domains, the Commission’s regulatory policymaking 
continuing to take place under a more polyarchic distribution of power and a weaker shadow 
of hierarchy, but also under lower uncertainty. 
Since the mid-2000s and specifically since 2003 in the power domain and 2005 in the gas 
domain, the Commission has been empowered to adopt “implementing acts”	  subject to the 
approval of “comitology”	  committees confined to Member State representatives, specifically 
in the issue areas of congestion management and tarification.76 Since the Commission has been 
able to develop detailed implementing measures supplementing legislative acts without having 
to go through the entire legislative procedure, the distribution of power has become less poly-
archic and the shadow of hierarchy has become stronger, across all issue areas and domains.  
In contrast, differences in uncertainty emerged across domains and issue areas. For regulating 
the issue area of congestion management, the Commission faced new policy questions for 
which it did not have clearly defined preferences in the power domain, while it maintained 
precise preferences for specific policies in the gas domain. Therefore, in the issue area of con-
gestion management, uncertainty was higher in power than in gas. Conversely, for tarification 
regulation, the Commission continued to hold precise policy preferences in the power domain, 
while being exposed to new policy questions in the gas domain for which it only had general 
preferences. Thus, for tarification regulation, uncertainty was higher in gas than in power.  
Thus, a third combination of conditions has been offered by the regulation, since the mid-
2000s, of congestion management in the power domain and tarification in the gas domain. 
These represent subcases of policymaking under conditions of less polyarchic distributions of 
power (and stronger shadow of hierarchy) and higher uncertainty. A fourth and last combina-
tion was offered by the regulation, during the same period, of congestion management in the 
gas domain and tarification in the power domain. These constitute subcases of the Commis-
sion’s policymaking under conditions of less polyarchic distributions of power (and stronger 
shadow of hierarchy) and lower uncertainty.  
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Methodology 
In this work, these subcases were studied by employing two methods. First, the conditions 
under which the Commission engages in experimentalist policymaking were compared with 
those under which it favours hierarchical policymaking. In line with a well-established view in 
the social sciences, the comparative analysis was based on variables.77 That is to say, it mainly 
aimed at establishing generalised relationships between variables, as opposed to rich descrip-
tions of a few instances of a certain phenomenon.78 
Second, the processes through which the Commission employs experimentalist or hierarchical 
architectures were traced. The variable-oriented qualitative analysis was therefore integrated 
with process tracing, which is distinctive in three aspects. The evidence upon which this ap-
proach concentrates is called ‘causal-process observations’, as opposed to the data analysed by 
quantitative techniques, namely ‘data-set observations’.79 It is founded on careful description. 
It focuses its attention on sequences.80 In sum, process tracing is ‘an analytical tool for drawing 
descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence –	  often understood as part 
of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena’.81 
A core advantage of this method is that it allows strengthening causal inferences in small-N 
designs, such as this, based on matching and contrasting of cases. It integrates the use of the 
comparative method in qualitative research, particularly to establish causal inferences, by sup-
plementing it through within-case analysis.82 Put it bluntly, it increases the ability of a qualita-
tive study to make causal inferences, relative to the simple matching and contrasting of cases 
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more recent works see Beach, D. and Pedersen, R.B. (2013) Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guide-
lines, University of Michigan Press; and Bennett, A. and Checkel, J.T. (2015) (eds) Process Tracing: From 
Metaphor to Analytic Tool, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	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that comparative designs bring on their own and which is not sufficient to establish causality. 
Furthermore, the use of process tracing is particularly appropriate in this thesis, since the case 
study selected offers a significant period of time, namely around two decades. 
Of course, the use of process tracing faces potential challenges. For example, the research 
might encounter common issues of missing variables, and concerns may arise as to whether 
plausible alternative explanations were appropriately considered and then dismissed.83 In at-
tempting to address these potential issues, this thesis started by identifying a timeline listing 
the sequence of events studied. It then considered the kind of evidence that could confirm or 
disconfirm the possible explanatory factors studied, and eventually appraised these factors in 
the light of the evidence found. To this end, it aimed at collecting and then studying information 
on all the steps that emerged as important to the sequence analysed. This was in turn supported 
by the combination of difference sources of evidence. 
To use the comparative and process tracing methods, this thesis predominantly relied on pri-
mary sources of evidence, even though secondary sources are also referenced where appropri-
ate. This is especially the case when the very beginning of the liberalisation and re-regulation 
of European energy markets is generally discussed, specifically with regard to the regulation 
of tarification in the power domain from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. These are periods 
and issues that have been already studied by other scholars, and accordingly, the thesis builds 
upon the existing empirical research. 
The primary sources of evidence used are the vast amount of publicly available regulatory 
policy documents including meetings minutes and presentations, notably from the Florence 
and Madrid Fora and the informal groups of experts they stimulated;84	  “position papers”	  pro-
duced by the informal regulatory network Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) as 
                                                
83 Collier, D. (2011) ‘Understanding Process Tracing’. PS: Political Science & Politics, 44(4): 823-830.	  
84For the Florence Forum for electricity, for the more recent meetings, see 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/meeting-european-electricity-regulatory-forum-florence; for previous 
meetings, see 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Florence_Fora. 
For the Madrid Forum for gas, for the more recent meetings, see https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/madrid-
forum; for previous meetings, see 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Madrid%20Fora. 
For the very first meetings of the Florence and Madrid Fora, which are not publicly available directly online, I 
have successfully requested access to documents to the Secretariat General of the Commission.  
38	  
well as a variety of trade associations, such as the European Transmission System Operators 
(ETSO),85 the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET),86 the Association of European 
Energy Exchanges (EuroPEX)87 and the Union of the Electricity industry (Eurelectric);88 im-
pact assessments,89 consultancy reports and academic studies, especially those commissioned 
by the Commission;90 progress reports, notably of the formal European regulatory network 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) and the EU regulatory agency 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), particularly those about voluntary 
“regional initiatives”;91 a sector inquiry of the Commission;92 and drafts put forward for public 
consultation, responses received and versions eventually adopted, notably those concerning 
non-binding guidelines of good practice of CEER and ERGEG,93 non-binding framework 
                                                
The most important stakeholder advisory group is arguably the Project Coordination Group, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. See 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Florence_Fora/P
CG. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
85Available at: https://www.entsoe.eu/news-events/former-associations/etso/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed on 11 
July 2016.	  
86Available at: http://www.efet.org/. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
87Available at: http://www.europex.org/. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
88Available at: http://www.eurelectric.org/. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
89Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/cia_2016_en.htm. Accessed on 11 
July 2016.	  
90Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/studies?field_associated_topic_tid=42. Accessed on 11 July 2016. 	  
91For an introduction to the Regional Initiatives, see 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_ACTIVITIES/EER_INITIATIVES; 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Regional_initiatives/Pages/default.aspx and 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Gas/Regional_%20Intiatives/Pages/default.aspx.  For the ERGEG progress 
reports, see: 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_ACTIVITIES/EER_INITIATIVES/Progress_Reports. 
For the ACER progress reports, see 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Regional_initiatives/Pages/Reports.aspx and 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Gas/Regional_%20Intiatives/Pages/Reports.aspx. Accessed on 11 July 2016. 	  
92See, for example: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/2005_inquiry/index_en.html. Accessed on 11 
July 2016.	  
93Available at: http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT. Accessed on 11 July 
2016. 	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guidelines of ACER,94 binding network codes of the formal European Network of Transmis-
sion System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E)95 and for Gas (ENTSO-G)96 and binding 
regulations of the Commission.97 
In order to collect additional information, crosscheck the evidence and address potential gaps 
emerging from the analysis of publicly available regulatory policy documents, the author con-
ducted 18 interviews between April 2016 and July 2016. Table 19 in Appendix provides the 
list of interviewees, describing their name, institution and/or company, position(s) held during 
the period and with regard to the issue under study, nationality, main policy domain of exper-
tise, and mode, place and date of interview. In addition, it also provides a brief profile for each 
interviewee.  
Before beginning his doctoral thesis, the author worked in the Eurelectric trade association in 
Brussels, which represents the European electricity industry. While this professional experi-
ence provided the author with important technical expertise as well as contacts, and even 
though at that time he was not directly involved in any of the subcases selected in the thesis, 
this could represent an additional source of bias. The author could, for example, be excessively 
in favour of European public policymakers and the integration process they promote, or on the 
contrary be too sensitive to interests of the industry it used to represent. Indeed, awareness of 
this risk prompted the author to select a sample of interviewees who is not only particularly 
expert and knowledgeable about the issues analysed, but also representative along a number of 
dimensions, with the aim of mitigating possible biases and taking different viewpoints into 
account. First, the 18 interviewees have 10 different European nationalities, namely, Austrian, 
Belgian, British, Finnish, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Slovenian and Spanish. This 
might be useful in case given regulatory initiatives were supported by some countries while 
opposed by others. Second, the expertise and experience of the interviewees are balanced 
across the power and gas domains: seven of the interviewees are particularly knowledgeable 
                                                
94Available at: http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/Pages/default.aspx; and 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Gas/Framework%20guidelines_and_network%20codes/Pages/default.aspx. 
Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
95Available at: https://www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/network-code-development/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed 
on 11 July 2016.	  
96Available at: http://www.entsog.eu/publications/congestion-management-cmp; and 
http://www.entsog.eu/publications/tariffs. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
97See, in particular, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/consultations; 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/wholesale-market/electricity-network-codes; and 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/wholesale-market/gas-network-codes. Accessed 
on 11 July 2016.	  
40	  
about gas, eight about power, and the rest are similarly knowledgeable about both domains. 
Indeed, the expertise and knowledge of interviewees about the subcases studied was a key 
criterion driving their selection. Third, while most of the interviewees are senior officials and 
representatives (e.g., Director, Chair, President, Head), a few are less senior people (e.g., Of-
ficer, Advisor). The aim here was to have a discussion with both the people responsible for 
providing direction and making decisions as well as those involved in the actual detailed draft-
ing of rules. Fourth, the interviewees proportionately represent both regulatory policymakers 
and regulatees, with 10 and 8 of them belonging to each category, respectively. Furthermore, 
each of these two broad categories of actors represents distinct sub-categories. Within regula-
tory policymakers, interviewees are not only from the Commission but are also from European 
regulatory networks (CEER, ERGEG) and the EU agency (ACER), as well as from the national 
regulatory authorities composing their boards. Within the category of regulatees, some inter-
viewees represent transmission system operators, others embody network users (e.g. producers, 
importers), and still others represent additional types of regulated companies (i.e., traders, 
power exchanges) at both the company and European trade association levels. Once again, the 
logic was to collect information from a number of different viewpoints. 
Ahead of each interview, the author sent a brief note introducing the relevant academic debates; 
identifying the gap, research question and case study; describing the provisional findings of 
each empirical chapter (Chapters 3-6); and presenting the then emerging argument and its 
broader implications. This note is available in Appendix. Most of the interviews were con-
ducted “face-to-face”, in either Brussels, Ljubljana (where the EU agency ACER is based) or 
London, and lasted thirty minutes to two hours, with an average duration of one hour and fifteen 
minutes.98 Interviews were “semi-structured”	  in that after briefly reviewing the written material 
sent in advance, the author mainly asked open-ended questions that were flexibly ordered. Such 
questions mainly aimed at understanding how far the findings that far emerged from the study 
of publicly available evidence corresponded to the interviewees’	   readings of the same pro-
cesses and events. For this reason, questions were asked to the interviewees who had most 
knowledge of the process under study, in order to verify and possibly fill in gaps that were left 
after the analysis of public documents. They included, for example, whether the rulemaking 
                                                
98	  A couple of interviews consisted instead of email exchanges. The reason was the difficulty of meeting the 
interviewees in person and also the considerable knowledge already possessed by the researcher on the specific 
issues under discussion. These exchanges therefore largely aimed at confirming the relevant preliminary find-
ings. Potential disadvantages of this mode of interview, relative to meetings in person, were mitigated by the 
availability of the interviewees to discuss over the telephone in case of need for clarifications, but such need did 
not arise.	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process adopted in the specific subcase under discussion was correctly characterised in the 
provisional findings as experimentalist or hierarchical, and whether the possible accounts for 
those findings corresponded to their understanding. This led to largely respondent-driven dis-
cussions, which in some cases provided insights the researcher was not aware of, and which 
were later corroborated by other interviewees. Furthermore, in some instances interviewees, 
on their own initiative, offered suggestions about additional people who could be interviewed. 
In order to stimulate candid responses, interviewees were offered the possibility of confidenti-



















Chapter Two: Regulating the Internal Energy Market 
This chapter has a twofold objective. First, it demonstrates that in all subcases, both experi-
mentalist and hierarchical architectures were available to the Commission. Hence, the Com-
mission could engage in both experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking. Second, it shows 
that the selected subcases also offer different combinations of the factors crucial to the claims 
made, namely, polyarchy (and hierarchy and its shadow) and uncertainty. Thus, while being 
able to engage in both experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking due to experimentalist 
and hierarchical architectures that developed in parallel and similarly across subcases, the 
Commission could do so under different conditions.  
Analogous hierarchical and experimentalist architectures 
Energy is a vital sector for modern market economies and European market integration.99 Yet 
both gas pipelines and electricity wires, similar to other elements of “network industries”	  such 
as water pipes and train tracks, exhibit strong “natural monopoly”	  features. This can be de-
scribed as a situation in which the market can most cheaply be supplied by a single firm. A 
natural monopolist, left to itself, would likely charge excessive prices; accordingly, there is a 
need for regulation.100 In particular, the functioning of both power and gas markets is strongly 
dependent upon how access to network capacity is managed, as well as how it is priced. That 
is to say, upon how the issue areas of congestion management and tarification are regulated. 
Congestion management is defined as the management of situations in which the demand for 
network capacity exceeds the amount of available network capacity, whereas tarification is the 
regulation of prices for accessing and using network capacity.  
The lack of or access at discriminatory conditions or tariffs to infrastructures such as gas pipes 
and electricity wires can lead to competition problems, notably, the favour of market entry of 
certain regulatees at the expense of others. Thus, regulation to ensure that all market actors 
have non-discriminatory access to these essential facilities is considered crucial to promote a 
“level playing field”	  and to prevent unfair competition, which can in turn lead to higher prices 
                                                
99See, for example, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/oil-gas-and-coal. Accessed on 13 January 2016.	  
100Natural monopoly can be described as a situation in which the market can most cheaply be supplied by a 
single firm. Examples include gas or water pipes, electricity or telecommunications wires, train tracks or a 
postal delivery round. See, for instance, Baldwin, R., Cave, M. and Lodge, M. (2011) Understanding 
Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice. Oxford: OUP, Ch.22.	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for consumers.101 With regard to the European dimension, interconnectors are the “bridges”	  
between national energy systems, and are therefore of critical importance to the single energy 
market.102 However, because interconnection capacity is often scarce and it is not always fea-
sible to accommodate the physical flows resulting from commercial transactions, the function-
ing of European energy markets is strongly dependent on how interconnection capacity is al-
located and how congestion in the cross-border networks is managed.103 Because discrimina-
tory tariffs can lead to distortions of competition, cross-border trade also requires energy to 
flow across countries without undue tariff barriers.104 Since regulation for ensuring access to 
interconnections at non-discriminatory conditions and tariffs is considered a vital precondition 
for establishing a competitive internal energy market, from the 1990s onwards, the Commis-
sion began to extend EU regulation in the power and gas domains, notably in the issue areas of 
congestion management and tarification.  
In the course of regulatory policymaking, in all subcases, the Commission could use both hi-
erarchical and experimentalist architectures. Hence, it could engage in both hierarchical and 
experimentalist policymaking. This thesis distinguishes between these two types of institu-
tional architectures based on key elements of experimentalist architecture as defined by its 
proponents. As seen in the Introduction and Chapter One, “in this decision-making design, 
framework goals (e.g., full employment, social inclusion, good water status, a unified energy 
grid) and measures for gauging their achievement are established by joint action of the Member 
States and EU institutions. Lower-level units, such as national ministries or regulatory author-
ities and the actors with whom they collaborate, are given the freedom to advance these ends 
as they see fit. Subsidiarity in this architecture implies that in writing framework rules, lower-
level units should be given sufficient autonomy to implement the rules and to propose changes 
to them. But in return for this autonomy, they must regularly report on their performance, es-
pecially as measured by the agreed upon indicators, and are required to participate in a peer 
                                                
101See for example Baldwin, R., Cave, M. and Lodge, M. (2011) Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, 
and Practice. Oxford: OUP; and http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.7.2.pdf. Accessed on 2nd 
December 2015. 	  
102European Commission Second report to the Council and the European Parliament on harmonization 
requirements: Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. Brussels, 16 
April 1999, COM(1999) 164 final, p.6.	  
103See for example ACER Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for 
Electricity. Draft for Consultation, DFGC-2011-E-003, 11 April 2011. 	  
104See for example http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-26_en.htm?locale=en. Accessed on 5 December 
2015.	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review in which their results are compared with those pursuing other means to the same general 
ends. Finally, the framework goals, metrics and procedures themselves are periodically revised 
by the actors who initially established them, augmented by new participants whose views have 
come to be seen as indispensable to full and fair deliberation”.105 
Based on these criteria, the thesis categorises the ordinary legislative procedure as a hierar-
chical architecture. This procedure has been available to the Commission in both the power 
and gas domains since the beginning of its liberalisation and re-regulation activities in the late 
1990s. It consists of the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a regu-
lation, directive or decision based on a proposal from the Commission. This is defined in Arti-
cle 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU as the most common EU law-making pro-
cedure, and gives the European Parliament the power to jointly adopt EU laws with the Council 
of the EU.106 The ordinary legislative procedure is commonly known as the “Community 
method”, which is characterised by the sole right of the European Commission to initiate leg-
islation, the co-decision power between the Council and the European Parliament and the use 
of qualified majority voting in Council.107 This procedure does not reflect key elements of ex-
perimentalist architecture, as national ministries or regulatory authorities and regulated com-
panies do not have sufficient autonomy to implement rules and propose changes to them, do 
not have to regularly report on their performance and participate in a peer review and do not 
periodically contribute with new participants to the revision of rules in response to the problems 
and possibilities revealed by the reviews. Thus, this thesis considers the ordinary legislative 
procedure to be a hierarchical architecture. 
Based on the same criteria, this thesis also categorises comitology as a hierarchical architecture. 
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, primary responsibility for implementing EU 
law lies with EU countries. However, where uniform conditions for implementation are 
                                                
105Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 273–4; see also Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. 
(2010) ‘Learning from Difference: the New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In C.F. 
Sabel and J. Zeitlin (Eds.) Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. 
Oxford: OUP, pp.1–28; and C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (2012) ‘Experimentalist Governance’. In D. Levy-Faur 
(Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford: OUP, pp.170–184.	  
106http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/ordinary-legislative-procedure.html. Accessed on 16 September 
2016.	  
107http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/community_intergovernmental_methods.html. Accessed on 16 
September 2016.	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needed, the EU act in question will confer implementing powers on the Commission.108 The 
term “comitology”	  refers to the set of procedures through which the European Commission 
exercises the implementing powers conferred upon it by the EU legislator, with the assistance 
of committees of representatives from EU countries. Such comitology committees are chaired 
by a Commission official and provide an opinion on implementing acts proposed by the Com-
mission.109 Comitology “refers to a set of procedures through which EU countries control how 
the European Commission implements EU law”, comitology committees only	  “include repre-
sentatives from all EU Member States and are chaired by a Commission official”	  and “only the 
Member States have a role to play in controlling how the Commission exercises its implement-
ing powers”. 110 Since these key characteristics of comitology are in contrast with key elements 
of experimentalist architecture, notably, the participation of regulated companies and other 
stakeholders in regular peer reviews and the periodic revisions of rules based on these reviews, 
this thesis considers it a hierarchical architecture.111 
In comitology, the opinions that the committee provide on the Commission’s proposed 
measures can be more or less binding, depending upon the particular procedure specified in the 
legal act being implemented. The choice of procedure for a committee is made by the EU 
legislator, and depends upon the nature of the implementing powers that are laid out in the 
basic regulation, directive or decision.112 The “basic legal act”	  defines the content and scope 
                                                
108http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=implementing.home. Accessed 
on 16 September 2016.	  
109http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/comitology.html. Accessed on 16 September 2016.	  
110http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=FAQ.FAQ; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=implementing.home. Accessed on 
16 September 2016.	  
111The author is aware of the scholarly debate about whether comitology procedures are instruments of control 
or rather deliberative mechanisms. Cfr. For example T. Christiansen and E. Kirchner (Eds.), Committee 
Governance in the European Union (Manchester University Press, 2000); C. Joerges and J. Neyer, 
‘Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving: European Comitology in the Foodstuffs 
Sector’, (1997) 4 European Journal of Public Policy 609; C. Joerges and E. Vos (Eds.), EU Committees: Social 
Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart, 1999); M.P.C.M. van Schendelen (Ed), EU Committees as Influential 
Policymakers (Ashgate, 1998); and Pollack, M.A. (2003) ‘Control Mechanism Or Deliberative Democracy? 
Two Images of Comitology’. Comparative Political Studies, 36 (1–2): 125:155. 
However, the focus in this Chapter is not on the actual operation of comitology but rather on its institutional 
design. In this respect, also experimentalists such as Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin recognize that 
comitology was “originally established by Member States to ensure that the Commission’s elaboration of rules 
respected political compromises”. See Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new 
architecture of experimentalist governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 278.  	  
112http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/comitology.html. Accessed on 16 September 2016.	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of the implementing powers and determines the type of comitology procedure to be applied in 
each case.113 
This hierarchical architecture has, nonetheless, been available to the Commission very simi-
larly across all subcases, because it was introduced almost identically across the power and gas 
domains as well as across the issue areas of congestion management and tarification. In the 
power domain, the first regulation on cross-border exchanges adopted in 2003 laid down basic 
principles that allowed for the adoption of guidelines detailing further relevant principles and 
methodologies, specifically in the issue areas of tarification and congestion management.114 
For that purpose, in some cases it empowered the Electricity Cross-Border Committee to con-
trol the Commission through the “regulatory procedure”, in which the Commission’s proposal 
had to be approved by a “qualified majority”	  of the Committee; if it was not approved, the 
matter was submitted to the Council of Ministers, which decided based on the qualified major-
ity. In other cases, the Commission acted on the basis of the “advisory procedure”, where the 
opinion of the Committee was merely advisory.115 In 2009, the first regulation was repealed by 
a second one, which changed the comitology procedure from regulatory or advisory to “regu-
latory with scrutiny”, where in addition to the Council, the European Parliament is included as 
a ‘full co-controller’	  which, acting by majority of its component members, can oppose the rules 
made by the Commission.116 Analogous to the power domain, the first regulation on conditions 
for accessing cross-border networks, which was adopted in 2005 in the gas domain, laid down 
principles and allowed for the adoption of guidelines specifying additional details in the issue 
areas of tarification and congestion management.117 To that end, and similar to the power do-
main, it was mandated that the Gas Committee operate under the regulatory procedure.118 
                                                
113http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=FAQ.FAQ. Accessed on 16 September 2016. 
114Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Recital (8).	  
115Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Art. 13.	  
116Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003. 
Art. 23.	  
117Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. Art.9(1) (a) and (b).	  
118Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. Art. 14.	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Thereafter, exactly as in the power domain, a second regulation that was adopted in 2009 re-
pealed the first one and changed the comitology procedure from regulatory to regulatory with 
scrutiny.119  
In addition to hierarchical architectures, in its regulatory policymaking, the Commission could 
also use experimentalist architectures, which developed in parallel. Furthermore, these exper-
imentalist architectures became institutionalised analogously across the power and gas do-
mains, as well as across the issue areas of tarification and congestion management. A signifi-
cant example is the Florence Forum for Electricity Regulation, also known as the Florence 
Forum, which was not derived from directives or other legal instruments, but instead, was or-
ganised by the Commission immediately after the first round of liberalisation legislation. Since 
1998, its key task has been to provide a “neutral and informal framework for discussion of 
issues and exchange of experiences concerning the implementation of EU legislation and the 
creation of the internal electricity market”. Twice a year, it brings together the Commission, 
European regulatory networks and EU agencies, Member State governments and national reg-
ulatory authorities, transmission network operators, electricity traders, consumers, network us-
ers, power exchanges and other stakeholders such as outside commercial and academic ex-
perts.120 In 1999, one year after the Florence Forum was established, the Commission also or-
ganised the Madrid Forum for Gas Regulation. The tasks, working arrangements and compo-
sition of the Madrid Forum mirror those of the Florence Forum. The Madrid Forum was estab-
lished for the discussion of issues regarding the creation of the internal gas market, and has 
been meeting twice a year since its inception. Its participants include the Commission, national 
regulatory authorities and governments, transmission system operators, gas suppliers and trad-
ers, consumers, network users and gas exchanges.121 Since their establishment, both the Flor-
ence and the Madrid Fora have particularly focused on the tarification of cross-border ex-
changes and the management of scarce interconnection capacity.122  
This thesis considers the Florence and Madrid Fora to be experimentalist architectures, because 
they reflect key elements of experimentalist architecture. In particular, these architectures are 
                                                
119Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions 
for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. Art.28.	  
120https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/meeting-european-electricity-regulatory-forum-florence. Accessed on 
16 March 2016.	  
121https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/madrid-forum. Accessed on 16 March 2016	  
122Cfr. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/meeting-european-electricity-regulatory-forum-florence; 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/madrid-forum. Accessed on 16 March 2016	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designed so that national ministries or regulatory authorities and regulated companies are given 
sufficient freedom to implement rules and to propose changes to them, to regularly report on 
their performance, to participate in peer reviews in which their results are compared to those 
of others, and together with other stakeholders such as academics, to periodically contribute to 
the revision of rules in response to the problems and possibilities revealed by the reviews. 
This thesis categorises as an additional experimentalist architecture the procedure for develop-
ing network codes. This procedure was introduced in 2009 by a “third legislative package”	  in 
both the power and gas domains, to develop detailed EU-wide rules that are binding on all 
cross-border networks in a number of issue areas, including tarification and congestion man-
agement.123 This architecture has been identically available to the Commission across domains 
and issue areas.  
The procedure for adopting network codes is as follows. The Commission begins by drafting 
an “annual priority list”	  of areas to be included in the development of network codes for elec-
tricity and gas in consultation with the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) and the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (EN-
TSO-E) and Gas (ENTSO-G). Once the annual priority list is established, the ACER develops 
“framework guidelines”	  that set principles for developing specific network codes. These frame-
work guidelines are used by the ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G to prepare a network code, which is 
submitted back to the ACER for its opinion. If the ACER deems that the code fulfils its frame-
work guidelines and the internal market objectives of the EU, it recommends that the Commis-
sion adopt the code. The Commission studies the code and then sends it to the Electricity Cross-
Border Committee and Gas Committee, comprising specialists from national energy ministries, 
for an opinion. Once the Committee accepts the draft network code, it is adopted via the 
comitology procedure with approval of the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, 
after which it becomes a legally binding regulation.124 
                                                
123Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003. 
Art.8(6); Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. 
Art.8(6).	  
124http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/wholesale-market/electricity-network-codes; 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/wholesale-market/gas-network-codes. Accessed on 
16 September 2016.	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This thesis considers this procedure to be an experimentalist architecture, because as afore-
mentioned, the drafting of network codes involves the Commission, the ACER and the EN-
TSO-E and ENTSO-G. Furthermore, because both the ACER and the ENTSO-E and ENTSO-
G are under strict consultation and transparency obligations in the delivery of their tasks with 
regard to framework guidelines and network codes, this procedure also closely involves other 
stakeholders.125 Finally, the network codes procedure is designed so that all of these actors will 
also regularly report on their performance and periodically contribute to the revision of rules 
in response to the problems and possibilities revealed. In the power domain, “European Stake-
holder Committees”	  were established to inform and consult stakeholders about the require-
ments in the network codes during the implementation period. To this end, “the ACER and 
ENTSO-E shall co-organise regular meetings to identify problems and propose improvements 
to the network codes”.126 Similarly, in the gas domain, the “Joint Functionality Process”, co-
managed by the ENTSO-G and the ACER and supported by the Commission, aimed towards 
reaching commonly recommended solutions on implementation and operational issues with the 
existing gas network codes. It “will provide stakeholders a possibility to raise and discuss is-
sues as well as an opportunity to be involved in developing solutions”. A platform “makes it 
possible for stakeholders to raise implementation and operation issues […] and gives an over-
view of all reported issues and their status. After an issue has been reported, the ACER and 
ENTSO-G will jointly validate, categorise and prioritise the raised issues and elaborate upon 
solutions, taking into account stakeholders’	  ideas”.127 
Thus, this section distinguished between experimentalist and hierarchical architectures based 
on the key elements of experimentalist architecture as defined by its proponents. It showed 
that, in the course of regulatory policymaking, the Commission could use both experimentalist 
and hierarchical architectures, which developed in parallel. Furthermore, it demonstrated that 
these architectures are very similar if not identical across domains and issue areas, thereby 
                                                
125http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/Pages/default.aspx; 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed on 16 
September 2016.	  
126http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/Pages/European-Stakeholder-
Committees.aspx. Accessed on 16 September 2016.	  
127http://www.entsog.eu/publications/joint-functionality-process#1-FIRST-FUNCTIONALITY-CYCLE-
FROM-2014. Accessed on 16 September 2016.	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demonstrating that in all of the selected subcases, the Commission could engage in both exper-
imentalist and hierarchical policymaking. Figure 1 shows the hierarchical and experimentalist 
architectures available to the Commission in both domains and issue areas.  
Figure 1. Hierarchical and experimentalist architectures available to the Commission in 
both domains and issue areas 
 
Different polyarchy (and shadow of hierarchy) and uncertainty  
Even though the Commission could engage in both experimentalist and hierarchical policy-
making due to experimentalist and hierarchical architectures that developed in parallel and very 
similarly across subcases, it could do so under different conditions. This is because the selected 
subcases feature different combinations of polyarchy (and hierarchy and its shadow) and un-
certainty.  
One such combination occurred from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, during which time, in 
all issue areas and domains, the Commission’s regulatory policymaking took place under con-
ditions of a more polyarchic distribution of power (and weaker shadow of hierarchy) and higher 
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weaker because traditionally, vertical delegation of powers from Member States to the supra-
national level was very modest.128 The formal rulemaking powers of the Commission were 
initially limited to its ability of proposing legislation. In the ordinary legislative procedure, the 
Commission had exclusive rights to propose legislation, but its proposals had to be adopted by 
both the European Parliament and the Council.129  
Uncertainty was higher because, at the very beginning of the liberalisation and re-regulation of 
European energy markets, the Commission did not have precise preferences about how to reg-
ulate congestion management and tarification to achieve the broad goal of non-discriminatory 
network access, neither in power nor in gas. Since very few jurisdictions had experimented 
with liberalisation, with Britain providing the only example of full-scale energy liberalisation 
in Europe, the liberalisation of national electricity and gas markets was a very new policy area 
with little experience to draw from.130 Furthermore, historically, European energy networks 
were not designed for the purpose of cross-border trade and the existing regulatory frameworks 
did not cover commercial exchanges across liberalised markets. Thus, the integration of na-
tional electricity and gas systems into a common market was entirely virgin territory, which 
raised a host of poorly understood technical issues.131 One such issue was how to manage sit-
uations in which the capacity of interconnection among national systems, which was histori-
cally limited, could not accommodate the requests for trade, which were growing as a result of 
gradual market liberalisation and integration. Another novel issue that arose from cross-border 
trade was how to compensate “transit”	  countries for the extra costs they incurred due to the 
external cross-border transactions they had to host. Chapters Three and Four will detail how 
primary sources, such as regulatory policy documents and interviews as well as secondary 
                                                
128Matlary, J. H. (1997) Energy Policy in the European Union. New York: St Martin’s Press; Padgett, S. (1992) 
The Single European Energy Market: The Politics of Realization’. Journal of Commons Market Studies, 30, 1, 
53-75.	  
129See for example http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq#q6. Accessed on 21 March 
2016.	  
130Eberlein, B. (2008) The Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance and 
Government. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 77; Eberlein, B. (2010) ‘Experimentalist Governance in the 
European Energy Sector’. In C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (Eds.) Experimentalist governance in the European 
Union: towards a new architecture. Oxford: OUP, p. 65; see also Eberlein, B. (2003) ‘Regulating cross-border 
trade by soft law? The Florence Process in the supranational governance of electricity markets’. Journal of 
Network Industries, 4(2): 137–55.	  
131Eberlein, B. (2008) The Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance and 
Government. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 77; Eberlein, B. (2010) ‘Experimentalist Governance in the 
European Energy Sector’. In C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (Eds.) Experimentalist governance in the European 
Union: towards a new architecture. Oxford: OUP, p. 65; see also Eberlein, B. (2003) ‘Regulating cross-border 
trade by soft law? The Florence Process in the supranational governance of electricity markets’. Journal of 
Network Industries, 4(2): 137–55.	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sources, suggest that initially, the Commission had general rather than specific preferences on 
how to address these issues, and as such, originally found itself in conditions of higher uncer-
tainty in all subcases.  
The same chapters, nonetheless, will also show that in a few years the Commission developed 
much more specific policy preferences with regard to the regulation of both congestion man-
agement and tarification, in power as well as in gas. This is evidenced, inter alia, by guidelines 
containing very specific provisions that the Commission voluntarily agreed upon in the early 
2000s, in all issue areas and domains.132 Thus, by the early 2000s, the Commission witnessed 
a relative decline in uncertainty across all subcases.    
In contrast, in the early 2000s, the distribution of power continued to be more polyarchic and 
the shadow of hierarchy was weaker, because the Commission’s formal rulemaking powers 
were still limited to the ordinary legislative procedure. Thus, in the early 2000s, a second com-
bination of conditions saw, in all issue areas and domains, the Commission’s regulatory poli-
cymaking taking place under a consistently more polyarchic distribution of power and weaker 
shadow of hierarchy, but also under lower uncertainty. 
As seen in the previous section, the Commission’s formal rulemaking powers were increased 
in the mid-2000s, specifically in 2003 in the power domain and 2005 in the gas domain. The 
Commission was empowered to adopt “implementing acts”	  subject to the approval of “comitol-
ogy”	  committees confined to Member State representatives, specifically in the issue areas of 
congestion management and tarification.133 Similarly across domains and issue areas, the Com-
mission became able to adopt detailed implementing measures, understood as “non-legislative 
acts of general application that supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a legis-
lative act”, by directly dealing with committees made up of specialists from national ministries 
                                                
132Cfr. Conclusions Sixth Meeting of the European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, 9/10 November 
2000, Guidelines on congestion management, pp.4–8; Conclusions of the 7th meeting of the European Gas 
Regulatory Forum Madrid, 24–25 September 2003. ANNEX 1 The Guidelines for Good TPA Practice - revised 
version, Art.8.1-8.2; Towards EU cross-border electricity trade: regulatory remarks and guidelines on tariffs and 
congestion (text as amended after the first Florence Working Group of 8 December 1999); Conclusions Eight 
Meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum. Florence, 21–22 February 2002, p.1; Conclusions Tenth 
Meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum. Rome, 8–9 July 2003, p.4; Conclusions of the 5th 
meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum. Madrid, 7–8 February 2002; Conclusions of the 6th Gas 
Regulatory Forum. 30/31 October 2002.	  
133Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Art. 13; Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on conditions for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks. Art. 14.	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rather than having to go through the entire legislative procedure.134 Certainly, this thesis does 
not argue that this led to a complete shift from polyarchy to hierarchy. It merely emphasises 
that the Commission’s formal rulemaking powers, initially limited to the ordinary legislative 
procedure, were increased through the comitology procedure. On this basis, it considers that 
since the mid-2000s, the distribution of power became less polyarchic and the shadow of hier-
archy became stronger in a similar manner across domains and issue areas. Table 4 shows how 
polyarchy (and the shadow of hierarchy) changed over time in all domains and issue areas. 
Table 4. Polyarchy (and shadow of hierarchy) in the subcases  
Polyarchy (and shadow of hierarchy)	  
More polyarchy (weaker shadow)	   Less polyarchy (stronger shadow)	  
All domains and issue areas from the late 
1990s to the early 2000s	  
All domains and issue areas from the mid-
2000s to the present day	  
 
Although since the mid-2000s, the distribution of power became less polyarchic and the 
shadow of hierarchy became stronger in a similar manner across issue areas and domains, dif-
ferences in uncertainty also emerged. Table 5 shows the uncertainty in all subcases. Chapter 
Five will detail how both regulatory policy documents and interviews indicate that in the power 
domain, the Commission was confronted with new policy questions for which it did not have 
straightforward preferences in the issue of congestion management. Thus, this thesis considers 
that the Commission found itself in conditions of higher uncertainty. Chapter Five will also 
show how the same type of primary sources indicate that, in contrast, the Commission had a 
precise idea of how to develop reforms in the gas domain, based upon the specific policy pref-
erences it had developed in the early 2000s and which it maintained throughout the decade. 
Therefore, this thesis considers that in the issue area of congestion management, from the mid-
2000s to the present day, uncertainty was higher in power than in gas. 
                                                
1341999/468/EC: Council Decision of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission; and 2006/512/EC: Council Decision of 17 July 2006 
amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission.	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Chapter Six will use regulatory policy documents and interviews to document that, with regard 
to tarification regulation in the power domain, the Commission maintained specific policy pref-
erences throughout the 2000s, namely, those it had developed at the beginning of the decade. 
It will also show that, in contrast, with regard to the gas domain, interviews suggest that the 
Commission knew that “something had to be done”	  but did not know exactly what, and that in 
regulatory policy documents, there is no trace of the Commission’s preferences for specific 
policies until the early 2010s. Thus, for tarification regulation from the mid-2000s to the pre-
sent day, this thesis assesses uncertainty as higher in gas than in power. 
Table 5. Uncertainty in the subcases 
Uncertainty	  
Higher 	   Lower	  
All domains and issue areas from the late 
1990s to the early 2000s	  
All domains and issue areas during the early 
2000s	  
Congestion management in power and 
tarification in gas from the mid-2000s to the 
present day	  
Congestion management in gas and tarification 
in power from the mid-2000s to the present day	  
 
Thus, a third combination of conditions is offered by the regulation, from the mid-2000s to the 
present day, of congestion management in the power domain and of tarification in the gas do-
main. These represent subcases of policymaking under conditions of less polyarchic distribu-
tions of power (and stronger shadow of hierarchy) and higher uncertainty. A fourth and final 
combination is offered by the regulation, during the same period, of congestion management 
in the gas domain and of tarification in the power domain. These constitute subcases of the 
Commission’s policymaking under conditions of less polyarchic distributions of power (and 
stronger shadow of hierarchy) and lower uncertainty.  
Chapter Three begins the empirical analysis of policymaking, by analysing the Commission’s 
regulation of congestion management across the gas and power domains from the late 1990s 
to the early 2000s, and offers two distinct combinations of conditions. From the late 1990s to 
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the early 2000s, the Commission found itself facing conditions of higher uncertainty and more 
polyarchic distributions of powers (and weaker shadow of hierarchy). During the early 2000s, 
the Commission continued to find itself in conditions of more polyarchic distribution of powers 
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Chapter Three: Interchanging Experimentalist with Hier-
archical Policymaking in Both Power and Gas Domains to 
Regulate Congestion Management 
Introduction 
This chapter begins the empirical analysis of policymaking, by comparing the regulation of 
congestion management across power and gas domains from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. 
Energy markets were historically managed on a national basis by state-owned, vertically inte-
grated monopolists, who undertook all aspects of production of the service in question.135 In 
that context, the rules governing access to networks were drawn up nationally.136 In the late 
1990s, there was virtually no European regulation governing how Europe’s cross-border elec-
tricity transmission networks and gas pipelines operated. There was a “European patchwork of 
asymmetric national rules”.137 Incumbent companies, often in alliance with national govern-
ments, typically controlled underdeveloped interconnectors and were able to distort competi-
tion,138 but by the early 2000s, the situation had fundamentally changed and an initial set of 
common rules were adopted in both the power and gas domains. By mandating that scarce 
interconnection capacity be managed through market-based approaches, and specifically auc-
tions in electricity139 and “use-it-or-lose-it” provisions and secondary markets in gas140, these 
rules marked a clear turning point from previous arrangements that limited competition and 
cross-border trade. 
                                                
135Baldwin, R., Cave, M. and Lodge, M. (2011) Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice. 
Oxford: OUP.	  
136See for example https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/wholesale-market/electricity-network-codes. Accessed 
on 2nd December 2015.	  
137Hancher, L. (1997) ‘	  Slow and Not So Sure: Europe’s Long March to Electricity Market Liberalization’. 
Electricity Journal, November, 92–101; Hancher, L. (1998) ‘Delimitation of Energy Law Jurisdiction. The EU 
and Its Member States: From Organisational to Regulatory Conflicts’. Journal of Energy and Natural Resources 
Law, 42, 42–67; Haase, N. (2008) ‘European gas market liberalisation: Are regulatory regimes moving towards 
convergence?’. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG24.	  
138Eberlein, B. (2010) ‘Experimentalist Governance in the European Energy Sector’. In C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin 
(Eds.) Experimentalist governance in the European Union: towards a new architecture. Oxford: OUP, p. 62.	  
139Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Art. 6.1 and Annex Guidelines.	  
140Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. Art.5.3(a) and Annex Guidelines.	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Throughout the phase analysed, in both the power and gas domains, the Commission could use 
the hierarchical architecture represented by the ordinary legislative procedure. At the same 
time, in the course of its regulatory policymaking, the Commission could also employ experi-
mentalist architectures, which developed in parallel to hierarchical architectures analogously 
across gas and power. Significant examples are the Florence Forum for Electricity Regulation 
and the Madrid Forum for Gas Regulation, which were organised by the Commission in 1998 
and 1999, respectively, to provide a “neutral and informal framework for the discussion of 
issues and exchange of experiences concerning the implementation of EU legislation and the 
creation of the internal market”. Both have had analogous compositions and working arrange-
ments, and since their establishment, have particularly focused on the issue area of congestion 
management (and tarification).141  
This chapter’s central finding is that, in both the power and gas domains, the Commission 
interchanged experimentalist with hierarchical policymaking, with important reforms first be-
ing agreed upon through the former and then being formalised and given binding power 
through the latter. At the very beginning of the market liberalisation and integration processes, 
the Commission employed experimentalist architectures, notably, the Florence and Madrid 
Fora, to stimulate the comparison of distinct approaches that were adopted by Member States 
and regulated companies, and to facilitate the development of agreements on reforms on this 
basis with high stakeholder participation. Thereafter, it favoured hierarchical policymaking. It 
monitored compliance with uniform solutions, and through the hierarchical architecture of the 
ordinary legislative procedure, developed reforms without conducting comparisons of different 
approaches and with low stakeholder participation, to make uniform solutions binding for all 
Member States and regulated companies. 
From the shadow of hierarchy perspective, it is surprising that the Commission engaged in 
experimentalist policymaking. The shadow of hierarchy it could cast on conflicting parties was 
weaker, because its formal rulemaking powers were limited to the ordinary legislative proce-
dure. The polyarchy-based viewpoint provides a consistent explanation, namely, that the Com-
mission engaged in experimentalist policymaking precisely because its course of action was 
constrained by its limited formal rulemaking powers, that is to say, because of the more poly-
archic distribution of powers. However, this view does not explain why, at some point, the 
                                                
141https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/meeting-european-electricity-regulatory-forum-florence; 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/madrid-forum. Accessed on 16 March 2016	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Commission shifted from experimentalist to hierarchical policymaking in both domains, de-
spite the fact that the distribution of power had remained more polyarchic. Since the first two 
arguments are only somewhat consistent with the patterns of policymaking found, this chapter 
develops an alternative, plausible explanation of why the Commission interchanged experi-
mentalist with hierarchical policymaking. The argument is that, at the very beginning of the 
market liberalisation and integration processes, the Commission engaged in experimentalist 
policymaking because it only had general policy preferences on how to regulate congestion 
management, and hence, uncertainty was higher. However, due to the emergence of agreements 
on reforms, the Commission developed much more specific policy preferences, and under these 
conditions of lower uncertainty, favoured hierarchical policymaking instead. 
This chapter first identifies the types of policymaking that the Commission engaged in, to show 
that it substituted experimentalist with hierarchical policymaking, and that it did so very simi-
larly across the power and gas domains. Then it assesses the findings against the claims devel-
oped. It highlights the inconsistencies of the polyarchy and shadow of hierarchy arguments in 
light of the identified patterns of policymaking and develops a plausible alternative argument 
based on uncertainty. 
Interchanging experimentalist with hierarchical policymaking in 
the power domain 
Observing initial experimentalist policymaking  
During the period from the late 1990s through the early 2000s, the Commission initially en-
gaged in experimentalist policymaking to regulate congestion management in the power do-
main. The indicators used to make this argument and the corresponding evidence are shown in 
Table 6. Member States and regulated companies were granted discretion to adopt different 
approaches. Due to employment of the experimentalist architecture of the Florence Forum, 
their different approaches were compared, and agreements on reforms were developed on the 
basis of these comparisons with high stakeholder participation. By providing for the use of 
market-based auctions, these reforms broke away from previously dominant administered sys-
tems of rationing scarce resources on a first-come, first-served basis and pro-rata, which limited 
entry and competition and greatly favoured incumbent generators and suppliers by allowing 
them to influence the conduct of their affiliated transmission system operators. More generally, 
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they established a common system for allocating cross-border capacity for commercial ex-
changes, which had not previously existed.   
Table 6. Initial experimentalist policymaking to regulate congestion management in the 
power domain from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
Indicator 	   Evidence 	  
Member States and/or 
regulated companies are 
granted discretion to adopt 
different approaches  
Directive 96/92/EC allows Member States and regulated 
companies to pursue different approaches to regulate network 
access, particularly congestion management (e.g., pro-rata, 
first-come, first-served, market-based auctions)   
Different approaches are 
compared 
Examples of the most experienced markets are provided in 
terms of liberalisation and integration (e.g., UK, Nordic, 
Spain), pro-rata rationing (e.g., Italy), and first-come, first-
served (e.g., France) compared to auctions (e.g., Spain)  
Agreements on reforms are 
developed based on 
comparisons  
Agreement in 1999 on market-based approach explicitly 
refers to auctions at the French–Spanish border, followed by 
guidelines on congestion management that was agreed upon 
in 2000 suggesting market-based auctions 
Agreement on reforms are 
developed with high 
stakeholder participation 
Agreements are developed within the Florence Forum, whose 
participation was broadened to include industry after the first 
meeting	  
 
The first indicator that the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking is that Mem-
ber States and regulated companies were granted discretion to pursue different approaches to 
regulate congestion management. From the 1990s onwards, the Commission began to extend 
EU regulation, notably, through a series of liberalising and re-regulatory directives. After the 
first set of legislation on price transparency and energy transits in the early 1990s and over five 
years of negotiations in the Council, the resulting legislation accepted the general principle of 
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market opening and the need for common rules in a European market. But as a political com-
promise, it was weak in terms of providing a coherent set of EU-level rules. The first 1996 
Electricity Directive only prescribed limited market opening and granted Member States a large 
margin of discretion regarding key regulatory issues, including the regime of access to the 
natural monopoly of transmission wires.142 Furthermore, it failed to establish common rules 
for the interconnection of national grid systems and for more general cross-border trade.143 
Right after this first round of legislation, the Commission created an experimentalist architec-
ture. Specifically, in 1998, it devised the Florence Forum for Electricity. This forum was not 
part of the Directive or more generally of the EU legal system, instead, its creation was the 
Commission’s initiative. As seen in Chapter Two, this is an experimentalist architecture, as it 
reflects key elements of experimentalist architecture as defined by its proponents. Its objective 
was to biannually provide a neutral and informal EU-level framework for the discussion of 
issues and exchange of experiences concerning the implementation of the 1996 Electricity Di-
rective.144   
The second indicator is that the Commission used the Florence Forum, which is characterised 
by high stakeholder participation. It is chaired by the Commission and brings together national 
regulatory authorities and Member States, representatives of various types of industry compa-
nies and consumers and experts and participants from outside of the EU.145 At its first meeting, 
the Commission explained that the Forum allowed for broader participation including repre-
sentatives from industry, consumers and commercial experts as well as participants from out-
side the EU. 146 Indeed, participants immediately suggested that participation be broadened, 
                                                
 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity; for analyses, see for instance Eberlein, B. (2008) The Making of the 
European Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance and Government. Journal of Public Policy, 28, pp 73–
92. 
142Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity; for analyses, see for instance Eberlein, B. (2008) The 
Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance and Government. Journal of Public 
Policy, 28, pp 73–92; Eberlein, B. (2010) ‘Experimentalist Governance in the Energy Sector’. In Sabel, C.F. and 
Zeitlin, J. (Eds.) Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: 
OUP.	  
143Eberlein, B. (2010) ‘Experimentalist Governance in the Energy Sector’. In Sabel, C.F. and Zeitlin, J. (Eds.) 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP.	  
144https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/meeting-european-electricity-regulatory-forum-florence. Accessed on 
19 September 2016.	  
145https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/meeting-european-electricity-regulatory-forum-florence. Accessed on 
19 September 2016.	  
146The European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, February 5th and 6th, 1998. Minutes, p.1.	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particularly from industry. Jonathan Green, Head of the Electricity Directorate at the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry of the United Kingdom (UK), noted that “there was perhaps a little 
too much consensus among participants and that this was a sign that participation should be 
broadened”.147 Participants subsequently considered that the broader participation in the Fo-
rum, with regard to specific topics, was extremely helpful as it allowed rich discussions and 
identification of the main issues.148 
The third indicator that the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking is that from 
its very first meetings, the Florence Forum was employed to compare different approaches 
carried out by Member States and regulated companies. In the opening address, Pablo Be-
navides, Director General for Energy of the Commission, explained that, “the ‘cross-fertilisa-
tion’ of experience between the Member States is extremely useful and important”.149 Jonathan 
Green, who spoke on behalf of the UK Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers, pointed out 
that while “particular national solutions cannot be taken as straight ‘blueprints’ for other Mem-
ber States [and] the situation and structure of the electricity market vary widely across the EU 
[…], mistakes may be made which should be recognised and learned from”. In particular, he 
argued that, “the UK has much to offer in terms of practical experience, but should certainly 
not be regarded as ‘the solution’ for other Member States”.150 Professor Sergio Garribba, Com-
missioner at the Italian regulatory authority, proposed that, “there should be more time left for 
discussion and questions since such interactions were the most particular and valuable element 
of this type of informal forum”.151 Participants agreed on the advantages of leaving more time 
for open and informal discussion.152  
British, Nordic and Spanish representatives brought information about the most experienced 
markets, in terms of national liberalisation and integration of distinct markets. Roger Urwin, 
of the British transmission network operator National Grid, gave an overview of developments 
in the UK since the power industry was restructured in 1990.153 Jan Magnusson, of the Swedish 
                                                
147The European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, February 5th and 6th, 1998. Minutes, p.19.	  
1482nd Forum of European Electricity Regulation. Florence, October 8th and 9th, 1998, p.8.	  
149The European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, February 5th and 6th, 1998. Minutes, p.2.	  
150The European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, February 5th and 6th, 1998, p.3.	  
151The European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, February 5th and 6th, 1998. Minutes, p.20.	  
152The European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, February 5th and 6th, 1998. Minutes, p.1.	  
153The European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, February 5th and 6th, 1998, p.3.  
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transmission network operator Svenska Kraftnat, emphasised what he presented as “key fac-
tors” for the successful regulatory reform of national electricity markets, based on key exam-
ples from Norway and England/Wales markets. He also stressed the main elements of the 
“Nord Pool”, a pioneering joint trading exchange between Norway and Sweden that opened all 
networks to access by third parties as of 1996.154 Maria Luisa Huidobro y Areba, of the Spanish 
wholesale market operator, gave an overview of the Spanish liberalisation experience begin-
ning in 1997, including how her company matched up bids from the demand and production 
sides of the market, which at that time, was a ground-breaking electricity pool.155  
The comparison of different approaches with congestion management was also enriched by 
participants from outside the EU. David Smol, of ILEX Energy Consulting, presented the New 
Zealand case and argued that one of the main lessons to be learned from it was that “there are 
two key steps to reform: separation of transmission from generation and supply, and establish-
ment of open and transparent wholesale trading arrangements”.156 James Barker, of the US law 
firm Barker, Dunn and Rossi, drew upon examples from California, Alberta, the New England 
Power Pool (NEPOOL), the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland Power Pool (PJM), New 
York, Canada, England and Wales, New Zealand and Australia. He suggested that, “while reg-
ulatory reform in the EU should seek to avoid the pitfalls and disadvantages of the US regula-
tory framework, it should also recognise the critical factors underpinning the successful aspects 
and advantages of the US model”.157  
Fourth and finally, based on these comparisons, agreements on reforms were developed. With 
a view to the increasing convergence of the positions already recognised during the presenta-
tions and open discussions, the Commission, in close cooperation with the German Presidency 
of the EU Council and Dr Jorge Vasconcelos, Chairman of the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and of the Portuguese regulatory authority, summarised that “rules and 
mechanisms regarding cross-border congestion management be based on the principles of cost-
reflectiveness, transparency and non-discrimination”.158 As suggested by Peter Styles, Chair-
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man of the Electricity Committee of the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET), ex-
perts, and particularly economists, pointed to the superiority of auctions compared to the pre-
viously dominant methods against these criteria.159 Professor Ignacio Perez-Arriaga, Commis-
sioner at the Spanish regulatory authority and one of the main experts on auctions in the late 
1990s, “highlighted the advantages of an auctioning system in order to deal with congestion at 
system bottlenecks”.160 The use of auctions for allocating scarce interconnection capacity con-
trasted with the “administered” methods that were dominant at that time. These were notably 
“pro-rata” rationing, used in Italy for example, in which all of the requested transactions were 
carried out but in which each transaction quantity was cut by the same percentage; and “first-
come, first-served” approaches, employed in France for instance, in which requests were ac-
cepted until the capacity limit was reached.161  
After almost two years of discussions and comparisons of different approaches adopted by 
Member States and regulated companies, at the Florence Forum meeting of November 1999, 
participants agreed that “congestion management should be based on market solutions that give 
proper and justified incentives to both market parties and transmission system operators to act 
in a rational and economic way. Where appropriate, the development of suitable market organ-
isation structures should be encouraged. In this light, the draft agreement towards a transparent 
auctioning-based allocation mechanism at the French–Spanish interconnector was noted”.162 
They also agreed that the Commission, based on work done in collaboration with regulatory 
authorities, Member States, the association of European transmission system operators (ETSO) 
and all other appropriate market actors, would outline proposals for the most appropriate reg-
ulatory approaches towards the allocation of interconnection capacity in the EU for discussion 
at the following meeting.163 At the 6th meeting of the Florence Forum in November 2000, the 
Commission, Member States, national regulatory authorities, transmission system operators as 
well as producers, consumers, traders, power exchanges and other market actors voluntarily 
agreed on Guidelines on congestion management.164 The Guidelines had 33 paragraphs, with 
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some containing several items. With regard to preferred methods for congestion management, 
the Guidelines stated that network congestion problems be addressed with market-based solu-
tions, particularly auction systems, and be designed in such a way that all available transport 
capacity be offered to the market. It also allowed bidders to participate in the sessions of any 
organised market (i.e., power exchange or pool) of the countries involved. 
In the late 1990s, the transition from administered methods to auctions was far from obvious, 
suggests Peter Styles.165 Dr Juan Jose Alba Rios, Chairman of the Markets Committee of the 
Union of the European electricity industry (Eurelectric) and Vice President of Regulatory Af-
fairs at Endesa, considers that the adoption of auctions and the creation of wholesale markets 
was crucial to favouring market entry from domestic and foreign new entrants, but that at that 
time, this was not at all evident.166 This important regulatory outcome resulted from the Com-
mission’s engagement in experimentalist policymaking. Member States and regulated compa-
nies were granted discretion to adopt different approaches. By using the experimentalist archi-
tecture of the Florence Forum, their different approaches were compared, and agreements on 
reforms were developed on the basis of these comparisons with high stakeholder participation.  
Observing a subsequent shift to hierarchical policymaking  
Shortly after the development of these agreements on reforms the Commission switched to 
hierarchical policymaking. The indicators and evidence used to make this claim are shown in 
Table 7. By turning to hierarchical architectures, namely, the ordinary legislative procedure, 
the Commission reduced stakeholder participation. It monitored compliance with uniform so-
lutions and codified reforms without conducting comparisons of different approaches, to make 
uniform solutions binding for all Member States and regulated companies. The resulting regu-
lation is important because it provided the first set of common rules for cross-border trade in 
electricity. At its core, it mandated that scarce interconnection capacity be managed through 
auctions, on the grounds that these are non-discriminatory, market-based solutions. This 
marked a clear turning point from previous arrangements such as pro-rata and first-come, first-
served principles, which limited competition and cross-border trade. 
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Right after the elaboration of agreements on reforms, the Commission reduced stakeholder 
participation by employing the ordinary legislative procedure, even though the experimentalist 
architecture of the Florence Forum was still available. As seen in Chapter Two, the ordinary 
legislative procedure is a hierarchical architecture because it does not reflect key elements of 
experimentalist architecture as defined by its advocates. In particular, since it consists of the 
joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision 
on a proposal from the Commission, it does not allow for stakeholder participation. Instead, 
participation is limited to Member States and the Commission.167 In March 2001, just a few 
months after development of the Guidelines on congestion management in November 2000, 
the Commission used the ordinary legislative procedure to propose a regulation to the European 
Parliament and the Council on conditions for accessing the network for cross-border exchanges 
in electricity.168 
Table 7. Subsequent hierarchical policymaking to regulate congestion management in 
the power domain from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
Indicator	   Evidence 	  
Member States and regulated 
companies are obligated to adopt 
uniform solutions 
Regulation 1228/2003 makes market-based auctions 
binding	  
Compliance with uniform solutions 
is monitored 
Compliance with the Guidelines agreed upon in 2000 is 
monitored	  
Reforms are not developed on the 
basis of comparisons 
Regulation 1228/2003 is not based on comparisons 	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Agreement on reforms is developed 
with low stakeholder participation 
Regulation 1228/2003 is adopted through the ordinary 
legislative procedure, in which participation is limited to 
Member States and the Commission	  
 
Rather than comparing different approaches pursued by Member States and regulated compa-
nies, the Commission monitored the compliance of Member States and regulated companies 
with uniform policy solutions. In February 2002, as a result of a discussion paper that reviewed 
the experience to date with the voluntary Guidelines, forum participants noted that there had 
been improvements in the ways in which congestion was handled at cross-border lines. Specif-
ically, at many borders, market-based congestion management systems were in place. How-
ever, it was also noted that, “certain congested interconnections remain without a market-based 
allocation mechanism for scarce capacity. With respect to some interconnectors, therefore, the 
guidelines adopted by the Forum are not applied”.169 Subsequently, the Commission and the 
CEER presented a detailed status report of congestion management mechanisms operating 
throughout the Community. This report argued that the delay in implementing market-based 
congestion management systems “has created a very unclear situation at certain borders and 
has seriously prevented non-incumbent market parties to operate. Market parties have made 
several complaints against practices at the interconnectors still using non-market-based meth-
ods like first come, first served”. The report highlighted that “some parties claim that the dif-
ficulty to reach an agreement in a relatively large group of parties, (at least) two transmission 
system operators and two regulators, has been an important factor to delay the process”.170 It 
considered that from the analysis “it is fair to say that the congestion management Guidelines 
agreed in the 6th Florence Forum meeting are only halfway implemented. Market-based meth-
ods are in use in 12 of the 24 interconnectors. However, most of the interconnectors with the 
highest economic value, especially those at the borders of Italy, do not yet have market-based 
methods in place”. The report suggested that, “the most important action is to move to market-
based methods on all interconnectors in the EU as soon as possible. This applies to the Italian 
borders, the borders of France with Germany, Belgium and Spain, the cable between Sweden 
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and Germany and to the Spanish Portuguese interconnector’. It concluded that, to comply with 
the Guidelines, making them binding “seems to be necessary”.171    
While monitoring compliance with the voluntary Guidelines stressed the importance of binding 
rules, reforms were not developed on the basis of comparisons of different approaches pursued 
by Member States and regulated companies. As aforementioned, rather than comparing differ-
ent approaches pursued by Member States and regulated companies, the Commission moni-
tored the compliance of these actors with uniform policy solutions. Furthermore, these compli-
ance-monitoring reports were elaborated upon and presented in 2002, although the Commis-
sion had already tabled its legislative proposal in 2001. Hence, the latter could not be based on 
the former. Instead, the content of the Commission’s proposal was identical to the voluntary 
Guidelines, which were annexed to it.172 Without adding any major changes to the Commis-
sion’s proposal, in June 2003, the European Parliament and Council adopted Regulation (EC) 
No. 1228/2003 on conditions for accessing the network for cross-border exchanges in electric-
ity.173 Thus, this Regulation codified the reforms previously agreed upon through experimen-
talist policymaking.  
Fourth and finally, rather than granting Member States and regulated companies discretion to 
pursue different approaches to regulate congestion management, Regulation (EC) No. 
1228/2003 obligated Member States and regulated companies to adopt uniform solutions to 
regulate congestion management, by making market-based solutions and auctions binding.  
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Thus, as illustrated, shortly after agreements on reforms were developed through 
experimentalist policymaking, the Commission shifted to hierarchical policymaking. It did not 
continue to grant discretion to adopt different approaches, compare them, and develop 
agreements on reforms on this basis and with high stakeholder participation. In contrast, by 
employing the hierarchical architecture of the ordinary legislative procedure, the Commission 
lowered stakeholder participation. It monitored compliance with uniform solutions, and 
without conducting comparisons of different approaches, codified reforms previously agreed 
upon to make uniform solutions binding for all Member States and regulated companies. 
Finding similar patterns of policymaking in the gas domain 
Observing initial experimentalist policymaking  
Similarly to the power domain, the Commission initially engaged in experimentalist 
policymaking in the gas domain. The indicators and evidence supporting this assertion are 
shown in Table 8. Member States and regulated companies were granted discretion to pursue 
different approaches to regulate congestion management. By employing the experimentalist 
architecture of the Madrid Forum, the Commission stimulated the comparison of these 
approaches and the development of agreement on reforms on this basis with high stakeholder 
participation. By promoting the freeing up of unused transport capacity through interruptible 
use-it-or-lose-it provisions and secondary markets, these reforms marked a turning point from 
the previous regime, which allowed incumbents to foreclose market entry by hoarding transport 
capacity without actually using it. 
Table 8. Initial experimentalist policymaking to regulate congestion management in the 
gas domain from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
Indicator 	   Evidence 	  
Member States and/or 
regulated companies are 
granted discretion to adopt 
different approaches  
Member states and transmission system operators were 
pursuing distinct approaches to regulate third party network 
access, particularly congestion management 
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Different approaches are 
compared 
Examples are provided from the most experienced markets 
including the UK, Spain and the Netherlands; overviews are 
given by the Gas Transmission Europe of access regimes, and 
in particular, of congestion management measures used by its 
members across Europe 
Agreements on reforms are 
developed based on 
comparisons  
Guidelines for good third party access are agreed upon in 
2001, and revised Guidelines are agreed upon in 2003, which 
suggest that congestion management be based on interruptible 
use-it-or-lose-it and secondary capacity trading markets 
Agreement on reforms are 
developed with high 
stakeholder participation 
Agreements are developed within the Madrid Forum and 
smaller working groups, both featuring high stakeholder 
participation	  
 
The first indicator that the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking is that 
Member States and regulated companies were granted discretion to pursue different approaches 
to regulate congestion management. The first 1998 Gas Directive, which marked the beginning 
of the liberalisation and re-regulation of European gas markets, set out the general framework 
and principles for the introduction of competition in the industry, but in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity, left much of the technical and practical details of implementation open to 
national interpretation. In particular, it granted Member States a large margin of discretion 
regarding key regulatory issues, such as the regime of access to the natural monopoly of 
transmission pipelines.174  
Right after this first round of legislation, in 1999, the Commission devised the Madrid Forum 
for Gas. As its “twin institution”	  in the power domain (i.e., Florence Forum), the Madrid Forum 
was not derived from the Directive or the EU legal system, but rather, was created upon the 
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Commission’s initiative. As seen in Chapter Two, this is an experimentalist architecture be-
cause it reflects key elements of experimentalist architecture as defined by its proponents. Its 
objective was to biannually provide a neutral and informal EU-level framework for the discus-
sion of issues and exchange of experiences concerning the implementation of the 1998 Gas 
Directive.175 
The second indicator of experimentalist policymaking is the Commission’s use of the Madrid 
Forum, which provides for high stakeholder participation, as it brings together national regu-
latory authorities, national governments, transmission system operators, gas suppliers and trad-
ers, consumers, network users and gas exchanges.176 
The third indicator is that from the very first Madrid Forum meeting, different approaches pur-
sued by Member States and regulated companies to regulate congestion management were 
compared, with the goal of “identifying the different methodologies and approaches concern-
ing access conditions that were under development in the Member States”. At that time, “only 
a limited number of Member States [had] already adopted a framework governing the condi-
tions for third party access to the gas system”. Callum McCarthy from the regulatory authority 
Ofgas, Lopex Silanes from the company Gas Natural and George Verberg from the company 
Gasunie outlined the approach for accessing conditions in their respective countries, namely, 
the UK, Spain and the Netherlands, respectively.177  
To further stimulate the comparison of different approaches to congestion management, the 
Commission, Member States and the CEER invited the European gas industry to establish a 
new body, bringing together representatives of all those responsible for the operation of the 
transmission network for gas in Europe. The objective of this body, namely, Gas Transmission 
Europe (GTE), was to “provide technical data regarding the transmission systems within Eu-
rope”, and in particular, to ensure “an appropriate exchange of experience and information in 
this respect and the development of best practice in the internal gas market”. The GTE was 
invited to submit a report outlining, on a Member State-by-Member State basis, the measures 
that needed to be taken, with regard to both structure and organisation, to avoid discrimination 
in network access and to guarantee confidentiality of commercial information received by gas 
undertakings in the context of third party access; the range of services offered by gas companies 
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in the context of third party access and the terms at which they were offered; the measures that 
needed to be taken to ensure appropriate transparency; and the mechanisms that needed to 
established to ensure that the administrative arrangements relevant to third party access fos-
tered competition and market entry. Furthermore, in order to progress towards developing the 
necessary rules to resolve possible issues of congestion, GTE was also asked to provide appro-
priate information concerning a matrix outlining relevant points in the internal European gas 
market and identifying the available transmission capacity between these points; as well as 
details of any mechanisms, existing or envisaged, for allocating transport capacity in the event 
of scarcity, including any measure that needed to be taken to ensure that gas capacity was 
allocated in a non-discriminatory manner between new entrants and incumbents part of a ver-
tically integrated company.178 
Fourth and finally, on the basis of comparisons of different approaches pursued by Member 
States and regulated companies, agreements on reforms were developed. Forum participants 
considered the “continued in-depth exchange of practical experience identifying concrete ob-
stacles to trade” to be important. In particular, as a result of the initial comparative exercise 
prepared by GTE, participants noted considerable differences across gas companies regarding 
services offered and terms and conditions imposed, which underscored the need to ensure that 
such differences did not hinder the creation of an effective single market.179 In addition, they 
stressed the importance of having adequate published information regarding available trans-
mission capacities, because “such information will serve to identify as early as possible poten-
tial bottlenecks in the trans-European network and possible measures to overcome such bottle-
necks as well as considerations with regard to allocation of scarce capacity in case of conges-
tion”.180 Based on such information, participants subsequently “noted with concern that capac-
ity constraints appear to become an increasingly important matter in the European gas market”. 
Hence, they stressed the need to develop appropriate principles for transparent and non-dis-
criminatory allocation of scarce capacity in the event of congestion.181 To ensure rapid pro-
gress, they agreed to establish a joint working group of representatives of the Commission, the 
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CEER and interested Member States. They asked that the working group elaborate upon guide-
lines needed for good practice regarding all necessary third party access services, including the 
role of market-based mechanisms, such as secondary capacity trading markets, to facilitate the 
efficient use of the network.182 The development of these guidelines featured high stakeholder 
participation, notably because GTE was invited to develop a proposal for principles for alloca-
tion of scarce capacity for discussion in the joint working group.183  
In February 2002, Madrid Forum participants adopted a multi-paragraph set of recommenda-
tions for Guidelines for good practice regarding third party access services.184,214 With regard 
to the role of market-based mechanisms, such as secondary capacity trading markets, the 
Guidelines allowed capacity rights to be freely tradable in a secondary market, and provided 
for transmission system operators to endeavour to discourage “capacity hoarding” and facili-
tate the reutilisation of unused capacity.185 However, at the subsequent Forum meeting, a lack 
of compliance with a number of requirements in the Guidelines was observed in several cases, 
as well as a significant degree of uncertainty about the interpretation of the Guidelines them-
selves and considerable differences in the implementation of the Guidelines between different 
transmission system operators, resulting in different levels of effective network access through-
out Europe. In order to “avoid ambiguity in the interpretation of the Guidelines for good prac-
tice and to ensure a level playing field and raise standards and aim towards best industry prac-
tice”, Forum participants considered it “appropriate and necessary to clarify the Guidelines for 
good practice and to reinforce these in certain respects”.186 In particular, the CEER, the Com-
mission, and consumers and traders stressed the positive role that non-firm (i.e., interruptible) 
capacity services could have in fostering competition and market liquidity and in enhancing 
the efficient use of the network.187 Forum participants invited the Commission to chair a spe-
cific working group with participation of national regulatory authorities, interested Member 
States and GTE, with the goal of preparing a revised version of the Guidelines in the following 
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months for adoption at the next Madrid Forum meeting. Where appropriate, the Commission 
would invite other relevant stakeholders, such as representatives of consumers and traders, to 
participate in the working group meetings.188 
After four years of debates and comparisons of different approaches to regulate congestion 
management within the Madrid Forum and smaller working groups, in September 2003, Forum 
participants voluntarily agreed upon the revised set of Guidelines,189 which provided more de-
tail and advanced requirements. Specifically, they provided for transmission system operators 
to facilitate secondary trade of capacity by developing standardised contracts, procedures and 
services; and to actively endeavour to discourage capacity hoarding and facilitate reutilisation 
of unused capacity by allowing unused capacity to be traded, at least on an interruptible basis 
that would be clearly defined.190 This paved the way for interruptible use-it-or-lose-it provi-
sions and secondary markets, understood as non-discriminatory market-based approaches, to 
promote competition by ensuring that capacity rights be awarded to parties who actually in-
tended to use them. This was a clear deviation from the previously dominant system, which 
limited entry and greatly favoured incumbents by allowing them to hoard transport capacity 
without actually using it. Since agreement on the Guidelines was developed with high stake-
holder participation and based upon comparisons of different approaches for regulating con-
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Observing a subsequent shift to hierarchical policymaking  
Very similarly to the power domain, almost immediately after elaboration of the revised 
Guidelines the Commission switched to hierarchical policymaking in the gas domain, as shown 
in Table 9. By using the hierarchical architectures of the ordinary legislative procedure, the 
Commission reduced stakeholder participation. It monitored compliance with uniform 
solutions and codified reforms without conducting comparisons of different approaches, to 
make uniform solutions binding for all Member States and regulated companies. The resulting 
regulation is important as it provided the first set of common rules for accessing the network 
for cross-border exchanges in gas. At its core, it mandated that transmission system operators 
offer unused capacity of certain users to other users. It also gave users the freedom to freely 
trade their capacity rights, by selling or subletting their unused capacity on secondary markets. 
By promoting the efficient use of scarce interconnection capacity, this regulation provided the 
impetus for competition and cross-border trade.  
Table 9. Subsequent hierarchical policymaking to regulate congestion management in the 
gas domain from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
Indicator	   Evidence 	  
Member States and regulated 
companies are obligated to adopt 
uniform solutions 
Regulation 1775/2005 makes interruptible use-it-or-lose-
it and secondary markets for trading capacity binding	  
Compliance with uniform solutions 
is monitored 
Compliance with the revised Guidelines, agreed upon in 
2003, is monitored	  
Reforms are not developed on the 
basis of comparisons 
Regulation 1775/2005 is not based on comparisons 	  
Agreement on reforms is developed 
with low stakeholder participation 
Regulation 1775/2005 is adopted through ordinary 
legislative procedure, in which participation is limited to 
Member States and the Commission	  
 
76	  
Shortly after the elaboration of agreements on reforms, the Commission reduced stakeholder 
participation by employing the hierarchical architecture of the ordinary legislative procedure, 
even though the experimentalist architecture of the Madrid Forum was still available. As seen 
in Chapter Two, the ordinary legislative procedure is a hierarchical architecture because it does 
not reflect key elements of experimentalist architecture. In particular, since participation is 
limited to Member States and the Commission, it does not provide for stakeholder participa-
tion.191 Just a few months after development of the revised Guidelines in September 2003, in 
December 2003, the Commission used the ordinary legislative procedure to table a legislative 
proposal for a regulation on access conditions to the transmission gas network.192 
Rather than comparing the different approaches of Member States and regulated companies in 
regulating congestion management, the compliance of these actors was monitored with uniform 
policy solutions. In 2004, the CEER prepared, in cooperation with GTE and its members, a 
monitoring report on compliance with the revised Guidelines. While noting an important im-
provement, this monitoring report indicated a certain lack of compliance with some key ele-
ments contained in the Guidelines that were agreed upon at the 7th Madrid Forum.193  
Reforms were not developed on the basis of comparisons of different approaches pursued by 
Member States and regulated companies. As aforementioned, rather than comparing different 
approaches pursued by Member States and regulated companies, the compliance of these actors 
was monitored with uniform policy solutions. Furthermore, these compliance-monitoring re-
ports were elaborated upon and presented in 2004, when the Commission’s proposal had al-
ready been tabled. Hence, the latter could not be based on the former. Instead, the content of 
the Commission’s proposal was based on the voluntarily revised Guidelines, which were an-
nexed to it. Without adding any major changes to the Commission’s proposal, in September 
2005, the European Parliament and Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 about 
conditions for accessing the natural gas transmission networks.194 In its introductory recital, 
Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 explains that the “experience gained in the implementation 
and monitoring of a first set of Guidelines for Good Practice, adopted by the European Gas 
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Regulatory Forum in 2002, demonstrates that in order to ensure the full implementation of the 
rules set out in the Guidelines in all Member States, and in order to provide a minimum guar-
antee of equal market access conditions in practice, it is necessary to provide for them to be-
come legally enforceable. A second set of common rules entitled ‘the Second Guidelines for 
Good Practice’	  was adopted at the meeting of the Forum on 24–25 September 2003 and the 
purpose of this Regulation is to lay down, on the basis of those Guidelines, basic principles and 
rules regarding network access and third party access services, congestion management, trans-
parency, […] and the trading of capacity rights”.195 At its core, it develops common rules “to 
free up unused capacity in accordance with the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’	  principle; [...and] to ensure 
that undertakings acquiring capacity rights are able to sell them to other licensed undertakings 
in order to ensure an appropriate level of liquidity on the capacity market”. For this purpose, 
“in the Guidelines annexed to this Regulation, specific detailed implementing rules are defined 
on the basis of the second Guidelines for Good Practice”.196 Thus, this Regulation codified the 
reforms previously agreed through experimentalist policymaking.  
Finally, rather than granting Member States and regulated companies the discretion to pursue 
different approaches for regulating congestion management, Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 
obligated Member States and regulated companies to adopt uniform solutions to regulate con-
gestion management by making interruptible use-it-or-lose-it and secondary markets for trad-
ing capacity binding.  
Thus, as can be seen, shortly after agreements on reforms were developed through experimen-
talist policymaking, the Commission shifted to hierarchical policymaking. Member States and 
regulated companies were not granted discretion to adopt different approaches, different ap-
proaches were not compared, and reforms were not developed on this basis and with high 
stakeholder participation. In contrast, by employing the hierarchical architecture of the ordi-
nary legislative procedure, the Commission lowered stakeholder participation. Compliance 
with uniform solutions was monitored, and without conducting comparisons of different ap-
proaches, reforms previously agreed upon were codified to make uniform solutions binding for 
all Member States and regulated companies. 
                                                
195Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. Recitals (1), (2) and (3).	  
196Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. Recitals (11), (13), (15), (16) and (18).	  
78	  
Accounting for the identified patterns of policymaking  
Showing the limitations of the shadow of hierarchy and polyarchy ex-
planations 
The previous sections showed that, to regulate congestion management from the late 1990s to 
the early 2000s in a strikingly similar manner across the power and gas domains, the Commis-
sion initially used the experimentalist architectures of the Florence and Madrid Fora to engage 
in experimentalist policymaking, whereby Member States and regulated companies were 
granted discretion to pursue different approaches, these different approaches were compared, 
and agreements on reforms were developed on this basis with high stakeholder participation. 
Then, it subsequently switched to hierarchical policymaking. By employing the hierarchical 
architecture of the ordinary legislative procedure, it codified reforms with low stakeholder par-
ticipation and without comparing different approaches, but rather, by monitoring compliance 
with uniform solutions to make them binding for all Member States and regulated companies.  
From the perspective of the shadow of hierarchy, it is surprising that the Commission engaged 
in experimentalist policymaking despite the weaker shadow it could cast to induce conflicting 
actors to cooperate. As seen in Chapter Two, until the mid-2000s, the formal rulemaking pow-
ers of the Commission in both domains were limited to the ordinary legislative procedure. In 
this procedure, the Commission had exclusive authority to propose legislation, although its 
proposals had to be adopted by both the European Parliament and the Council.197 Given its 
limited formal rulemaking powers, this thesis considers that the shadow of hierarchy that the 
Commission could cast from the late 1990s to the early 2000s was weaker. Consequently, it is 
puzzling that the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking even though its ability 
to threaten adverse legislation to incentivise parties to cooperate was weaker.  
This is all the more surprising because parties had rather conflicting policy preferences. Euro-
pean electricity and gas markets were historically managed on a national basis by state-owned, 
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vertically integrated monopolists who undertook all aspects of the service in question.198 The 
rules governing the actions of transmission system operators and how access was given to net-
work users, such as producers and suppliers, were drawn up nationally. In that context, publicly 
owned, vertically integrated incumbent companies typically controlled underdeveloped inter-
connectors and were often able to distort competition.199 From the 1990s onwards, the Com-
mission began to extend EU regulation, notably, through a series of liberalising and re-regula-
tory directives. The legal and political rationale for EU action has been to end long-standing 
national legal monopolies and allow effective competition to create a “single energy market”, 
a key objective of the Commission since it began bringing energy into the single market agenda 
in the mid-1980s.200 However, the Commission’s efforts met resistance from many Member 
States that, often in alliance with historically state-owned incumbents, were keen to retain tight 
control over a sector considered to be of strategic geopolitical and economic importance.201 At 
that time, not every Member State had delegated powers to sector-specific national regulatory 
authorities. An important example is Germany, which continued to rely on general competition 
authorities until the mid-2000s. In addition to the conflicts between national and EU public 
policymakers, energy liberalisation and re-regulation also had to confront a second, often re-
lated conflict, notably between incumbent producers and suppliers, which traditionally were 
vertically integrated, and hence, which also owned transmission networks, as well as new pro-
ducers and suppliers that depended upon network access to enter the market.202 Since in the 
early 2000s the ownership of competitive and network activities was only separated in three 
Member States in the power domain and in one Member State in the gas domain, the prefer-
ences of incumbents and new entrants were conflicting.203 Indeed, “certain companies mounted 
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a ferocious defence of the status quo in their own countries and in Brussels in response to the 
process of liberalisation, and some found much support from their Member States”.204 
While from the shadow of hierarchy perspective it is surprising that the Commission initially 
engaged in experimentalist policymaking despite its limited formal rulemaking powers, from 
the polyarchy-based viewpoint the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking pre-
cisely because of its limited formal rulemaking powers. Since the Commission’s formal rule-
making powers were limited, this thesis assesses the distribution of power as being more pol-
yarchic, meaning that the Commission could not impose outcomes, but rather, had to pursue 
them cooperatively with others. Indeed, at the first meeting of the Florence Forum in 1998, the 
Commission explained that the objective of the Forum was to develop a consensus among all 
of the parties involved, namely, governments, regulators and industry, as a complement to har-
monisation measures. It clarified that the EU-harmonised rules could not be further refined to 
any greater level of detail than that already included in the Directive.205 Pablo Benavides, Di-
rector General for Energy of the Commission, sent “a clear message that pressure to direct the 
Commission to issue further and more detailed proposals concerning harmonisation of national 
electricity markets would be resisted. Any such movement towards enforcing common regula-
tory solutions at the EU level would be incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity”. These 
considerations were similarly applied to the power and gas domains. Professor Claus Dieter 
Ehlermann, former Director General for Competition of the Commission,	   “underlined this 
point, emphasising that, indeed, in applying internal market and competition principles to the 
electricity and gas sectors of the Member States, the Commission had already pushed its com-
petence to the limit vis-à-vis the subsidiarity constraint”.206 Thus, the perspective emphasising 
the importance of polyarchy explains the Commission’s engagement in experimentalist poli-
cymaking on the basis of the more polyarchic distribution of powers.  
Yet from this perspective, it is difficult to explain why in the early 2000s in both the power and 
the gas domains, the Commission switched to hierarchical policymaking even though the dis-
tribution of powers remained more polyarchic. As seen in Chapter Two, it was only in the mid-
                                                
204Stern, J.P. (1998) Competition and Liberalization in European Gas Markets: a diversity of models.  London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 173; referenced in Klop, M. ‘Charting the Gaps: EU regulation of gas 
transmission tariffs in the Netherlands and the UK’. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 26, January 2009, 
p.6. 	  
205The European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, February 5th and 6th, 1998. Minutes, p.1.	  
206The European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, February 5th and 6th, 1998. Minutes, p.16.	  
81	  
2000s and specifically in 2003 in the power domain and 2005 in the gas domain, that the Com-
mission’s formal rulemaking powers were strengthened.207 Then the Commission was en-
trusted with the additional power to adopt implementing acts subject to the approval of com-
mittees, confined to Member State representatives, and operating according to comitology pro-
cedures. It became able to develop detailed implementing measures supplementing legislative 
acts without having to go through the entire ordinary legislative procedure. However, from the 
late 1990s to the early 2000s, the Commission’s formal rulemaking powers were still limited 
to the ordinary legislative procedure. Thus, from the polyarchy viewpoint, it is surprising that 
the Commission shifted to hierarchical policymaking despite the fact that the distribution of 
powers continued to be more polyarchic.  
Developing an alternative, plausible argument based on uncertainty 
Since the shadow of hierarchy and polyarchy perspectives only partially explain the identified 
patterns of policymaking, this chapter develops an alternative, plausible explanation. The ar-
gument is that, at the very beginning of the market liberalisation and integration processes, the 
Commission only had general policy preferences on how to regulate congestion management. 
Under these conditions of higher uncertainty, it engaged in experimentalist policymaking. But 
due to the emergence of agreements on reforms, the Commission developed much more spe-
cific policy preferences. Under these conditions of lower uncertainty, it switched to hierarchical 
policymaking. 
In the late 1990s, in both the power and gas domains, there was little experience with market 
liberalisation and almost none with market integration. European energy industries were his-
torically organised as national monopolies in a closed national context.208 In Europe, Britain 
was the first country to adopt comprehensive market reforms, specifically in 1986 in gas and 
1990 in electricity, followed by Scandinavian countries.209 These market reforms featured, in 
particular, the separation of production from transmission in order to confine regulation to the 
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network, and by opening it to third party access, to allow competition in production and sup-
ply.210 In the past, the same company owned the gas fields and power plants, transported gas 
and power to homes and businesses, and retailed them to customers.211 Since very few juris-
dictions had experimented with liberalisation, with Britain providing the only example of full-
scale energy liberalisation in continental Europe, the liberalisation of national energy markets 
was a very new policy area with little experience to draw from.212  
Furthermore, the integration of national energy systems into a common market was entirely 
virgin territory, which raised a host of poorly understood technical issues.213 One such issue 
was how to manage situations in which the capacity of interconnection among national sys-
tems, which was historically limited and managed by vertically integrated companies, could 
not accommodate the requests for trade, which instead were growing as a result of gradual 
market liberalisation and integration. Historically, European energy networks were not de-
signed with the purpose of cross-border trade in mind, and the existing regulatory frameworks 
did not cover commercial exchanges across liberalised markets. In the past, trade over inter-
connectors only took place between vertically integrated transmission system operators for 
their own commercial interests, either as a guaranteed mechanism for the purposes of technical 
reserve or based on long-term purchase contracts.214  Cross-border transactions took place 
within a framework of technical cooperation among vertically integrated national utilities, fo-
cusing more on system security and on the efficient use of production resources rather than on 
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commercial objectives.215 However, after entry into the force of the first Directives, reservation 
of capacity for long-term contracts had to compete with short-term needs for the transactions 
of eligible customers and traders. As noted by the Commission at the beginning of 1999, since 
the capacity of interconnectors would often not be sufficient for the expected increase in trade 
after liberalisation, interconnectors tended to often be bottlenecks of the European transmission 
system. Moreover, in contrast to ‘normal’ bottlenecks within the territory of one transmission 
system operator, interconnectors involved, by definition, two transmission system operators. 
In order to ensure the economically optimal usage of available capacity as well as fair and non-
discriminatory access for all system users, a new level of coordination between transmission 
system operators needed to be established.216 As suggested by Fernando Lasheras Garcia, Di-
rector of Iberdrola’s representative office in Brussels, the prospect that physical capabilities for 
trading among countries would be lower than the needs of market players, was indeed a new 
challenge from which new conditions for efficient cross-border trade emerged,.217 As con-
firmed by Peter Styles, Chairman of the Electricity Committee of the EFET, cross-border deals 
really started in 1998. But at that time, there was no common capacity allocation and conges-
tion management procedure in place. Instead, cross-border transport capacity (and its price) 
were negotiated among neighbouring vertically integrated companies, which were at the same 
time both producers and transmission system operators.218  
Although a lack of experience does not necessarily imply higher uncertainty, this chapter did 
not find any evidence, in the main regulatory policy documents of that period, that the Com-
mission had specific preferences on how to regulate congestion management. On the contrary, 
these publicly available primary sources suggest that the preferences of the Commission were 
quite general. With regard to the power domain, neither the first 1996 Electricity Directive nor 
the 1992 Commission’s proposal on which the Directive was based, mentioned specific mar-
ket-based approaches or auctions, but rather, only made reference on how to access the system 
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in accordance with general objectives, and transparent and non-discriminatory criteria.219 This 
chapter did not find reference to these specific congestion management methods in the minutes 
of the first Florence Forum meetings held throughout 1998.220 Analogously, with respect to the 
gas domain, the first 1998 Gas Directive, the 1992 Commission’s proposal on which the Di-
rective was based, and the first overview report on the Directive’s implementation adopted by 
the Commission in 2000, did not mention specific use-it-or-lose-it or secondary markets, but 
instead, only referred to accessing the system in accordance with general objectives, and trans-
parent and non-discriminatory criteria.221 There was also no reference to these specific conges-
tion management methods in the minutes of the first Madrid Forum meetings held in 1999 and 
2000.222 
Based on the general, rather than specific policy preferences of the Commission, this chapter 
considers that the Commission initially found itself in conditions of higher uncertainty. Under 
these conditions, the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking. Member States 
and regulated companies were granted discretion to pursue different approaches, their different 
approaches were compared, and agreements on reforms were developed on this basis with high 
stakeholder participation. 
As a result of the elaboration on the reform agreements, however, the Commission developed 
much more precise policy preferences. Specifically, by November 2000, the Commission had 
explicit preferences for market-based methods, particularly auctions, in the power domain.223 
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By September 2003, the Commission had precise preferences for interruptible use-it-or-lose-it 
and secondary markets in the gas domain.224  
Based on these more detailed and specific policy preferences, this chapter considers that the 
Commission subsequently found itself in conditions of lower uncertainty, which resulted in the 
switch to hierarchical policymaking. By tabling legislative proposals shortly after the elabora-
tion of these agreements, in March 2001 in the power domain and in December 2003 in the gas 
domain, it codified reforms with low stakeholder participation and without conducting com-
parisons of different approaches, but rather, by monitoring compliance with uniform solutions, 
making them binding for all Member States and regulated companies. 	  
Conclusions 
This chapter began with empirical analysis of policymaking, by comparing the regulation of 
congestion management from the late 1990s to the early 2000s across the power and gas do-
mains. Its central finding was that, in a strikingly similar manner across both domains, the 
Commission interchanged experimentalist with hierarchical policymaking, with important re-
forms first being agreed upon through the former and then being formalised and given binding 
power through the latter. Initially, the Commission employed experimentalist architectures, 
namely the Florence and Madrid Fora, to stimulate the comparison of different approaches that 
the Member States and regulated companies were granted discretion to pursue and to facilitate 
the development of agreements on reforms on this basis with high stakeholder participation. 
Thereafter, it shifted to hierarchical policymaking. By using the hierarchical architecture of the 
ordinary legislative procedure with low stakeholder participation, it codified reforms that were 
previously agreed upon through experimentalist processes without conducting comparisons of 
different approaches, but instead, by monitoring compliance with uniform solutions, making 
them binding for all Member States and regulated companies.  
From the shadow of hierarchy perspective, it is surprising that the Commission engaged in 
experimentalist policymaking despite the weaker shadow it could cast to induce conflicting 
parties to cooperate, in turn due to its limited formal rulemaking powers. The polyarchy point 
of view accounts for the Commission’s engagement in experimentalist policymaking precisely 
because of its limited formal rulemaking powers, which made the distribution of power more 
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polyarchic. However, it does not explain why the Commission subsequently shifted to hierar-
chical policymaking, despite the fact that the distribution of powers had remained more poly-
archic. Since both the shadow of hierarchy and polyarchy perspectives have limitations, this 
chapter developed an alternative explanation. Specifically, that at the very beginning of the 
market liberalisation and integration processes, the Commission only had general policy pref-
erences. Under these conditions of higher uncertainty, it engaged in experimentalist policy-
making. However, due to the emergence of agreements on reforms, it developed much more 
specific policy preferences, and under these conditions of lower uncertainty, it subsequently 
favoured hierarchical policymaking.  
The identified patterns of policymaking could be due, however, to specificities in the issue area 
analysed. For this reason, Chapter Four continues to compare the Commission’s regulatory 
policymaking across power and gas domains from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, shifting 











Chapter Four: Interchanging Experimentalist with Hier-
archical Policymaking in Both Power and Gas Domains 
Also in Tarification Regulation 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the argument that the Commission engages in experimentalist policy-
making under conditions of higher uncertainty, which was developed in the previous chapter. 
It continues to compare the Commission’s regulatory policymaking across power and gas do-
mains from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, but shifts the attention from congestion manage-
ment to another key issue area, namely, tarification regulation. As aforementioned, energy 
markets were historically managed on a national basis by state-owned, vertically integrated 
monopolists, who undertook all aspects of production of the service in question.225 The rules 
governing not only how access was given to network users but also how it was priced were 
drawn up nationally.226 In that context, cross-subsidies within domestic systems were perva-
sive.227 In the late 1990s, there was no European regulation governing the tarification of Eu-
rope’s cross-border electricity networks and gas pipelines. Cross-subsidies distorted competi-
tion and trade to favour incumbents to the detriment of domestic and foreign new entrants.228 
By the early 2000s, however, the situation had fundamentally changed. An initial set of rules 
mandating common tarification approaches and principles promoting competition and cross-
border trade were adopted, marking a clear turning point from previous regimes that favoured 
incumbents by segmenting markets and hindering entry. 
Throughout the period analysed, in both the power and gas domains, the Commission could 
use hierarchical architectures, namely, the ordinary legislative procedure. At the same time, it 
could also employ experimentalist architectures, which developed in parallel to hierarchical 
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architectures analogously across both domains. In particular, it could use the Florence and Ma-
drid Fora, which were created in 1998 and 1999, respectively, and since then have had analo-
gous composition and working arrangements with a particular focus on the issue area of tarifi-
cation regulation (and congestion management).229  
This chapter’s central findings are strikingly similar to those of Chapter Three. In both the 
power and gas domains, the Commission interchanged experimentalist with hierarchical poli-
cymaking, with important reforms first being agreed upon through the former and then being 
formalised and given binding power through the latter. At the very beginning of the market 
liberalisation and integration processes, the Commission employed experimentalist architec-
tures, notably the Florence and Madrid Fora, to stimulate the comparison of different ap-
proaches that were being adopted by Member States and regulated companies, and to facilitate 
the development of agreements on reforms on this basis and with high stakeholder participa-
tion. Thereafter, it shifted to hierarchical policymaking. It monitored compliance with uniform 
policy solutions, and by using the hierarchical architecture of the ordinary legislative proce-
dure, codified some of the reforms that were previously agreed upon through experimentalist 
processes, laid the groundwork for the future codification of others with low stakeholder par-
ticipation, and made uniform solutions binding for all Member States and regulated companies. 
Thus, the implications of the chapter’s findings are also analogous to those of Chapter Three. 
From the shadow of hierarchy perspective, it is surprising that the Commission engaged in 
experimentalist policymaking despite the weaker shadow it could cast to induce conflicting 
actors to cooperate. From the polyarchy viewpoint, the Commission’s engagement in experi-
mentalist policymaking can precisely be explained in light of its limited formal rulemaking 
powers. Yet this does not explain why, at some point in both domains, the Commission shifted 
from experimentalist to hierarchical policymaking, despite continuity in polyarchy. In contrast, 
the patterns of policymaking found are consistent with the argument developed in Chapter 
Three. At the very beginning of the market liberalisation and integration processes, the Com-
mission only had general policy preferences about how to regulate tarification. Under these 
conditions of higher uncertainty, it engaged in experimentalist policymaking. However, as a 
result of the emergence of agreements on reforms, the Commission developed more specific 
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policy preferences. Under these conditions of lower uncertainty, it shifted to hierarchical poli-
cymaking.  
This chapter first identifies the types of policymaking that the Commission engaged in, to show 
that it substituted experimentalist with hierarchical policymaking very similarly across the 
power and gas domains. Then it shows how the identified patterns of policymaking confirm 
the limitations of the shadow of hierarchy and polyarchy perspectives and provide support to 
the argument emphasising uncertainty. 	  
Interchanging experimentalist with hierarchical policymaking in 
the power domain 
Observing initial experimentalist policymaking  
From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, to regulate tarification in the power domain, the Com-
mission initially engaged in experimentalist policymaking; the indicators and evidence used 
to make this argument are shown in Table 10. Member States and regulated companies were 
granted discretion to adopt different approaches. By employing experimentalist architectures, 
notably the Florence Forum, their different approaches were compared, and agreements on a 
number of reforms were developed on the basis of these comparisons with high stakeholder 
participation. These reforms are important. First, by granting access to the entire European 
grid at a flat rate through a “postage-stamp”	  tariff, they deviated from the previous tarification 
system based on transit fees for each transactions network users engaged in, which limited 
entry and cross-border trade.230 Second, by setting up an intertransmission system operator 
compensation mechanism, they ensured that transmission system operators recovered the 
costs of hosting cross-border flows of power on their networks.231 Third, by harmonising 
transmission tariffs levied on generators, they avoided distortions of competition between pro-
ducers located in different countries and created a “level playing field”.232  
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Table 10. Initial experimentalist policymaking to regulate tarification in the power do-
main from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
Indicator 	   Evidence 	  
Member States and/or 
regulated companies are 
granted discretion to adopt 
different approaches  
Directive 96/92/EC allows Member States and regulated 
companies to pursue different approaches to regulate network 
access, particularly tarification (e.g., nodal pricing, distance-
related tariffs, postage stamp tariffs)   
Different approaches are 
compared 
Examples of national as well as cross-border tarification 
approaches are provided (e.g., UK, Germany, Sweden, New 
Zealand, the US and those reviewed by Aachen University) 
study 
Agreements on reforms are 
developed based on 
comparisons  
Agreements in 1999 on postage-stamp tariff not based on 
transactions, in 2002 on provisional inter-transmission system 
operator compensation mechanism, and in 2003 on 
harmonised transmission charges levied on generators 
Agreement on reforms are 
developed with high 
stakeholder participation 
Agreements are developed within the Florence Forum, whose 
participation is broadened to include industry after the first 
meeting	  
 
The first indicator that the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking is that Mem-
ber States and regulated companies were granted discretion to pursue different approaches to 
tarification regulation. As seen in Chapter Three, the liberalisation and re-regulation of Euro-
pean power markets began with the first Electricity Directive adopted by the European Parlia-
ment and Council in 1996.233 The Directive prescribed progressive market opening and estab-
lished, for the first time, some common rules for the organisation of the sector. However, it set 
out a very broad framework that left Member States an exceptionally wide margin of discretion 
                                                
233Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity.  
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regarding crucial regulatory issues such as the regime of access to monopoly networks, includ-
ing its pricing. In particular, it left Member States the freedom to choose between “regulated 
access”, giving eligible customers and their suppliers a right of access on the basis of a pub-
lished tariff, and “negotiated access”, in which the would be supplier/eligible customer and the 
grid operator negotiated in ‘good faith’ and on the basis of indicative prices.234 It allowed any 
combination of tariff principles and structures. In the absence of any common tarification ap-
proach, differences in tariff regulation inevitably occurred across Member States.235 Further-
more, the Directive simply did not address technical and regulatory issues arising from the very 
idea of cross-border trade in an integrated European market, such as the pricing of cross-border 
transmission.236  
The second indicator that the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking is that it 
used the experimentalist architecture of the Florence Forum, which features high stakeholder 
participation. From its very first meeting, industry representatives of both transmission system 
operators and producers, and consumers and experts from outside Europe participated in the 
Forum, notably, by presenting their views and experiences about tarification regulation. Roger 
Urwin, of the UK National Grid Company, explained that transmission prices in the UK were 
controlled by a pioneering form of incentive regulation that was developed by Professor Ste-
phen Littlechild, who was then the Director General of the British electricity regulatory author-
ity.237 Rudiger Winkler, of Vereinigung Deutscher Elektrizitatswerke, informed participants 
that in Germany, a proposal for distance sensitive tariffs was subject to strong criticism. Jan 
Magnusson, of Svenska Kraftnat grid utility, pointed to the experience of the Swedish electric-
ity market to argue for yet another approach, namely, “nodal tariffs”.238 Tim Russell, from the 
British National Power, in a presentation entitled, “Transmission access: what a generator 
wants”, suggested that there were trade-offs between economic efficiency, fairness and politi-
cal acceptability and that “there is no single, particular pricing methodology (e.g., postage 
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stamp, contract, MW Mile, Long Run Marginal Pricing) that can be considered the ‘intrinsi-
cally right’ solution for all”.239 Christof Bauer of Degussa presented the view of the industrial 
consumers. He suggested that Germany had left many important aspects of transmission agree-
ments open to negotiation, often between a powerful incumbent and a much weaker new en-
trant, hence arguing against “negotiated third party access”.240 David Smol, from ILEX Con-
sulting, presented the New Zealand case to suggest that one of the main lessons to be learned 
was that transmission pricing and contracts had to be transparent. James Barker of the US law 
firm Barker, Dunn and Rossi spoke about the US experience in reform of electricity markets 
by drawing upon examples from California, Alberta, NEPOOL, PJM, New York, Canada, Eng-
land and Wales, New Zealand and Australia. He argued that, “the EU states, at a relatively 
early stage in developing the structures and principles of such market regulation, could learn 
much from identifying the various advantages and disadvantages of the existing US framework 
and should consider carefully how to avoid its failures and pick the elements of success”. In 
particular, he suggested that a critical element was to allow the regulator to establish transpar-
ent and standard transmission prices.241 Debates also involved round table discussions of reg-
ulators.242   
Third, different approaches of Member States and regulated companies were compared. These 
comparisons had a twofold objective. First, to identify the different types of transmission pric-
ing systems that were developing in the Member States, in order to evaluate their relative ad-
vantages or disadvantages so that clear objectives could be pursued and any necessary revisions 
could be made. Second, to monitor the conditions under which cross-border electricity trade 
between Member States could take place.243 A study carried out by the Aachen University upon 
request from the Commission was particularly important. A qualitative and quantitative com-
parison of tarification approaches adopted within nine European countries (i.e., Austria, Eng-
land/Wales, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) was 
conducted, and existing cross-border arrangements in electricity transmission (i.e., US, Scan-
dinavia, England/Scotland, Germany and the UCPTE transit agreement) and other areas of the 
economy (i.e., post and telephone) were reviewed. The results showed that in most Member 
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States, tarification systems were non-transaction-based; thus, it was recommended that such an 
approach be generally adopted. The study also addressed different approaches to ensure that 
transmission system operators could recover the costs for hosting on their networks’	   transit 
flows, and recommended compensation for inter-transmission system operators.244  
On the basis of these comparisons, an agreement on a number of important reforms was devel-
oped. In accordance with the recommendations of this study, the Commission expressed a clear 
preference for a non-transaction-oriented tarification system. Dr. Jorge Vasconcelos, Chairman 
of the CEER and of the Portuguese regulatory authority, and Professor Ignacio Perez-Arriaga, 
Commissioner of the Spanish regulatory authority, presented the common views of the Italian, 
Portuguese and Spanish regulators, which largely coincided with that of the Commission.245 
With the goal of increasing convergence of the positions and to outline a working programme 
for the following months, the Commission, in close cooperation with the German presidency 
of the Council and Dr. Vasconcelos, summarised that any tarification system had to be non-
transaction based. Therefore, it did not have to identify different charges according to individ-
ual contract paths.246 At the 4th Florence Forum in November 1999, participants considered 
that “the voluntary approach developed so far has produced a common understanding of the 
main problems and processes involved in cross-border electricity trade, as well as a common 
view about possible solutions”. Following the principles and the working programme estab-
lished at the last meeting, they agreed on the fundamental principle that each transmission sys-
tem operator’s network costs be recovered through charges imposed upon local network users. 
Thus, these charges provided access to the complete interconnected EU network, “independent 
of the commercial transactions that the network users may engage in”.247 This reform deviated 
from the then dominant system of transit fees or export charges, which hindered competition 
and cross-border trade. Indeed, all transit or export tariffs were eventually eliminated. 
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On the basis of the aforementioned comparisons, Forum participants also agreed on a mecha-
nism to allow compensation for transmission system operators. They recognised that the exist-
ence of cross-border transactions could cause individual power systems to incur extra costs and 
that this justified the acknowledgement of additional network charges. The participants agreed 
that transmission system operators who suffered extra costs caused by cross-border transac-
tions had to receive payments from other transmission system operators.248 The Commission 
could bring forward proposals in this area, but “it is reticent to do so insofar as industry will 
resolve this issue in the near future”. In particular, in the Commission’s view, such an issue 
“would preferably be dealt with, at least at an initial stage, by the newly developing transmis-
sion system operators under the control of regulators”.249 Indeed, the association of ETSO, 
created upon invitation of the Commission, proposed a scheme designed to provide compen-
sation to the transmission system operators who incurred costs related to cross-border transac-
tions, while at the same time charging this compensation to transmission system operators who 
were responsible for such costs. As suggested by Professor Pippo Ranci Ortigosa, co-founder 
and Vice President of the CEER and President of the Italian regulatory authority, the main 
issues were how to quantify the transits (i.e., the flows of energy) and how to assess which 
costs had to be compensated for (i.e., average or marginal).250 In order to address these issues, 
Forum participants set up a working group, bringing together the Commission, national regu-
latory authorities, Member States and ETSO.251 The Commission, regulatory authorities and 
Member States recognised the important progress and efforts made by the ETSO in coming 
forward with an unanimous proposal on the methodology to be applied and the amount of 
money that had to be recovered for an initial one year period.252 To refine the cost calculations, 
an additional working group chaired by the Commission was established. At the 8th meeting of 
the Florence Forum in February 2002, participants reached an agreement on a provisional 
scheme that was to be implemented from March 2002 to January 2003.253 At the following 
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meeting, ETSO presented a proposal for the implementation of a revision of the existing mech-
anism to be put into effect from January 2003; this revision was regarded by the CEER, the 
Commission and Member States as an improvement over the existing approach, notably be-
cause it provided a more robust description of the network affected by transits.254 This reform 
is important because, according to Florence Forum participants, establishment of such a tarifi-
cation system and trade facilitating mechanisms “will enable the single market to become a 
reality”.255 As can be seen, it was not hierarchically imposed by the Commission, but rather, 
was developed on the basis of comparisons and largely from the industry. 
Finally, on the same basis, Forum participants also came to an agreement on a third reform. 
The association of the European power producers and suppliers (Eurelectric) highlighted that, 
as a complement to non-transaction-based tariffs and the compensation mechanism for trans-
mission system operators, the rapid harmonisation of transmission charges within national sys-
tems was also very important. Indeed, regulatory authorities, Member States, ETSO and the 
other market players represented at the Forum stressed the importance of making simultaneous 
progress in harmonising transmission charges, and invited the Commission to forward pro-
posals on that issue.256 Participants then asked the CEER, in close collaboration with the Com-
mission, Member States, ETSO and other relevant stakeholders to continue this work.257 At the 
10th Forum meeting in July 2003, participants agreed on the harmonisation of transmission 
charges levied on producers through determination of a range, going from zero to a positive 
figure, within which all national charges would have to remain.258 Thus, this third and last 
reform, contributed to the creation of a level playing field and the avoidance of competition 
between generators located in different countries.  
Observing a subsequent shift to hierarchical policymaking 
After the development of these agreements on reforms, the Commission switched to hierar-
chical policymaking, as evidenced by the indicators shown in Table 11. By using the hierar-
chical architecture of the ordinary legislative procedure, the Commission reduced stakeholder 
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participation. Without comparing different approaches, it codified parts of the reforms previ-
ously agreed upon and laid the ground for the future codification of others, to make uniform 
solutions that were binding for all Member States and regulated companies. The resulting reg-
ulation is important because it provided the first set of common rules for cross-border trade in 
electricity. At its core, it mandated non-transaction-based tariffs and the establishment of a 
mechanism whereby transmission system operators could compensate each other for the costs 
of hosting cross-border flows of electricity on their networks.259 This represents a clear turning 
point from the past, where transit fees on cross-border flows represented a major obstacle to 
the development of the internal electricity market and a common system of cross-border tari-
fication had simply not existed. 
Table 11. Subsequent hierarchical policymaking to regulate tarification in the power 
domain from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
Indicator	   Evidence 	  
Member States and 
regulated companies are 
obligated to adopt 
uniform solutions 
Regulation 1228/2003 makes non-transaction-based tariffs and an 
inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism 
binding, and lays the ground for the future codification of details 
of the compensation mechanism as well as the harmonisation of 
charges levied on generators	  
Compliance with uniform 
solutions is monitored 
Regulation 1228/2003 provides for compliance-monitoring 
reports with the adopted uniform solutions 	  
Reforms are not 
developed on the basis of 
comparisons 
Regulation 1228/2003 is not based on comparisons 	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Agreement on reforms is 
developed with low 
stakeholder participation 
Regulation 1228/2003 is adopted through ordinary legislative 
procedure, in which participation is limited to Member States and 
the Commission	  
 
The first indicator used to argue that, after the development of agreements on reforms, the 
Commission switched to hierarchical policymaking, is that it reduced stakeholder participation. 
Rather than using the experimentalist architecture of the Florence Forum, which continued to 
be available, the Commission employed the hierarchical architecture of the ordinary legislative 
procedure, which as seen in Chapters Two and Three, features low stakeholder participation. 
By turning to such hierarchical architecture, the Commission favoured a procedure in which 
participation does not include stakeholders, but rather, is limited to itself and Member States.  
Second, the Commission developed reforms without comparing different approaches to tarifi-
cation regulation pursued by Member States and regulated companies. Instead, it codified re-
forms previously agreed upon, and laid the ground for the future codification of others that had 
not yet been agreed upon. In March 2001, it tabled a legislative proposal.260 The proposal re-
flected agreements that, as seen in the previous section, had already been reached at that time, 
namely, the establishment of compensation for transmission system operators and nontransac-
tion-based tariffs. In its recital, it stated that “transmission system operators should be com-
pensated for costs incurred as a result of hosting transit flows of electricity on their networks 
by the operators of the transmission systems from which transits originate or for which they 
are destined”, and that “it would not be appropriate to apply distance-related tariffs, or a spe-
cific tariff to be paid only by exporters or importers”.261 With respect to the intertransmission 
system operator compensation mechanism, it proposed that the amounts of transit hosted and 
amounts of transit flow originating and/or ending in national transmission systems should be 
determined on the basis of the flow of electricity actually measured in a given period of time, 
and the costs incurred as a result of hosting transit flow should reflect costs and benefits borne 
by a network from hosting transit flow compared to the costs borne in the absence of such 
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flow.262 With regard to charges for access to networks, it proposed that exporters and importers 
should not be charged any specific charge in addition to the general charge for access to na-
tional networks, and that there should be no specific network charge on individual transac-
tions.263 Furthermore, the Commission proposed the future adoption of guidelines on the de-
tails of the determination of the transmission system operators liable to pay compensations for 
transit flows, details of the payment procedure to be followed, details of methodologies to de-
termine the amount of transits hosted and exports/imports of electricity made, details of the 
methodology to determine the costs incurred as a result of hosting transits of electricity and 
details of the harmonisation of the charges applied to generators under national tariff sys-
tems.264 At the time when the Commission tabled its legislative proposal, as seen in the previ-
ous section, these reforms had not yet been agreed upon. In June 2003, the European Parliament 
and Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 on conditions for accessing the network 
for cross-border exchanges in electricity, without adding any major change to the Commis-
sion’s proposal.265 Thus, the Commission did not develop reforms based on comparisons of 
different approaches, but rather, codified reforms based on agreements previously reached 
through experimentalist processes and comparisons. Chapter Six described how a few years 
later, it also codified the rest of the reforms that were previously agreed upon. 
Third, Member States and regulated companies did not continue to be granted discretion to 
pursue different approaches to tarification regulation. On the contrary, by giving binding power 
to these reforms, the Commission imposed uniform policy solutions on all Member States and 
regulated companies. Fourth and finally, rather than comparing different approaches pursued 
by Member States and regulated companies, Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 prescribed the 
monitoring of compliance with the uniform policy solutions it had made binding for all Mem-
ber States and regulated companies.266 
                                                
262Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the 
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Art.6. 2001/C 240 E/12, COM(2001) 125 final, 
2001/0078(COD), Submitted by the Commission on 13 March 2001, Art.3(1) and (6).	  
263Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the 
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Art.6. 2001/C 240 E/12, COM(2001) 125 final, 
2001/0078(COD), Submitted by the Commission on 13 March 2001, Art.4(1), (4) and (5).	  
264Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the 
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Art.6. 2001/C 240 E/12, COM(2001) 125 final, 
2001/0078(COD), Submitted by the Commission on 13 March 2001, Art.7.	  
265Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Arts. 3, 4 and 8.	  
266 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Art. 14.	  
99	  
Finding similar patterns of policymaking in the gas domain 
Observing initial experimentalist policymaking  
Similarly to the power domain, the Commission initially engaged in experimentalist 
policymaking in the gas domain. This assertion is supported by the indicators shown in Table 
12. By using the experimentalist architecture of the Madrid Forum, the Commission stimulated 
the comparison of different approaches of tarification regulation that Member States and 
regulated companies had been granted discretion to pursue, and facilitated the development of 
agreements on reforms on this basis with high stakeholder participation. The importance of 
these reforms is twofold. First, by establishing that tariffs should reflect costs, these agreements 
deviated from previous ones, in which cross-subsidies that had detrimental effects on 
competition were pervasive. 267  Second, by introducing entry-exit systems in which entry 
transport capacity can be sold without any restriction as to its final destination, they marked a 
clear turning point from the previously dominant point-to-point systems, which ensured that 
incumbents with larger portfolios of gas supply contracts had a commercial advantage over 
new entrants.  
Table 12. Initial experimentalist policymaking to regulate tarification in the gas domain 
from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
Indicator 	   Evidence 	  
Member States and/or regulated 
companies are granted discretion 
to adopt different approaches  
Directive 98/30/EC allows Member States and regulated 
companies to pursue different approaches to regulate 
network access and in particular tarification (e.g., point-to-
point, entry-exit, hybrids) 
Different approaches are 
compared 
Comparisons of UK, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, 
France and Italy, in individual presentations as well as 
overviews by GTE, CEER and the Brattle Group   
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Agreements on reforms are 
developed based on comparisons  
Agreements in 2002 on the principle of cost-reflective 
tariffs and entry-exit systems 
Agreement on reforms are 
developed with high stakeholder 
participation 
Agreements are developed within the Madrid Forum, which 
features high stakeholder participation	  
 
The first indicator used to claim that the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking 
is that Member States and regulated companies were granted discretion to pursue different 
approaches to regulate tarification. As seen in Chapter Three, the first 1998 Gas Directive set 
out the general framework for the introduction of competition in the industry, but left much of 
the technical and practical details of implementation open to national interpretation. With re-
gard to tarification regulation, in particular, it allowed any combination of tariff principles and 
structures. In the absence of any common EU regulatory framework, differences in tariff reg-
ulation inevitably occurred across Member States.268  
The second indicator is that the Commission employed the Madrid Forum, which as seen in 
Chapters Two and Three is an experimentalist architecture characterised by high stakeholder 
participation. Organised by the Commission in 1999, it brings together national regulatory au-
thorities, national governments, transmission system operators, gas suppliers and traders, con-
sumers, network users and gas exchanges.269  
Third, the Madrid Forum was used to compare different approaches to tarification regulation 
adopted by Member States and regulated companies, with the objective of “identifying the 
different methodologies and approaches concerning access conditions, in particular tarifica-
tion, that are developing in the Member States”. For this purpose, at the 1st Madrid Forum 
meeting, Callum McCarthy from the British regulatory authority, Lopex Silanes from the Span-
ish company Gas Natural, and George Verberg from the Dutch company Gasunie, outlined the 
approach to tarification regulation in their respective countries. On this basis, three different 
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methodologies were identified: the “entry-exit” approach applied in the UK, the distance-re-
lated “point-to-point” approach applied in Spain, and a hybrid system adopted in the Nether-
lands.270 As seen in Chapter Three, the Commission, Member States and the CEER invited the 
European gas industry to establish a new body, bringing together representatives of all those 
responsible for the operation of the transmission network for gas in Europe. The aim of GTE 
was to provide technical data regarding the transmission systems within Europe.271 In particu-
lar, GTE was invited to provide the Commission with a detailed examination of the tarification 
mechanisms and levels, for a representative sample of services and types of customers, on a 
Member State-by-Member State basis; and with an overview of specific measures with regard 
to cross-border transit arrangements, where any existed, also on a Member State-by-Member 
State basis.272    
Fourth, based on these comparisons, agreements on reforms were developed. As a result of the 
information provided by GTE, Forum participants recognised “very significant differences 
among tariff structures for transmission in the EU”.273 They considered that the significant dif-
ferences that existed among national tariff structures, “where not based on common principles, 
could have hampered gas trade and market liquidity”. Hence, in order to facilitate transporta-
tion across the boundaries of transmission system operators, they stressed the need for a Euro-
pean gas market based on common principles.274 At the 5th Madrid Forum meeting in February 
2002, participants agreed upon a set of common principles proposed by the CEER, including 
the principle that all tariffs for the use of gas transmission networks be cost-reflective so that 
any differences in tariffs applied to different customers for similar services would reflect the 
underlying costs, thereby avoiding cross-subsidies.275  
Based on the same comparisons, an agreement on a second important reform was also devel-
oped. Based on the “significant differences” among the observed national tariff structures, and 
in addition to agreeing upon the principle of cost-reflectiveness, the Commission, regulators, 
most Member States, traders and local distributors expressed “serious doubts” that distance-
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related, point-to-point systems would effectively promote trade and market liquidity.276 In-
stead, they considered that entry-exit would best meet the agreed upon set of principles, par-
ticularly that of cost-reflectivity, and would also best facilitate the development of competition 
in the European gas market.277 The CEER, in close consultation with GTE, was invited to ex-
amine the concrete consequences of different tarification systems, and to present the results of 
its work for discussion at the following Forum meeting.278 By making explicit references to 
implementation experiences with entry-exit systems, such as those of UK and Italy, the paper 
prepared by the CEER highlighted that the key feature of such a system was that entry capacity 
could be sold without any restriction on its final destination. Therefore, it stimulated the devel-
opment of hubs where network users who had booked entry or exit capacity could sell or buy 
gas, which in turn, fostered trade and competition. The paper contrasted this system with point-
to-point systems, where there was an incentive for network users to swap gas scheduled to flow 
in opposite directions in order to save the associated transport costs. This system ensured a 
commercial advantage of incumbents over new entrants, due to their existing large portfolios 
of gas supply contracts.279 Similarly, a study prepared for the Commission by the Brattle Group 
consulting firm, based on its advantages in terms of cost-reflectivity and the promotion of com-
petition, recommended entry-exit systems.280 At the 6th Madrid Forum meeting in October 
2002, the Commission, the CEER, most Member States, consumers, traders and local distrib-
utors “confirmed their view that an entry-exit tariff structure would in principle best facilitate 
the development of competition in the European gas market”.281   
Observing a subsequent shift to hierarchical policymaking 
 Similarly to the power domain, also in the gas domain the Commission shifted to hierarchical 
policymaking almost immediately after the development of agreements on reforms, as evi-
denced by the indicators showed in Table 13. Shortly after the elaboration of agreements on 
reforms, the Commission used the ordinary legislative procedure to table a legislative proposal. 
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By using this hierarchical architecture, it reduced stakeholder participation. Rather than con-
ducting comparisons of different approaches pursued by Member States and regulated compa-
nies, it monitored their compliance with uniform solutions. Instead of developing reforms 
based on comparisons, it codified part of the reforms that were previously agreed upon, thereby 
obligating Member States and regulated companies to implement uniform policy solutions. The 
resulting regulation is important because it provided the first set of common rules for accessing 
the network for cross-border exchanges in gas. By imposing that tariffs be cost-reflective, it 
departed from previous regimes, which were dominated by tariffs that did not reflect costs and 
which created cross-subsidies in favour of incumbents over new entrants, distorting competi-
tion and cross-border trade.  
Table 13. Subsequent hierarchical policymaking to regulate tarification in the gas domain 
from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
Indicator	   Evidence 	  
Member States and regulated 
companies are obligated to adopt 
uniform solutions 
Regulation 1775/2005 makes cost-reflective tariffs 
binding, and a few years later, another piece of EU 
legislation also makes entry-exit systems binding	  
Compliance with uniform solutions 
is monitored 
Compliance with entry-exit systems is monitored, 
notably through the CEER checklist	  
Reforms are not developed on the 
basis of comparisons 
Regulation 1775/2005 is not based on comparisons 	  
Agreement on reforms is 
developed with low stakeholder 
participation 
Regulation 1775/2005 is adopted through the ordinary 
legislative procedure, in which participation is limited to 
Member States and the Commission	  
 
Shortly after agreements on reforms were achieved, the Commission reduced stakeholder par-
ticipation by employing the ordinary legislative procedure, which as seen in Chapters Two and 
Three, is a hierarchical architecture characterised by low stakeholder participation because par-
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ticipation is limited to the Commission and Member States. In December 2003, the Commis-
sion tabled a legislative proposal for regulation on conditions for access to gas transmission 
networks.282 
Rather than comparing different approaches of tarification regulation pursued by Member 
States and regulated companies, compliance with uniform policy solutions was monitored. In 
September 2003, the CEER provided a checklist of necessary elements of entry-exit systems, 
which the Commission considered a workable basis for monitoring the implementation of en-
try-exit systems. A result of this checklist, it was noted that an increasing number of Member 
States had already implemented entry-exit tariff systems.283 Indeed Jacques Laurelut, Vice 
President of GTE, had already noted in July 2004 that, “for many transmission system opera-
tors such move from point-to-point to entry/exit is now behind in the past [and] the move to-
ward entry/exit tariff systems is now widely pursued by the transmission system operators”.284 
Reforms were not developed based on comparisons. In contrast, shortly after development of 
the agreement on the principle of cost-reflectivity (and entry-exit systems) in 2002, in 2003, 
the Commission proposed its codification to the European Parliament and Council.285 In Sep-
tember 2005, the European Parliament and Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 
on conditions for accessing the natural gas transmission networks without making any major 
changes to the Commission’s proposal.286 The regulation mandated that the tariffs applied by 
transmission system operators and approved by regulatory authorities reflect actual costs in-
curred and avoid cross-subsidies between network users.287 Thus, the Commission’s legislative 
proposal was based on part of the reforms that had already been agreed upon through experi-
mentalist processes, namely, the principle of cost-reflectivity, as seen in the previous section. 
Chapter Six will show that a few years later, the Commission codified through hierarchical 
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transmission networks. Brussels, 10.12.2003, COM(2003) 741 final 2003/0302 (COD).	  
283Conclusions of the 7th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum. Madrid, 24–25 September 2003, 
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conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. Art.3 (1) and (2).	  
105	  
policymaking via the ordinary legislative procedure also the other part of the reforms previ-
ously agreed through experimentalist processes, namely entry-exit systems.  
Finally, far from granting discretion to Member States and regulated companies to adopt dif-
ferent approaches in an experimentalist fashion, the Commission imposed uniform policy so-
lutions of tarification regulation, by making the principle of cost-reflectiveness binding for all 
Member States and regulated companies. 
Accounting for the identified patterns of policymaking  
Confirming the limitations of the shadow of hierarchy and polyarchy 
explanations 
The previous sections show patterns of policymaking that were strikingly similar to those ob-
served in Chapter Three with regard to the issue area of congestion management. This chapter 
also shows that in the issue area of tarification regulation, in both the power and gas domains, 
the Commission initially engaged in experimentalist policymaking but subsequently switched 
to hierarchical policymaking. These findings confirm the limitations of the shadow of hierarchy 
and polyarchy explanations.  
From the shadow of hierarchy perspective it is puzzling that, in both the power and gas do-
mains, the Commission initially engaged in experimentalist policymaking. During the period 
analysed, the Commission’s formal rulemaking powers were limited to the ordinary legislative 
procedure. As seen in Chapters Two and Three, in such a procedure, the Commission had ex-
clusive rights to propose legislation, but its proposals needed to be adopted by both the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council.288 For this reason, this thesis considers that the shadow of 
hierarchy, which the Commission could cast on parties to induce cooperation, was weaker.  
One cannot argue that even if the Commission’s ability to threaten adverse legislation was 
weaker, it still engaged in experimentalist policymaking because the parties were not conflict-
ing. This is because, in fact, the parties had conflicting preferences. In the power domain, sug-
gests Professor Ortigosa, co-founder and Vice President of the CEER and President of the Ital-
                                                
288See for example http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq#q6. Accessed on 21 March 
2016.	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ian regulatory authority, the Commission wanted to maximise the circulation of energy; na-
tional governments apparently favoured the interests of their transmission system operators but 
also those of their main generators and suppliers. These companies sometimes favoured liber-
alisation depending upon the market power they could exercise in an only partially integrated 
European market and large consumers had precisely opposite interests.289 By taking into ac-
count views expressed by network users (Eurelectric), traders (EFET), large industrial consum-
ers (International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers, IFIEC and European Chemical 
Industry Council, CEFIC) and power exchanges (EuroPEX), the Commission, regulators and 
Member States raised issues and requested amendments to the overall level of compensation 
for cross-border flow as well as to the collection mechanism initially proposed by the ETSO.290 
In addition, two distinct categories of Member States existed: those that intended to charge 
exporters with costs and those that favoured a system of repartition of costs and revenues for 
all users of the network. As clarified by Fernando Lasheras Garcia, there was tension between 
transit countries interested in maximising payments and external countries interested in mini-
mising such payments.291 Indeed the Commission, large industrial consumers, traders, local 
distributors and a number of Member States and national regulators favoured the elimination 
of export charges.292 In contrast, transit countries in particular wished to maintain such export 
charges, with Germany being the last one to remove them.293  
Similarly, the gas domain parties also had conflicting preferences. Right after the establishment 
of GTE, the Commission, CEER and Member States requested that Eurogas (the association 
representing the European gas industry) and GTE re-examine the division of capabilities and 
independence between the new body’s constituent parts, to ensure that GTE was fully capable 
of taking into account the interests of all network users without discriminating between new 
entrants and vertically integrated incumbents.294 In addition, while the Commission, CEER, 
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consumer organisations, traders (EFET) and local distributors (the Voice of Local Energy Dis-
tributors across Europe, GEODE) considered that an entry-exit system would best meet the 
principle of cost-reflectivity and facilitate the development of competition, GTE suggested that 
an appropriate balance between distinct objectives (e.g., cost-reflectivity and simplicity) 
needed to be established, and that each system had comparative advantages and disadvantages; 
hence, there should be no bias against entry-exit or point-to-point systems.295 Thus, while the 
CEER, the Commission, Member States, representatives of consumers and traders considered 
that tarification systems needed to move closer together and particularly favoured entry-exit 
systems, GTE resisted such harmonisation, arguing instead that considerable differences ex-
isted across domestic markets and that accordingly tarification systems should be chosen on a 
case-by-case basis at the national level.296  
In contrast to the shadow of hierarchy perspective, the polyarchy viewpoint provides a useful 
explanation of why the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking in both domains. 
From this outlook, the Commission’s engagement in experimentalist policymaking can be ac-
counted for precisely in light of its modest formal rulemaking powers. Since delegation of 
rulemaking powers from Member States to the supranational level was traditionally very lim-
ited,297 the Commission could initially only count on the ordinary legislative procedure. For 
this reason, the distribution of powers was more polyarchic. The Commission, therefore, could 
not impose rules hierarchically, but rather, had to cooperate with parties to develop them 
through experimentalist policymaking.  
However, the polyarchy perspective does not explain why, in both the power and gas domains, 
the Commission initially engaged in experimentalist policymaking but then shifted to hierar-
chical policymaking, even if its formal rulemaking powers had not changed, and thus, the dis-
tribution of powers had not become less polyarchic. 
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Supporting the argument emphasising uncertainty 
The identified patterns of policymaking are consistent with the argument about uncertainty 
developed in Chapter Three. As mentioned in Chapters Two and Three, the integration of na-
tional electricity systems into a common market was entirely virgin territory, which raised a 
host of poorly understood technical issues.298 One such novel issue was how to facilitate trade, 
and at the same time, how to compensate transit countries for the extra costs they incurred due 
to the external cross-border transactions they had to host. As suggested by Peter Styles, previ-
ously no common system for cross-border tarification was in place. Instead, tariffs were nego-
tiated among neighbouring, vertically integrated companies, which were at the same time both 
generators and transmission system operators.299 Furthermore, countries charged transit fees or 
export charges to compensate for the extra costs of hosting cross-border flow. In 1998, Florence 
Forum participants agreed that, “the main issue is the need for the rapid development of mech-
anisms and tarification systems that will enable the single market to become a reality”. They 
recognised, however, that “at present, such mechanisms and systems do not exist. As a matter 
of fact, up to now, cross-border transactions were limited to technical exchanges (stand-by and 
emergency exchanges over short distance) among the owners of the high-voltage grid. […] The 
old rules […] do not cover commercial electricity exchanges through liberalized markets”.300 
In the words of the Commission, “for most eligible customers it is in fact organisationally and 
economically difficult to choose a supplier situation in another Member State, in particular if 
a third or fourth Member State has to be transited. The reason for this is simple: there is no 
tariff framework for cross-border transactions. Each transaction has to be negotiated, and each 
concerned transmission system operator will require a transmission fee, which is not neces-
sarily coordinated with the transmission fees already payable to other transmission system op-
erators. Thus, the sum of all required transmission fees will in most cases add up to a prohibi-
tive amount, making it cheaper for the customer to stick to the local supplier”.301 
                                                
298Eberlein, B. (2008) The Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance and 
Government. Journal of Public Policy, 28: 77; Eberlein, B. (2010) ‘Experimentalist Governance in the 
European Energy Sector’. In C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (Eds.) Experimentalist governance in the European 
Union: towards a new architecture. Oxford: OUP, p. 65; see also Eberlein, B. (2003) ‘Regulating cross-border 
trade by soft law? The Florence Process in the supranational governance of electricity markets’. Journal of 
Network Industries, 4(2): 137–55.	  
299Interview with Peter Styles, Chairman of the Electricity Committee of EFET. London, 28 July 2016.	  
3002nd Forum of European Electricity Regulation. Florence, October 8th and 9th, 1998, p.3.	  
301Commission of the European Communities Second report to the Council and the European Parliament on 
harmonization requirements: Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. 
Brussels, 16 April 1999, COM(1999) 164 final, pp.14–15.	  
109	  
While the lack of experience about cross-border tarification does not necessarily imply that the 
Commission only had general policy preferences on how to regulate this issue area, the lack of 
reference to specific policy preferences in the available primary sources does. No reference to 
non-transaction-based tariffs or inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanisms 
were found in any of the main regulatory policy documents at the beginning of liberalisation 
and re-regulation of European power markets. These documents include the 1992 Commis-
sion’s proposal for the first Electricity Directive, the Directive as adopted in 1996 by the Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council, a Commission’s report on the state of liberalisation of the en-
ergy markets adopted in April 1998, the Commission’s first report on harmonisation require-
ments with regard to the Directive published in March 1998, and the minutes from the first 
Florence Forum meetings held in 1998.302 At that time, the broad goal of non-discriminatory 
tarification was known, but the detailed methods to achieve such a framework goal were un-
known, which was confirmed by Fernando Lasheras Garcia.303 
Similarly, the Commission did not have specific policy preferences on how to regulate tarifi-
cation in the gas domain. This claim is supported by the lack of reference by the Commission, 
in the main regulatory policy documents of that period, on specific tarification methods, and in 
particular, on the principle of cost-reflectivity or entry-exit systems. No reference was found 
on such principle or systems in the 1992 Commission’s proposal for a first Gas Directive, the 
1998 Directive as adopted by the European Parliament and Council, a Commission’s report on 
the state of liberalisation of the energy markets adopted in April 1998, the first overview report 
on the Directive’s implementation adopted by the Commission in 2000, or the minutes of the 
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first Madrid Forum meetings held during 1999 and 2000.304  
Based on the lack of specific policy preferences on how to regulate tarification in the power 
and gas domains, this chapter considers that, at the very beginning of the liberalisation and re-
regulation of European energy markets, the Commission faced higher uncertainty in both do-
mains. As previously seen in this chapter, under these conditions of higher uncertainty, the 
Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking by employing the experimentalist ar-
chitectures of the Florence and Madrid Fora to compare different approaches pursued by Mem-
ber States and regulated companies, and to develop agreements on reforms on this basis with 
high stakeholder participation. 
However, in both domains, the Commission shifted to hierarchical policymaking by using the 
hierarchical architecture of the ordinary legislative procedure to codify reforms with low stake-
holder participation without comparing different approaches, but rather, by monitoring com-
pliance with uniform policy solutions to make them binding for all Member States and regu-
lated companies. This chapter argues that the Commission shifted to hierarchical policymaking 
when it found itself in conditions of lower uncertainty in both domains.  
In the power domain, the Commission shifted to hierarchical policymaking by tabling a legis-
lative proposal in March 2001.305 By then, uncertainty had become lower because the Com-
mission had developed more specific policy preferences. This is evidenced by regulatory policy 
documents, such as Commission reports and minutes of the Florence Forum. In the second 
report on harmonisation requirements with regard to the Directive published in April 1999, the 
Commission considered that a non-transaction-based tarification system, which relied on inter-
transmission system operator compensation in order to facilitate trade, would have had several 
advantages: it recognised the customers’ need for simple and non-transaction-based tariffs, and 
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at the same time, allowed transmission system operators to be remunerated for the costs in-
curred.306 As seen in this chapter, at the 4th Florence Forum meeting in November 1999, par-
ticipants including the Commission voluntarily agreed that “the network charges will be inde-
pendent of the commercial transactions that the network users may engage in”, and at the same 
time, that “transmission system operators that suffer the extra costs of losses and congestions 
caused by cross-border transactions should receive payment from other transmission system 
operators”.307 These documents show that, by the end of 1999, the Commission had developed 
specific policy preferences on how to regulate tarification in the power domain, namely, on the 
basis of non-transaction-based tariffs and an inter-transmission system operator compensation 
mechanism. Thus, when in March 2001 the Commission used the ordinary legislative proce-
dure to engage in hierarchical policymaking, it faced lower uncertainty. 
Similarly, the Commission engaged in hierarchical policymaking in the gas domain by tabling 
a legislative proposal via the ordinary legislative procedure only after it had developed specific 
policy preferences on how to regulate tarification. The Commission tabled a legislative pro-
posal in December 2003,308 but by that time, had already developed specific policy preferences. 
This is demonstrated in the minutes of the Florence Forum, which show that in February 2002, 
the Commission together with other Forum participants, voluntarily adopted the principle of 
cost-reflectivity, and that in October of the same year, the Commission also expressed its spe-
cific preference for a precise tarification system, namely, entry-exit.309  
Conclusions 
This chapter examined the argument that the Commission engages in experimentalist policy-
making under conditions of higher uncertainty, as outlined in Chapter Three. It continued to 
compare the Commission’s regulatory policymaking across power and gas domains from the 
late 1990s to the early 2000s, but shifted attention from the issue area of congestion manage-
ment to that of tarification regulation. Its central findings were strikingly similar to those of 
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Chapter Three. In both the power and gas domains, at the very beginning of the market liber-
alisation and integration processes, the Commission used the experimentalist architectures of 
the Florence and Madrid Fora to stimulate the comparison of different approaches pursued by 
Member States and regulated companies and the development of agreements on reforms on 
this basis with high stakeholder participation. Thereafter, it shifted to hierarchical policymak-
ing. It monitored compliance with uniform policy solutions and by using the hierarchical ar-
chitecture of the ordinary legislative procedure. In addition, without comparing different ap-
proaches and with low stakeholder participation, it codified reforms that were previously 
agreed upon through experimentalist processes, making uniform solutions binding for all Mem-
ber States and regulated companies. 
These findings confirmed the limitations of the shadow of hierarchy and polyarchy explana-
tions. The former does not explain well the Commission’s engagement in experimentalist pol-
icymaking, given that the shadow of hierarchy the Commission could cast on conflicting par-
ties to induce them to cooperate was weaker. The latter explains it in the light of the more 
polyarchic distribution of power, which meant that the Commission could not impose rules 
hierarchically, but rather, had to cooperate with others to develop them through experimentalist 
policymaking. However, this viewpoint does not explain why, in both the power and gas do-
mains, the Commission switched to hierarchical policymaking, even if the distribution of 
power had not changed. In contrast, this chapter’s findings support the argument about uncer-
tainty developed in Chapter Three. In addition, in the issue area of tarification regulation, in 
both the power and gas domains, at the very beginning of the liberalisation and integration 
processes, the Commission only had general policy preferences. Under these conditions of 
higher uncertainty, it engaged in experimentalist policymaking, but due to the emergence of 
agreements on reforms, the Commission developed more specific policy preferences. Under 
these conditions of lower uncertainty, it shifted to hierarchical policymaking.  
Even though the findings from the late 1990s to the early 2000s are very similar across the 
distinct issue areas of congestion management (Chapter Three) and tarification (Chapter Four), 
this could have been due to factors common to both issue areas and other than uncertainty, such 
as time. Specifically, the type of policymaking that the Commission engages in could be a 
function of time, with policymaking generally beginning with experimentalist processes and 
then becoming formalised through hierarchical processes. For this reason, Chapter Five brings 
the empirical analysis of policymaking to the period from the mid-2000s to the present day 
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Chapter Five: Engaging in Different Policymaking across 
the Power and Gas Domains to Regulate Congestion Man-
agement 
Introduction 
This chapter further examines the argument that the Commission engages in experimentalist 
policymaking under conditions of higher uncertainty, which was developed in Chapter Three 
and supported in Chapter Four. It begins Phase Two of the empirical analysis of policymaking, 
which encompasses the period from the mid-2000s to the present day, during which time dif-
ferences in uncertainty emerged across issue areas and domains. In particular, this chapter com-
pares the regulation of congestion management across the power and gas domains during this 
time period. As seen in Chapter Three, in the early 2000s, an initial set of common rules man-
dating that scarce interconnection capacity be managed through market-based approaches had 
been adopted, marking a clear turning point from previous arrangements that limited competi-
tion and favoured incumbents. Still, energy did not always flow efficiently across Europe and 
incumbents remained largely able to foreclose markets. The current situation is dramatically 
different as Commission regulations and decisions containing legally binding rules have been 
adopted, which govern all cross-border electricity and gas market transactions with the goal of 
reducing congestion and efficiently allocating cross-border transport capacity.310   
In both domains, the Commission could engage in experimentalist and hierarchical policymak-
ing, due to the presence of both experimentalist and hierarchical architectures. In addition to 
the ordinary legislative procedure, the Commission could also use the hierarchical architecture 
represented by the comitology procedure, thanks to the power it became equipped with almost 
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identically in the power and gas domains in 2003 and 2005, respectively.311 At the same time, 
the Commission could also resort to experimentalist architectures, which developed in parallel 
to hierarchical architectures analogously across the gas and power domains. In addition to the 
Florence and Madrid Fora, since 2009, in both the power and gas domains, the Commission 
has been able to co-develop rules with the ACER, ENTSO-E, ENTSO-G and other stakehold-
ers, based on the network codes procedure.312 
This chapter’s central findings are that the Commission engaged in different types of policy-
making across the two domains. In the power domain, the Commission employed experimen-
talist architectures, such as the Florence Forum and the network codes procedure, to stimulate 
the comparison of different approaches being pursued by Member States and regulated com-
panies and to facilitate the development of agreements on reforms on this basis with high stake-
holder participation. Alternatively, in the gas domain, the Commission engaged in hierarchical 
policymaking. By using the hierarchical architecture of the comitology procedure, it developed 
reforms without comparing different approaches and with low stakeholder participation, to im-
pose uniform policy solutions on all Member States and regulated companies and to monitor 
their compliance with them. 
From the polyarchy perspective, it is surprising that in the power domain, the Commission 
engaged in experimentalist policymaking, even if the distribution of powers had become less 
polyarchic because of the stronger Commission’s formal rulemaking powers. In contrast, this 
finding is consistent with the shadow of hierarchy viewpoint, according to which the Commis-
sion’s engagement in experimentalist policymaking can be accurately explained because it 
could cast a stronger shadow of hierarchy thanks to its strengthened formal rulemaking powers. 
However, this viewpoint does not explain why the Commission did not also engage in experi-
mentalist policymaking in the gas domain, even though the shadow of hierarchy that loomed 
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Art.8(6); Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. 
Art.8(6).	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was equivalent across the two domains. Instead, the perspective emphasising uncertainty can 
account for the patterns of policymaking found. In the power domain, the Commission was 
confronted with new policy questions for which it did not have straightforward policy prefer-
ences. Under these conditions of higher uncertainty, it engaged in experimentalist policymak-
ing. On the other hand, in the gas domain, the Commission continued to hold previously estab-
lished preferences for specific policies. Under these conditions of lower uncertainty, it favoured 
hierarchical policymaking.   
This chapter first identifies the types of policymaking the Commission engaged in, to contrast 
the use of experimentalist policymaking in the power domain with the use of hierarchical pol-
icymaking in the gas domain. Then it shows how the polyarchy and shadow of hierarchy view-
points are only partially consistent with the identified patterns of policymaking, hence further 
confirming their limitations. Together, these findings provide further support for the uncer-
tainty perspective, which is able to explain the identified patterns of policymaking. 	  
Engaging in different types of policymaking in the two domains 
Finding experimentalist policymaking in power 
In the power domain, to regulate congestion management from the mid-2000s to the present 
day, the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking, as supported by the indicators 
and evidence shown in Table 14. Member States and regulated companies were granted the 
discretion to pursue different approaches to regulate congestion management, namely, different 
types and subtypes of market-based auctions. Through experimentalist architectures, such as 
the Florence Forum and the network codes procedure, a “target model”	  was developed on the 
basis of comparisons of different approaches pursued by Member States and regulated compa-
nies with high stakeholder participation. It was then formalised through a Regulation, which 
established a binding guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management governing 
cross-border EU electricity markets. This Regulation is important because it promotes the ef-
ficient allocation of transport capacity, by providing that transport and commodity rights are 
implicitly traded through single rather separate auctions and that a single matching algorithm 
establishes both prices and volumes across all borders.313 
                                                
313https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/wholesale-market/electricity-network-codes; 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/CACM/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed on 4 
October 2016. 	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Table 14. Experimentalist policymaking to regulate congestion management in the 
power domain from the mid-2000s to the present day 
Indicator 	   Evidence 	  
Member States and/or 
regulated companies are 
granted discretion to adopt 
different approaches  
Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 allows Member States and 
regulated companies to pursue different approaches to regulate 
congestion management, namely, different types (i.e., explicit, 
implicit) and subtypes of auctions (i.e., implicit auctions though 
volume coupling and price coupling) 
Different approaches are 
compared 
Comparisons of different types of auctions (e.g., explicit auctions) 
in Italy-Slovenia (September 2007) and Italy-Switzerland 
(January 2008) and implicit auctions in the “Trilateral Market 
Coupling” involving France, Belgium and the Netherlands 
(November 2006), the Iberian electricity market project 
integrating Spain and Portugal (July 2007) and a project 
interconnecting Continental Europe and Nordic countries through 
Germany and Denmark (at that time expected by June 2008); 
comparisons of different subtypes of implicit auctions, namely, 
volume coupling, especially at the Danish-German border, and 
price coupling, notably, the Trilateral Market Coupling project 
connecting France, Belgium and the Netherlands 
Agreements on reforms 
are developed based on 
comparisons  
Agreements in 2009 on a target model for congestion 
management based on implicit auctions through price coupling, 
then formalised through Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 
Agreement on reforms is 
developed with high 
stakeholder participation 
Agreements are developed within the Florence Forum and then 
formalised through the network codes procedure, which both 
feature high stakeholder participation	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Member States and regulated companies were granted the discretion to pursue different ap-
proaches to regulate congestion management. As seen in Chapter Three, Regulation (EC) No. 
1228/2003 established the first common rules on cross-border trade. It mandated that network 
congestion problems be addressed through auctions, considered non-discriminatory market-
based approaches, rather than previously used long-term contracts and administered methods 
(e.g., pro-rata, first-come, first-served) that favoured incumbents by foreclosing the market. 
However, Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 did not specify what type of auction should be used, 
let alone through which specific arrangement. In particular, it left open the choice between 
“explicit auctions”, where commodity and transport rights are explicitly traded through sepa-
rate auctions, and “implicit auctions”, where transport rights are traded implicitly while trading 
commodity, through a single auction.314  
The Commission favoured high stakeholder participation by employing the Florence Forum, 
which as seen in Chapters Two, Three and Four is an experimentalist architecture characterised 
by high stakeholder participation. Immediately after the adoption of Regulation (EC) No. 
1228/2003, in the context of the Florence Forum, the Commission asked two consulting groups, 
Frontier Economics and Consentec, to jointly analyse cross-border congestion management 
approaches.315 ETSO and EuroPEX, which had published separate position papers, were then 
invited to elaborate upon a joint proposal on cross-border congestion management.316 Thereaf-
ter, the debate was broadened to include additional actors, notably generators and suppliers 
represented by Eurelectric.317 At the 11th Florence Forum meeting in September 2004, partici-
pants decided to set up a number of “Mini-Fora”. They had a similar composition to the Flor-
ence Forum, as they brought together the Commission, national regulatory authorities, Member 
                                                
314Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. 	  
315Frontier Economics and Consentec “Analysis of Cross-Border Congestion Management Methods for the EU 
Internal Electricity Market”. Study commissioned by the European Commission Directorate-General Energy 
and Transport, Final Report, June 2004.	  
316For previous separate position papers, see ETSO “Co-ordinated use of Power Exchanges for Congestion 
Management”. Final Report, April 2001; ETSO “Co-ordinated use of Power Exchanges for Congestion 
Management in Continental Europe: Market Design and Role of Power Exchanges”. Open Discussion Paper. 
Draft, February 2002; EuroPEX ‘Congestion Management. Presented at the Eighth Meeting of the European 
Electricity Regulatory Forum. Florence 21–22 February 2002; Co-ordinated congestion management: an ETSO 
vision, ETSO, April 2002; Outline proposals for a co-ordinated congestion management scheme based on the 
ETSO vision, ETSO, September 2002; Using implicit auctions to manage cross-border congestion: 
“Decentralised Market Coupling”, EuroPEX, July 2003. 
For the joint proposal, see ETSO and EuroPEX “Flow-based market coupling”. A joint ETSO-EuroPEX 
Proposal on Cross-Border Congestion Management and Integration of Electricity Markets in Europe. Interim 
Report, September 2004.	  
317Eurelectric “Contribution to the 11 Electricity Regulatory Forum”. April 2004. 	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State governments, transmission system operators and power exchanges. However, they had a 
macro-regional rather than pan-European dimension, and an exclusive focus on the issue area 
of congestion management. The aim of the Mini-Fora was to provide a plan and a detailed 
timetable for the introduction of market-based auctions.318 Mini-Fora meetings took place for 
more than one year.319 In the spring of 2006, with the support of the Commission, the ERGEG, 
which had been created in 2003 by the Commission as its formal advisory group,320 launched 
the “Regional Initiatives”, which had similar compositions and tasks as the Mini-Fora. They 
aimed to bring together the Commission, national regulatory authorities, transmission system 
operators and other stakeholders in a voluntary process to advance integration at the regional 
level as a step towards the creation of an internal market. According to the ACER, the Regional 
Initiatives “represent a bottom-up approach to completion of the internal energy market, in the 
sense that they bring all market participants together to test solutions for cross-border issues, 
carry out early implementation of the EU acquis and come up with pilot projects that can be 
exported from one region to others”.321  
The distinct types of auctions adopted by the Regional Initiatives were compared through 
ERGEG monitoring reports, which were regularly discussed at the Florence Forum.322 As an-
ticipated, Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 mandated the transition from administered methods 
to market-based auctions, but left the discretion to Member States and regulated companies 
with regard to the type of auctions. Through comparisons, Forum participants noted that some 
regions had preferred to move from the previously dominant administered methods (e.g., pro-
rata; first-come, first-served) to explicit auctions (e.g., Italy-Slovenia, September 2007; Italy-
Switzerland, January 2008), where the rights to buy or sell power in a neighbouring market 
and the transport rights to import or export power are traded through two distinct auctions. 
Other regions favoured the transition to implicit auctions, in which the right of buying or selling 
                                                
318Conclusions 11th Florence Electricity Regulatory Forum. September 2004.	  
319See, for example, 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/CLOSED%20PUBLIC%20CONSULTA
TIONS/ELECTRICITY/Congestion%20Management%20Guidelines/CD/E05-PC-03-
01_Public%20consultation%20paper%20on%20draft%20guidelin.pdf. Accessed on 4 October 2016.	  
3202003/796/EC: Commission Decision of 11 November 2003 on establishing the European Regulators Group 
for Electricity and Gas.	  
321http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/electricity/regional_initiatives/Pages/default.aspx; see also 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_ACTIVITIES/EER_INITIATIVES/ERI. Accessed on 
20th April 2015.	  
322http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_ACTIVITIES/EER_INITIATIVES and 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_ACTIVITIES/EER_INITIATIVES/ERI. Accessed on 
15th April 2015.	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power across borders also implies the right to transport it. The latter most notably included the 
“Trilateral Market Coupling”, a pioneering project that has connected France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands since November 2006. Regions that favoured a transition towards implicit auctions 
also included the Iberian electricity market project, integrating Spain and Portugal (July 2007), 
and a project interconnecting Continental Europe and Nordic countries through Germany and 
Denmark (at that time scheduled for June 2008).323  
On the basis of these comparisons, agreements on reforms were developed. By 2007, key actors 
had explicitly expressed their preference for implicit rather than explicit auctions, as shown by 
the following references. The Commission declared that, “although explicit auctioning is the-
oretically and with perfect foresight an efficient mechanism and it is in practice compatible 
with Regulation 1228/2003, it has efficiency deficits compared to implicit auctioning”.324 It 
also stated that, “in the future, more capacity will be allocated through implicit auctions. The 
so-called market coupling method, developed by ETSO and EuroPEX, has the highest potential 
of truly integrating the European electricity market through implicit auctions. […On the con-
trary,] explicit auctions as currently practiced often lead to inefficient use of interconnection 
capacity and prevent market integration”.325 The ERGEG claimed that, “it is now widely rec-
ognized that […] implicit allocation methods are more efficient than explicit auctions and 
should be the target mechanism for all regions”.326 Eurelectric explained that “it is now appro-
priate to restate our position as regards the preferred solution and the way forward”, also sup-
porting implicit rather than explicit auctions.327 As suggested by Peter Styles, this was far from 
evident because until 2006, implicit auctions had not been implemented in Europe except in 
the Nordic market.328 
After an agreement in favour of implicit auctions was reached among most actors, however, a 
new issue emerged regarding what specific arrangements should be adopted to ensure coher-
ence and convergence across European regions, since Member States and regulated companies 
                                                
323See for example ERGEG Regional Initiatives Annual Report. Progress and Prospects – March 2007; The 
Regional Initiatives – Europe’s key to energy market integration. ERGEG Regional Initiatives Annual Report - 
February 2008.  
324European Commission, DG for Competition, Energy Sector Inquiry, January 2007.	  
325European Commission, DG Energy and Transport, Report on Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-border trade in 
electricity, May 2007, p.5.	  
326ERGEG, Coherence and Convergence Report, July 2007.	  
327Union of the Electricity Industry –	  EURELECTRIC Position Paper Improving Interconnection Capacity 
Allocation. August 2005, p. 7.	  
328Interview with Peter Styles, Chairman of the Electricity Committee of EFET. London, 28 July 2016.	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had been granted the discretion to pursue implicit auctions through different approaches, that 
is, through different subtypes of implicit auctions. France, for example, was involved in four 
parallel projects at the same time: the first with Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Neth-
erlands; the second with Germany, Austria, Greece, Italy and Slovenia; the third with Spain 
and Portugal; and the fourth with the UK and Ireland. In 2007, the French regulatory authority 
expressed concerns about the compatibility of these distinct projects and raised the issue of 
“interregional coherence”.329 Similarly, ERGEG published “Coherence and Convergence Re-
ports”	  which warned that, although most regions had indeed been moving towards implicit 
auctions, attention was needed to their detailed design and implementation to ensure regions’	  
compatibility.330 These concerns were echoed by generators and suppliers. Eurelectric de-
nounced that different paces of market integration across Europe were leading to a “patchwork 
of different solutions”.331 It claimed that there were too many initiatives, sometimes overlap-
ping, going in different directions or not fully compatible. In order to “start keeping track sys-
tematically of which regions are not meeting their targets”, it hence suggested the next step to 
be the development of “a master plan that includes specific targets for concrete issues”.332 
The Commission continued to favour high stakeholder participation. Similarly to three years 
earlier, in the context of the Florence Forum it requested that Consentec Consulting look at 
what needed to be done within and between regions to move towards a single European elec-
tricity market.333 Then, ETSO and EuroPEX were asked to write a common discussion paper 
that addressed challenges highlighted by the consulting study.334 Thereafter, ERGEG was in-
vited to create an informal Project Coordination Group (PCG) of experts with participants from 
the Commission, regulators and Member State representatives, transmission system operators, 
                                                
329CRE “Management and use of electric interconnections in 2007”.   
330ERGEG ERI Coherence and Convergence Report –	  Conclusions. E08-ERI-12-04, 15 February 2008, p.10.	  
331‘Set up EU-side master plan for market integration, regulators told’. European Daily Electricity Markets, 
Heren Energy, 2 March 2009.	  
332‘Set up EU-side master plan for market integration, regulators told’. European Daily Electricity Markets, 
Heren Energy, 2 March 2009.	  
333CONCLUSIONS XIVth European Electricity Regulatory Forum. Florence, 24–25 September 2007, p.4.	  
334CONCLUSIONS XIVth European Electricity Regulatory Forum Florence, 24–25 September 2007, p.4; 
EuroPEX and ETSO ‘Coordinated Model(s) for Regional and Inter-Regional Congestion Management 
Methods’. 1 February 2008, p.1. Available at 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Florence_Fora/15
th_Florence_Forum. Accessed on 9th December 2015; EuroPEX-ETSO, Interim Report Development and 
Implementation of a Coordinated Model for Regional and Inter-Regional Congestion Management, April 2008; 
Available at http://www.europex.org/index/pages/id_page-22/lang-en/. Accessed on 9th December 2015; 
EuroPEX and ETSO ‘Development and Implementation of a Coordinated Model for Regional and Inter-
Regional Congestion Management’. Final Report, January 2009.	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power exchanges, generators and suppliers and traders.335 The PCG was asked to develop a 
model to harmonise interregional and EU-wide coordinated congestion management, and to 
proposing a roadmap with concrete measures and a detailed timeframe, taking into account 
progress achieved by the Regional Initiatives.336 
Through debates in the PCG, its participants compared different approaches. As a result of the 
joint ETSO-EuroPEX paper, two main alternatives for implementing implicit auctions were 
identified: a less harmonised “volume coupling”, in which only the flows between markets are 
determined in the first stage and prices are subsequently calculated by the local power ex-
changes, and a more harmonised “price coupling”, in which a single pattern matching algo-
rithm established both prices and volumes across all borders.337  
By taking into account the experiences of the Regional Initiatives, PCG participants developed 
agreements on reforms as well as on metrics for assessing the progress towards them. By their 
5th meeting, they considered the volume-coupling arrangements less efficient, because in the 
Danish-German experience they had delivered economically incoherent results (i.e., energy 
flowing from higher to lower priced areas) and had created problems of market power by al-
lowing transport capacity to be often booked but unused. Volume coupling was not producing 
the correct results and was considered unpredictable, explains Peter Styles.338 This was con-
firmed by Alberto Pototschnig, Director of the ACER, who suggests that the Danish-German 
volume-coupling project was a disaster as it failed to launch twice. Until then, many actors 
believed that those arrangements could have worked.339 In contrast, by reflecting on the Trilat-
eral Market Coupling project connecting France, Belgium and the Netherlands since 2006, 
PCG participants concluded that price-coupling arrangements had been proven to efficiently 
operate.340 A few months afterwards, PCG participants also developed a consensus on the pro-
gressive extension throughout Europe of the price-coupling arrangements, rather than tackling 
                                                
335Conclusions XVth European Electricity Regulatory Forum. Florence, 24–25 November 2008, p.2. 
336http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Florence_Fora
/PCG. Accessed on 4 October 2016.	  
337EuroPEX-ETSO, Interim Report Development and Implementation of a Coordinated Model for Regional and 
Inter-Regional Congestion Management, April 2008; Available at http://www.europex.org/index/pages/id_page-
22/lang-en/. Accessed on 9th December 2015; EuroPEX and ETSO ‘Development and Implementation of a 
Coordinated Model for Regional and Inter-Regional Congestion Management’. Final Report, January 2009.	  
338Interview with Peter Styles, Chairman of the Electricity Committee of EFET. London, 28 July 2016.	  
339Interview with Alberto Pototschnig, Director of ACER. Ljubljana, 9 June 2016.	  
340Minutes of the 5th PCG Meeting. 8 July 2009 from 11:00 to 16:30 hours, CEER offices, Brussels.  
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interregional coordination through looser volume-coupling arrangements.341 After one year of 
comparisons and debates within the PCG,342 in December 2009, the Commission, regulators, 
transmission system operators, power exchanges, generators and suppliers and traders success-
fully proposed to the Florence Forum a target model for congestion management based on 
implicit price coupling and a roadmap for its progressive extension from the Trilateral Market 
Coupling region to neighbouring regions.343  
Thereafter, the Commission continued to engage in experimentalist policymaking by using the 
experimentalist architecture represented by the network codes procedure, even though it could 
have used hierarchical architectures, such as the comitology procedure. As seen in Chapter 
Two, the network codes procedure is an experimentalist architecture, because it reflects its key 
elements as set by its proponents. In particular, it constitutes a highly inclusive procedure in 
which rules are drafted by the Commission, the ACER and the ENTSO-E. Furthermore, since 
both the ACER and ENTSO-E are under strict consulting and transparency obligations, this 
procedure also closely involves other stakeholders.344 
After consulting with the ACER and ENTSO-E, the Commission included congestion man-
agement as a priority area in the development of network codes, and asked the ACER to pro-
duce framework guidelines that set principles for developing specific network codes.345 On the 
basis of these framework guidelines, the ENTSO-E also drafted a network code by consulting 
                                                
341Minutes of the 5th PCG Meeting. 8 July 2009 from 11:00 to 16:30 hours, CEER offices, Brussels; 6th PCG 
Meeting. 7 October 2009 from 10:30 to 17:00 hours ENTSO-E offices, Brussels; 7th PCG Meeting. 2 
November 2009 from 10:30 to 17:00 hours Eurelectric offices, Brussels; 7th PCG Meeting. 2 November 2009 
from 10:30 to 17:00 hours Eurelectric offices, Brussels.  
342Available at 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Florence_Fora/P
CG. Accessed on 9th December 2015.	  
343PCG Proposal for Target Model and Roadmap for Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management. PCG 
Report to the XVIIth Florence Forum. 10&11 December 2009, Rome; and PCG Presentation to the Florence 
Forum on the Target Model. Both available at: 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Florence_Fora/P
CG. Accessed on 7 October 2016.    
344http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/Pages/default.aspx; 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed on 16 
September 2016.	  
345Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for Electricity. FG-2011-E-002, 
29 July 2011. 	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stakeholders, as recommended by the ACER.346 Then the Commission proposed the draft net-
work code to the Electricity Cross-Border Committee, made up of specialists from national 
energy ministries.347 The Committee eventually accepted the draft network code, which was 
adopted via the comitology procedure with approval of the Council of the EU and the European 
Parliament. In 2015 it became a legally binding regulation termed Commission Regulation 
(EU) 2015/1222, which establishes very detailed guidelines on capacity allocation and conges-
tion management that governs all cross-border power networks. At its core, it mandates that 
congestion management be based on implicit price coupling.348 Thus, it formalises and gives 
binding power to the reforms that, as just seen, were agreed upon at the Florence Forum through 
experimentalist policymaking. As confirmed by Alberto Pototschnig, even before the frame-
work guidelines and network code were elaborated upon, there was a target model that had 
been developed through a “significant informal work”.349 Indeed Mark Copley, Vice Chair of 
the electricity working group of the ACER and Partner at the British regulatory authority as 
well as a former employee of ENTSO-E, suggests that the Trilateral Market Coupling project 
began without the Commission’s initiative, that the policymaking process was largely industry-
driven rather than hierarchically imposed by regulatory policymakers, and that the Commission 
subsequently spread the agreed upon solution to latecomers.350 This reform is very important. 
On its basis, in a landmark move towards the internal electricity market, in 2014, the markets 
of an area from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Barents Sea became fully interlinked, covering 17 
jurisdictions and approximately 75% of the electricity delivered in the EU. This was quickly 
followed by expansion to the Iberian market and Italy.351 As a result, 19 countries are currently 
connected representing about 85% of the power consumption in Europe.352 
 
                                                
346http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Recommendations/ACER%20Recomm
endation%2001-2013.pdf 	  
347https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/wholesale-market/electricity-network-codes. Accessed on 4 October 
2016.	  
348Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and 
congestion management.	  
349Interview with Alberto Pototschnig, Director of ACER. Ljubljana, 9 June 2016.	  
350Mark Copley, Vice-Chair Electricity Working Group ACER and Associate Partner Wholesale Markets 
Ofgem. London, 24 June 2016.	  
351http://www.acer.europa.eu/Media/News/Pages/ACER-review-of-2014-regional-initiatives-for-energy-
market-integration-highlights-coupling-from-the-Strait-of-Gibraltar-to-.aspx. Accessed: 10th April 2015. 
352http://www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling. Accessed on 11 December 2015.	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Observing hierarchical policymaking in the gas domain  
In contrast to the power domain, the Commission engaged in hierarchical rather than experi-
mentalist policymaking in the gas domain, as shown by the indicators described in Table 15. 
The Commission monitored the effectiveness of uniform policy solutions, and by employing 
the hierarchical architecture represented by the comitology procedure, developed reforms with-
out comparing different approaches with low stakeholder participation to make uniform policy 
solutions binding for all Member States and regulated companies. The resulting Commission 
Decision is important, as its aim is to reduce congestion in gas pipelines by requiring companies 
to make use of their reserved capacity or risk losing it, with unused capacity being placed back 
on the market.353  
Table 15. Hierarchical policymaking to regulate congestion management in the gas 
domain from the mid-2000s to the present day 
Indicator	   Evidence 	  
Member States and 
regulated companies are 
obligated to adopt 
uniform solutions 
Commission Decision 2012/490/EU mandates the application of 
firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions as of July 2016 at pipelines that 
face congestion above certain thresholds	  
Compliance with 
uniform solutions is 
monitored 
First Commission’s sector inquiry monitors the (in)effectiveness of 
previous provisions (i.e., interruptible use-it-or-lose-it), after which  
Commission Decision 2012/490/EU requires the ACER to monitor 
implementation of the amended provisions (i.e., oversubscription 
and buy back, firm use-it-or-lose-it) 	  
Reforms are not 
developed on the basis of 
comparisons 
Commission Decision 2012/490/EU is not based on comparisons 	  
                                                
353https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/wholesale-market/gas-network-codes. 
Accessed on 5 October 2016.	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Agreement on reforms is 
developed with low 
stakeholder participation 
Commission Decision 2012/490/EU is adopted through the 
comitology procedure, in which participation is limited to Member 
States and the Commission	  
 
As seen in Chapter Three, at the 7th Madrid Forum in September 2003, participants agreed 
upon a revised version of Guidelines on congestion management.354 These were formalised 
and given binding power by Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005, which established the first set of 
common rules on conditions for accessing gas transmission networks. In addition to entitling 
network users that wished to resell their contracted but unused capacity to do so on secondary 
markets, this regulation required transmission system operators to offer unused transport ca-
pacity on at least an interruptible basis.355 This paved the way for interruptible use-it-or-lose-it 
provisions and secondary markets, understood as non-discriminatory market-based ap-
proaches, to promote competition by enabling transport capacity rights to be awarded to parties 
who actually intended to use them. However, at the 7th Madrid Forum in September 2003, at 
which the revised Guidelines on congestion management were agreed upon, participants al-
ready noted that “further developments need to be made on a number of other important issues 
to create a real competitive gas market, which are not covered in the Guidelines or are covered 
in insufficient detail, notably […] use-it-or-lose-it rules. Special attention must be paid not to 
create disadvantages for newcomers, wholesalers and consumers wishing to change their sup-
plier”.356 Furthermore, at approximately the time that Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 was 
adopted, consumers and new entrants voiced concerns about the development of wholesale 
markets, limited consumer choice and observed as well as expected increases in gas prices.357  
Prompted by these concerns, and distinctive of hierarchical policymaking, the Commission 
chose to monitor the effectiveness of the uniform policy solutions imposed rather than compare 
different approaches pursued by Member States and regulated companies in an experimentalist 
fashion. In June 2005, it launched a sector inquiry,358 which was one of the most thorough 
                                                
354Conclusions of the 7th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum. Madrid, 24–25 September 2003, 
Annex 1: The Guidelines for Good TPA Practice –	  revised version, p.18.	  
355Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks.	  
356Conclusions of the 7th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum. Madrid, 24–25 September 2003, p.2.	  
357http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-716_en.htm?locale=en. Accessed on 14 January 2016. 
358 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-05-203_en.htm?locale=en. Accessed on 14 January 2016. 
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investigations in the Commission’s history. During the course of one and a half years, the 
Commission sent about 3,000 questionnaires to a variety of regulated companies, and assessed, 
in all Member States, the extent to which important lines were foreclosed. It also reviewed the 
state of congestion in about 40 pipelines and important points connected to key routes, and 
undertook an in-depth analysis of a number of pipelines in which the problem of congestion 
was particularly acute.359 However, this thorough investigation did not compare different ap-
proaches of regulating congestion management pursued by Member States and regulated com-
panies, but rather, assessed the effectiveness of the uniform policy solutions mandated by Reg-
ulation (EC) No, 1775/2005, namely, interruptible use-it-or-lose-it provisions and secondary 
markets. In 2007, the conclusion was made that long-term transport capacity bookings filled 
up cross-border networks, leaving market players, who did not have such legacy contracts, 
without access to transport capacity. As such, new entrants were unable to secure transport 
capacity on key routes due to the predominance of long-term contracts signed between incum-
bent network operators, and typically, their supply affiliates. The situation was expected to 
persist for the term of the pre-liberalization legacy contracts (typically 15–20 years duration) 
but also potentially longer, due to the existence of provisions allowing these contracts to be 
extended. Furthermore, companies using gas transmission pipelines to transport their gas 
across countries often used less transport capacity than they had reserved, precluding new mar-
ket players from accessing transport capacity and consequently entering the markets.360 As a 
consequence, the problem emerging from the sector enquiry was that, although there was 
enough physical infrastructure capacity, the existing congestion management rules were not 
effective in promoting efficient use of the capacity. Instead, they still allowed incumbents to 
hoard the scarce transport capacity without actually using it, hence hindering entry and com-
petition. Thus, the sector inquiry concluded that the congestion management mechanisms in-
troduced by Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 were functioning poorly.361 As explained by Ste-
phen Rose, Chairman of Eurelectric working group Gas to Power and Head of Gas Market 
Design at RWE, the sector inquiry was the driving force behind the reform of the existing 
congestion management rules. Its main finding was that a lack of sufficient physical capacity 
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was not the reason the European gas market was not developing as desired; rather, the under-
lying cause was due to contractual congestion.362  
After the Commission concluded that the existing congestion management rules had to be 
amended, it developed reforms without conducting comparisons of different approaches and 
with low stakeholder participation. It did not employ experimentalist architectures, despite the 
fact that the Madrid Forum was available in gas just as the Florence Forum was in power. Nor 
did it follow the envisaged rulemaking procedure for developing network codes, which as seen 
in Chapter Two and in the previous section of this chapter, is an experimentalist architecture 
that features lengthy involvement of the ACER, the ENTSO-G and several rounds of consul-
tations with other stakeholders.363  
In contrast, the Commission employed the comitology procedure, which as seen in Chapter 
Two, is a hierarchical architecture characterised by low stakeholder involvement, given that 
participation is limited to the Commission and Member States representatives. According to 
the Commission, “this power may be called for when the full process to develop EU-wide 
binding codes is likely to take longer or where the ENTSO-G might be ill-suited to be entrusted 
with drafting, for example because of potential conflicts of interest”.364 On these grounds, the 
Commission considered that it was “better placed to come up more rapidly with a more neutral 
proposal, taking the diverging views of the different Member States and different stakeholders 
into account”.365 It asked the formal advisory group it had created in 2003 to provide it with 
input for revising the existing rules.366 According to the ERGEG, the objective was to “rapidly 
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draft, p.7. 
366http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/CLOSED%20PUBLIC%20CONSUL
TATIONS/GAS/E09-PC-36/BG. Accessed on 9 August 2016.	  
130	  
adopt new provisions allowing to reduce congestion”.367 In its revised principles, ERGEG be-
gan by noting that Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 had introduced use-it-or-lose-it mechanisms 
“at least on an interruptible basis”	  as a means to manage congestion and to avoid possible 
capacity hoarding.368 It concluded, however, that the situation across Europe demanded con-
gestion management measures to be more effectively implemented.369 Without comparing dif-
ferent approaches, it suggested that firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions would have significantly 
enhanced the existing interruptible provisions, as unused capacity would have been brought 
back to the market on a firm rather than interruptible basis.370 Therefore, it recommended that 
interruptible provisions be replaced with firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions.371 Similarly, in its 
impact assessment, the Commission argued that the existing regime at that time, in which new 
entrants could only get interruptible capacity while established players had long-term firm ca-
pacity reservations, provided a very asymmetrical risk profile among competitors, to the detri-
ment of new entrants.372 The Commission reasoned that this made it very difficult for new 
entrants to enter the gas market on equal terms with incumbent players, because the use of 
interruptible capacity was subject to the possibility that the original capacity holder would 
change its mind and claim back that capacity. Given that interruptible capacity was only a 
“second class”	  right, it made it very difficult to compete with holders of “first class”	  rights.373 
In contrast, the Commission believed firm use-it-or-lose-it provision, which basically restricts 
the possibility for original capacity holders to change their minds, to be a very effective tool, 
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368ERGEG revised principles on gas CAM and CMP. 10 December 2009, E09-GNM-10-03, p.7.	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as it immediately allows unused capacity to be freed up and remarketed to other network us-
ers.374 The Commission concluded that this was the most appropriate solution to effectively 
combat contractual congestion, namely, to foster the creation of a level playing field between 
new entrants and incumbents.375 In 2012, the Gas Committee adopted via comitology the Com-
mission’s proposal, which led to the Commission Decision 2012/490/EU.376  
Rather than granting discretion to Member States and regulated companies to pursue different 
congestion management approaches, this Decision imposed uniform policy solutions. It ex-
plained that “despite the application of certain congestion management principles such as the 
offering of interruptible capacities as provided for by Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 […], 
contractual congestion in the Union gas transmission networks remains an obstacle to the de-
velopment of a well-functioning internal market in gas. Therefore it is necessary to amend the 
guidelines on the application of congestion management procedures”.377 At its core, the Com-
mission Decision 2012/490/EU mandated the application of firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions as 
of July 2016 at pipelines facing congestion above certain thresholds, as assessed through spe-
cific criteria. Below those thresholds, this was provision is not compulsory. Instead, the oblig-
atory, default mechanism is an “oversubscription and buy-back”	  scheme, in which transmission 
system operators oversell firm capacity, and if necessary, buy it back from the market.378 
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In addition, rather than stimulating the comparison of different approaches, the Commission 
Decision 2012/490/EU provided for the compliance monitoring of Member States and regu-
lated companies of the adopted uniform policy solutions.379 It did so by tasking the ACER to 
produce annual monitoring reports, which since 2013, have assessed the levels of congestion 
at European cross-border networks, verifying that the mandatory oversubscription and buy-
back scheme were applied and identifying cross-border networks at which congestion meets 
specific thresholds, thereby making firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions compulsory.380   
This Commission Decision is important. First, because the oversubscription and buy-back 
scheme applies to firm rather than interruptible capacity, this compulsory provision already in 
and of itself facilitates the efficient use and maximisation of capacities in the networks.381 Se-
cond, based on the latest ACER’s monitoring reports, the firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions will 
become compulsory for a number of important pipelines, as suggested by Dr. Margot Loudon, 
Deputy Secretary General of Eurogas.382 Third, a number of national regulatory authorities, 
most notably Germany and Austria, have been implementing the firm use-it-or-lose-it provi-
sions, even if not compulsory.383 As can be seen, this important reform was developed through 
hierarchical policymaking, because it was elaborated upon without comparing different ap-
proaches and with low stakeholder participation, making uniform policy solutions binding for 
all Member States and regulated companies and providing for the monitoring of compliance 
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Explaining the different identified patterns  
Further showing the limits of the polyarchy and shadow of hierarchy 
viewpoints 
From the perspective emphasising the importance of polyarchy, it is surprising that, in the 
power domain, the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking. As seen in Chapter 
Two, in the mid-2000s, the formal rulemaking powers of the Commission were strengthened. 
The Commission became able to develop rules without going through the ordinary legislative 
procedure, by directly proposing rules to comitology committees composed of Member State 
representatives. Because of the stronger formal rulemaking powers of the Commission, this 
thesis considers that the distribution of powers became comparatively less polyarchic, or more 
hierarchical. Yet, despite its increased ability to impose outcomes rather than pursue coopera-
tion with others, in the power domain, the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymak-
ing by employing experimentalist architectures, such as the Florence Forum and the network 
codes procedure, as previously seen in this Chapter. Thus, this finding is at odds with the ar-
gument centred on polyarchy. 
In contrast, the Commission’s engagement in experimentalist policymaking in the power do-
main can be explained through the shadow of hierarchy lens. From this perspective, the Com-
mission engaged in experimentalist policymaking, precisely because, thanks to its strengthened 
formal rulemaking powers, it could cast a stronger shadow of hierarchy to induce conflicting 
parties to cooperate. The EFET supported the development of rules on congestion management 
as long as it left some regulatory differences across borders, because traders’	  business is based 
on arbitrage. Since implicit auctions do not allow arbitraging, traders resisted the transition 
from explicit to implicit auctions, suggests Dr. Martin Povh, Officer at the ACER, and confirms 
Alberto Pototschnig.384 Equally, national power exchanges strenuously resisted the creation of 
a single European power exchange, because this would have fundamentally threatened their 
businesses and very existence, points out Dr. Guido Cervigni, former Head of Market Devel-
opment at the Italian power exchange, and confirm Dr. Juan Jose Alba Rios and Alberto 
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Pototschnig.385 Yet despite these conflicts, the Commission still engaged in experimentalist 
policymaking because, due to its comitology powers, it could cast a stronger shadow of hier-
archy to induce parties to cooperate.  
However, this viewpoint does not explain why, in the gas domain, the Commission engaged in 
hierarchical policymaking instead. From the shadow of hierarchy perspective, it is puzzling 
that the Commission engaged in distinct types of policymaking across the two domains, even 
if the shadow of hierarchy it could cast on parties to induce them to cooperate was very similar 
in both. As seen in Chapter Two, also in the gas domain in the mid-2000s the Commission was 
equipped with comitology powers, similar to the power domain. Furthermore, the gas domain 
parties also had conflicting preferences. Regulatory policy documents such as responses to the 
public consultations carried out by the ERGEG and the Commission on the modification of 
congestion management rules show that incumbent importers and suppliers as well as trans-
mission system operators strongly resisted the proposal for firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions, 
put forward by the Commission with support from regulators. Instead, these actors proposed a 
measure more in line with their preferences, namely, an oversubscription and buy-back scheme 
in which transmission system operators, taking into account statistical scenarios for the likely 
amount of unused capacity, oversell transport capacity beyond technical limits, and to the ex-
tent necessary, subsequently buy it back from the market.386 As previously seen in this chapter 
and also suggested by Dr. Margot Loudon and Stephen Rose, the eventual outcome was a com-
promise.387 Thus, from the shadow of hierarchy perspective it is hard to explain why in the 
power domain the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking, whereas in the gas 
domain it engaged in hierarchical policymaking, despite the fact that the shadow it could cast 
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on actors to induce them to cooperate was very similar across the two domains and that actors 
had conflicting policy preferences in both. 
Providing further support to the uncertainty perspective 
The distinct types of policymaking processes the Commission engaged in across the two do-
mains can be explained by the uncertainty argument. According to this account, in the power 
domain, the Commission was exposed to policy questions for which it did not have specific 
policy preferences, namely, what type of auctions should be used and through which detailed 
arrangements they should be implemented. Under these conditions of higher uncertainty, it 
engaged in experimentalist policymaking. In contrast, in the gas domain, the Commission con-
tinued to hold precise policy preferences for specific solutions, namely, use-it-or-lose-it provi-
sions. Under these conditions of lower uncertainty, it favoured hierarchical policymaking.  
No evidence was found in the main regulatory policy documents of the mid-2000s that at that 
time, in the power domain, the Commission had precise preferences for specific types of auc-
tions and arrangements over others. As anticipated, Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 established 
that market-based auctions be used, but did not express preferences for either explicit or im-
plicit auctions, let alone provide specific details about how such auctions should be imple-
mented.388 Nor did the reports on implementation of the internal electricity market, published 
by the Commission in 2004 and 2005, express any preference for specific types and subtypes 
of auctions compared to others.389   
On the contrary, many regulatory policy documents of that time show that implicit auctions 
were rapidly identified as the theoretical ideal solution, which neither the Commission nor 
other actors knew how to apply to continental Europe. Already in the Guidelines on congestion 
management the Commission voluntarily agreed upon in 2000 in the Florence Forum, the ap-
proach based on implicit auctions was considered “too difficult to implement in the short term, 
since it requires the existence of exchanges or power pool based arrangements on both sides of 
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the interconnection”.390 From 2001 to 2005, this was reiterated in many publicly available reg-
ulatory policy documents, including consulting studies conducted on behalf of the Commission 
and presentations delivered and discussed in the Florence Forum. All of these documents 
pointed to the theoretical superiority of implicit over explicit auctions, as the former avoid 
possible abuses of market power by ensuring that all transport capacity is used, and maximise 
overall economic surplus by ensuring that energy flows efficiently (i.e., from lower to higher 
priced areas as far as technically possible). At the same time, they all questioned the practical 
feasibility of this theoretically ideal solution. The key issue was that the only existing imple-
mentation experience with implicit auctions was the Scandinavian “Nord Pool”. But this com-
mon market was managed by a single power exchange. This sharply contrasted with Continen-
tal Europe, which instead, was organised into several national markets managed by a number 
of national or regional power exchanges.391 Thus, the key question was whether, in practice, 
implicit auctions could be applied to continental Europe, and if so, how. Dr. Juan Jose Alba 
Rios confirms that the Commission did not have a precise idea of what to do.392 
As previously seen in this chapter, it was only in 2007 that the Commission as well as other 
actors such as ERGEG expressed a precise preference for implicit rather than explicit auc-
tions.393 This only happened after practical experiences. In particular, the Trilateral Market 
Coupling project connecting France, Belgium and the Netherlands as of 2006, showed that 
                                                
390 Conclusions Sixth Meeting of the European Electricity Regulation Forum. Florence, 9/10 November 2000, 
Guidelines on congestion management, pp.6-7.	  
391 Cfr. ETSO “Co-ordinated use of Power Exchanges for Congestion Management”. Final Report, April 2001; 
ETSO “Co-ordinated use of Power Exchanges for Congestion Management in Continental Europe: Market 
Design and Role of Power Exchanges”. Open Discussion Paper. Draft, February 2002; EuroPEX ‘Congestion 
Management. Presented at the Eighth Meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum. Florence 21-22 
February 2002; Co-ordinated congestion management: an ETSO vision, ETSO, April 2002; Outline proposals 
for a co-ordinated congestion management scheme based on the ETSO vision, ETSO, September 2002; Using 
implicit auctions to manage cross-border congestion: “Decentralised Market Coupling”, EuroPEX, July 2003; 
ETSO and EuroPEX “Flow-based market coupling”. A joint ETSO-EuroPEX Proposal on Cross-Border 
Congestion Management and Integration of Electricity Markets in Europe. Interim Report, September 2004; 
Frontier Economics and Consentec “Analysis of Cross-Border Congestion Management Methods for the EU 
Internal Electricity Market”. Study commissioned by the European Commission Directorate-General Energy 
and Transport, Final Report, June 2004; Eurelectric “Contribution to the 11 Electricity Regulatory Forum”. 
April 2004; Union of the Electricity Industry – EURELECTRIC Position Paper Improving Interconnection 
Capacity Allocation. August 2005, p. 7. 
392 Interview with Dr Juan Jose Alba Rios, Chairman of Eurelectric Markets Committee and Vice-President of 
Regulatory Affairs at Endesa. Brussels, 17 May 2016.	  
393European Commission, DG for Competition, Energy Sector Inquiry, January 2007; European Commission, 
DG Energy and Transport, Report on Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-border trade in electricity, May 2007, p.5; 
ERGEG, Coherence and Convergence Report, July 2007.	  
137	  
implicit auctions could indeed be applied to continental Europe even in the absence of a single 
European power exchange.  
Yet the chapter found no evidence that, when the Commission had developed precise prefer-
ences for implicit rather explicit auctions, it had specific preferences for detailed arrangements 
to implement implicit auctions. In addition to all the regulatory policy documents just men-
tioned, this is also shown by the Commission’s sector inquiry published in January 2007; the 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the ex-
perience gained in the application of the Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003, published in May 
2007; the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament about pro-
gress in creating the internal electricity market, published in April 2008; and the minutes of the 
Florence Forum meeting held in 2007. None of these documents reference price- or volume-
coupling arrangements to implement implicit auctions; therefore, there is also no trace of the 
Commission’s specific preferences for either.394   
Instead, as seen in this chapter, it was only from 2009 onwards that the Commission, together 
with other actors, had developed specific policy preferences for price- rather than volume-
coupling arrangements in order to implement implicit auctions. This is evidenced by the meet-
ing minutes of the PCG of experts held in July, October and November 2009; the target model 
the Commission voluntarily agreed upon in the PCG and proposed to the Florence Forum in 
December 2009; the framework guidelines developed in 2011 by the ACER and the draft net-
work code elaborated in 2013 by ENTSO-E on their basis, which were both approved by the 
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Commission; and the Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 which was eventually adopted 
in 2015 via comitology.395  
As suggested by Dr. Matti Supponen, Policy Coordinator at the Directorate General for Energy 
of the Commission who was closely involved in this rulemaking process, in simplified terms, 
the reform of congestion management rules essentially entailed the adaptation of the Nordic 
model to the Continental Europe context, including the application of such a model in the ab-
sence of a central European power exchange. But in practice, this proved to be so complicated 
that the Commission could not have conceived it on its own and imposed it through hierarchical 
policymaking. Instead, as can be seen, it required experimentalist policymaking, in which the 
Trilateral Market Coupling project represented “the”	  experiment and the Commission acted as 
the main convener of the process.396  
The patterns found in the power domain contrast with those found in the gas domain, where 
the Commission engaged in hierarchical rather than experimentalist policymaking. The chapter 
argues that the Commission did so under conditions of lower uncertainty. It considers that, in 
the gas domain, the Commission found itself in conditions of lower uncertainty because both 
interviews and regulatory policy documents show that from the mid-2000s to the present day 
it held specific policy preferences, namely, for use-it-or-lose-it provisions.  
As can be seen, the Commission’s sector inquiry launched in mid-2005 and concluded at the 
beginning of 2007 and was the driving force behind the reform of the existing rules on conges-
tion management. However, as suggested by Stephen Rose, the Commission had a clear idea 
of what it wanted to do, namely, to release transport capacity in the short term. Effectively, the 
Commission sought a “quick win”, and chose a faster and less inclusive rulemaking procedure 
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in light of its specific policy preferences.397 To achieve its objective, the Commission had a 
clear preference for firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions, confirms Dr. Margot Loudon.398 The fact 
that the Commission had specific policy preferences about both its goals and the precise meth-
ods to achieve them is further confirmed by Dr. Annegret Groebel, Vice President of CEER 
and Head of the International Relations Department at the German regulatory authority.399  
The Commission was particularly supported by the German regulatory authority, which was 
among the key promoters of firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions even in the absence of any prac-
tical experience, suggest Csilla Bartok and Thomas Holzer, respectively Team Leader and Of-
ficer at the ACER.400 The German regulator believed that stricter rules were needed and fa-
voured a stricter application of the existing use-it-or-lose-it provisions rather than “changing 
fundamentals”, which it expected, would have created stronger resistance from the industry. 
To apply the existing policy more strictly rather than changing it completely is the approach 
generally followed, when possible, by the German regulator, which in this case coincided with 
the specific preferences of the Commission, explains Dr. Annegret Groebel.401 
Publicly available regulatory policy documents further confirm that the Commission had spe-
cific policy preferences about how to reform congestion management rules. Already in the 
conclusions of the sector inquiry, the Commission “highlighted the importance of enhancing 
the scope for entry through […] strict application of use-it-or-lose-it provisions”.402 The pref-
erence for firm use-it-or-lose-it provisions was then reaffirmed throughout all the regulatory 
policy documents that were key to the development of this reform, namely the principles and 
recommendations developed by the Commission’s formal advisory body (ERGEG) in 2009, 
                                                
397Interview with Stephen Rose, Chairman of Eurelectric Working Group Gas to Power and Head of Gas 
Market Design at RWE. London, 25 May 2016.	  
398Interview with Dr Margot Loudon, Deputy Secretary General of Eurogas. Brussels, 18 May 2016.	  
399Interview with Dr Annegret Groebel, Vice-President of CEER and Head of the International Relations 
Department of the German regulatory authority. Telephone, 10 June 2016.	  
400Interview with Csilla Bartok, Team Leader Framework Guidelines and Network Codes ACER. Ljubljana, 9 
June 2016; and Interview with Thomas Holzer, Framework Guidelines and Network Codes Officer ACER. 
Ljubljana, 9 June 2016.	  
401Interview with Dr Annegret Groebel, Vice-President of CEER and Head of the International Relations 
Department of the German regulatory authority. Telephone, 10 June 2016.	  
402COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report). Brussels, 10.1.2007, COM(2006) 851 final, 
p.13; and DG COMPETITION REPORT ON ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY. Brussels, 10 January 2007, 
SEC(2006) 1724, p.327.	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the proposal put forward by the Commission in 2010 on the basis of ERGEG’s Recommenda-
tions, the impact assessment carried out by the Commission, and the Commission Decision as 
eventually adopted via comitology in 2012.403 
Thus, both regulatory policy documents and interviews show that, in the gas domain, to the 
Commission and important regulators it appeared straightforward that the best solution was 
simply to impose a stricter application of the already existing use-it-or-lose-it provisions, even 
though this idea was not backed by any practical implementation experience. Under these con-
ditions of lower uncertainty, as shown in this chapter, the Commission engaged in hierarchical 
policymaking.  
Conclusions 
This chapter further examined the argument that the Commission engages in experimentalist 
policymaking under conditions of higher uncertainty, which was developed in Chapter Three 
and supported in Chapter Four. It began Phase Two of the empirical analysis of policymaking, 
which encompasses the period from the mid-2000s to the present day, during which time un-
certainty differed across issue areas and domains. In particular, this chapter compared the reg-
ulation of congestion management across the power and gas domains during this period. This 
chapter’s central finding was that the Commission engaged in different types of policymaking 
across the two domains. In the power domain, the Commission used experimentalist architec-
tures, such as the Florence Forum and the network codes procedure, to stimulate the compari-
son of different approaches pursued by Member States and regulated companies and to facili-
tate the development of agreements on reforms on this basis with high stakeholder participa-
tion. Alternatively, in the gas domain, the Commission engaged in hierarchical policymaking. 
By using the hierarchical architecture of the comitology procedure, it developed reforms with-
out comparing different approaches and with low stakeholder participation, to make uniform 
                                                
403ERGEG revised principles on gas CAM and CMP. 10 December 2009, E09-GNM-10-03; ERGEG 
Congestion management on European Gas Transmission Networks: Recommendations for Guidelines Adopted 
via a Comitology Procedure. E09-GNM-10-07, 10 December 2009; ERGEG Congestion management 
procedures: Recommendations for guidelines to be adopted via a comitology procedure. E10-GWG-67-04, 8 
September 2010; Congestion management procedures: Commission proposal for guidelines to be adopted via a 
comitology procedure. 28 September 2010; COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT: IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Commission decision amending Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 
715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission 
networks. Brussels, XXX […](2012) XXX draft; Commission Decision 2012/490/EU of 24 August 2012 on 
amending Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks.	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solutions binding for all Member States and regulated companies and to monitor compliance 
with them. 
These findings further confirm the limitations of the polyarchy and shadow of hierarchy expla-
nations. From the polyarchy perspective, it is surprising that in the power domain, the Com-
mission engaged in experimentalist policymaking, even if the distribution of powers had be-
come less polyarchic because of the stronger Commission’s formal rulemaking powers. In con-
trast, this can be explained through the shadow of hierarchy lens, according to which the Com-
mission’s engagement in experimentalist policymaking can be precisely explained because it 
could cast a stronger shadow of hierarchy thanks to its strengthened formal rulemaking powers. 
However, this viewpoint does not explain why the Commission did not also engage in experi-
mentalist policymaking in the gas domain, even though the shadow of hierarchy it could cast 
was equivalent in both domains. Instead, the noted patterns of policymaking provide additional 
support for the argument based on uncertainty. In the power domain, the Commission was 
confronted with new policy questions for which it did not have precise policy preferences. 
Under these conditions of higher uncertainty, it engaged in experimentalist policymaking. In 
the gas domain, the Commission continued to hold previously established preferences for spe-
cific policies. Under these conditions of lower uncertainty, it favoured hierarchical policymak-
ing.   
It is possible that the Commission engaged in distinct types of policymaking processes across 
the two domains for sector-specific reasons rather than because of uncertainty. One such reason 
could be distinct degrees of conflicts. Indeed, a number of interviewees suggest that, although 
conflicts were present in both domains, in the power domain, industry actors were a driving 
force behind the policymaking process. Eurelectric, in particular, was often even more sup-
portive than the regulators themselves. In contrast, in the gas domain, most of the industry, 
including Eurogas, strongly resisted the development of reforms.404 Thus, the type of policy-
making the Commission engaged in could have been a function of the different degree of con-
flicts characterising the two domains and hence more generally of the domain. For this reason, 
Chapter Six provides a final examination of the argument that the Commission engages in 
experimentalist policymaking under conditions of higher uncertainty. It continues to analyse 
                                                
404Interview with Dr Juan Jose Alba Rios, Chairman of Eurelectric Markets Committee and Vice-President of 
Regulatory Affairs at Endesa. Brussels, 17 May 2016; Interview with Alberto Pototschnig, Director of ACER. 
Ljubljana, 9 June 2016; Interview with Edith Hofer, Assistant to the Director General for Energy of the 
European Commission. Brussels, 19 May 2016; Interview with Dr Martin Povh, Framework Guidelines and 
Network Codes Officer ACER. Ljubljana, 9 June 2016.	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policymaking during the period from the mid-2000s to the present day, but shifts the focus to 
the issue area of tarification regulation, which was not characterised by different degrees of 

















Chapter Six: Engaging in Different Policymaking across 
the Power, Gas Domains Also in Tarification Regulation 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the final evaluation of the argument that the Commission engages in 
experimentalist policymaking under conditions of higher uncertainty, which was developed in 
Chapter Three and supported in Chapters Four and Five. It continues to compare the Commis-
sion’s regulatory policymaking across power and gas domains from the mid-2000s to the pre-
sent day, but shifts the focus from congestion management to tarification regulation. As seen 
in Chapter Four, in the early 2000s, an initial set of rules mandating common tarification ap-
proaches and principles was adopted. Yet, significant heterogeneities in the tarification ap-
proaches applied across Member States remained, creating distortions of competition and 
cross-border trade. Today, the situation is remarkably different. EU regulations have advanced 
the harmonisation of transmission tariff structures in Europe, fostering a level playing field and 
internal market. 
Throughout the period studied, in both the power and gas domains, the Commission could use 
identical hierarchical architectures, namely, the ordinary legislative and comitology proce-
dures. At the same time, it could also employ experimentalist architectures, which developed 
in parallel to hierarchical architectures very similarly across the gas and power domains. In 
addition to the Florence and Madrid Fora, it could employ the network codes procedure to co-
develop rules together with the ACER, ENTSO-E, and ENTSO-G and stakeholders.  
This chapter’s central findings are strikingly similar to those of Chapter Five, except that they 
are reversed across the two domains. The Commission engaged in different types of policy-
making processes across the gas and power domains. In the power domain, it did not use ex-
perimentalist architectures, even though they were available just as in the gas domain. Instead, 
it favoured hierarchical policymaking. By employing the hierarchical architecture of the 
comitology procedure, it developed reforms not underpinned by comparisons of different ap-
proaches and with low stakeholder participation, to impose on all Member States and regulated 
companies, and monitored their compliance with uniform policy solutions. In contrast, in the 
gas domain, the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking. It used experimentalist 
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architectures, such as the Madrid Forum and the network codes procedure, to stimulate com-
parisons of different approaches pursued by Member States and regulated companies and to 
develop agreements on reforms on this basis with high stakeholder participation.  
Thus, the implications of this chapter’s findings are analogous (though reversed) to those of 
Chapter Five. From the shadow of hierarchy perspective, it is surprising that, in the power 
domain, the Commission favoured hierarchical policymaking despite the stronger shadow of 
hierarchy it could cast to induce actors to cooperate as a result of its strengthened rulemaking 
powers. From the polyarchy viewpoint, the Commission’s engagement in hierarchical policy-
making can be explained in light of the less polyarchic distribution of powers. Yet this view-
point does not explain why, in contrast to the power domain, the Commission did engage in 
experimentalist policymaking in the gas domain, even though polyarchy was the same across 
both domains. Alternatively, the patterns of policymaking found are consistent with the argu-
ment about uncertainty. In the power domain, the Commission continued to hold previously 
established preferences for specific policies. Under these conditions of lower uncertainty, it 
favoured hierarchical policymaking. Instead, in the gas domain, the Commission found itself 
exposed to new questions for which it did not have specific policy preferences. Under these 
conditions of higher uncertainty, it engaged in experimentalist policymaking. Furthermore, in 
tarification regulation conflicts were similar across the two domains and the patterns of uncer-
tainty and policymaking were reversed across domains compared to the issue area of conges-
tion management studied in Chapter Five. Importantly, this chapter therefore also shows that 
the type of policymaking is not dependent on conflicts or the more general sector.  
As usual, the chapter initially identifies the types of policymaking that the Commission en-
gaged in, to show that it engaged in different policymaking processes across the power and gas 
domains. Then it shows how the noted patterns of policymaking provide further confirmation 
of the limits of the shadow of hierarchy and polyarchy perspectives and additional support to 





Engaging in different types of policymaking across the two do-
mains  
Finding hierarchical policymaking in the power domain 
In contrast to the gas domain, the Commission engaged in hierarchical rather than experimen-
talist policymaking in the power domain, as shown by the indicators described in Table 16. 
The Commission monitored compliance with uniform policy solutions that had been previously 
voluntarily agreed upon, and by employing the hierarchical architecture of the comitology pro-
cedure, developed reforms without undertaking comparisons of different approaches and with 
low stakeholder participation to make uniform policy solutions binding for all Member States 
and regulated companies. The resulting Commission Regulation is important. By making bind-
ing an inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism and a range within which 
network access tariffs levied on generators should be kept, it ensures that transmission system 
operators receive a fair compensation for the costs of hosting cross-border flow of electricity 
on their networks and that variations in charges applied to generators for accessing transmis-
sion systems across different Member States do not distort competition between them.405	  
Table 16. Hierarchical policymaking to regulate tarification in power from the mid-2000s 
to the present day	  
Indicator	   Evidence 	  
Member States and 
regulated companies are 
obligated to adopt 
uniform solutions 
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 774/2010 mandates a common 
inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism and a 
harmonised range of transmission charges levied on generators	  
                                                
405Commission Regulation (EU) No 774/2010 of 2 September 2010 on laying down guidelines relating to inter-
transmission system operator compensation and a common regulatory approach to transmission charging. 	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Compliance with 
uniform solutions is 
monitored 
Initial ERGEG compliance reports monitor compliance with the 
uniform policy solutions previously agreed upon on a voluntary 
basis; then Commission Regulation (EU) No. 774/2010 requires the 
ACER to monitor compliance with the inter-transmission system 
operator compensation mechanism  
Reforms are not 
developed on the basis of 
comparisons 
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 774/2010 is not based on 
comparisons  
Agreement on reforms is 
developed with low 
stakeholder participation 
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 774/2010 is adopted through 
comitology procedure, in which participation is limited to Member 
States and the Commission 
	  
As seen in Chapter Four, in the early 2000s, the Florence Forum participants agreed on a set 
of reforms. First, access to the entire European grid should be granted at a flat rate through a 
“postage-stamp”	  tariff, to facilitate trade and a departure from the previous tarification system 
based on transit fees for each transaction that network users engage in.406 Second, an inter-
transmission system operator compensation mechanism should be created, to ensure that trans-
mission system operators recover the costs of hosting cross-border flow of power on their net-
works.407 Third, transmission tariffs levied on generators should be harmonised to avoid dis-
tortion of competition among producers located in different countries.408 Then, Regulation 
(EC) No. 1228/2003 mandated non-transaction-based tariffs and the creation of inter-transmis-
sion system operator mechanism for compensating transmission system operators for the cost 
of hosting cross-border flow of electricity on their networks.409 Furthermore, it laid the ground-
work for the future adoption of guidelines on the details of such an inter-transmission system 
                                                
406Towards EU cross-border electricity trade: regulatory remarks and guidelines on tariffs and congestion (text 
as amended after the first Florence Working Group of 8 December 1999). P.1.	  
407Conclusions Eight meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum. Florence, 21-22 February 2002, 
p.1.	  
408Conclusions Tenth meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum. Rome, 8-9 July 2003, p.4.	  
409Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Articles 3 and 4.	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operator compensation mechanism as well as the harmonisation of charges applied to genera-
tors under national tariff systems.410 
Rather than comparing different approaches to tarification regulation adopted by Member 
States and regulated companies, compliance with uniform policy solutions was monitored. 
Asta Sihvonen-Punkka, Chair of the Electricity Focus Group of the Commission’s formal ad-
visory group (ERGEG), noted some lack of compliance with Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003. 
Her report pointed out that the temporary inter-transmission system operator compensation 
mechanism, which had been applied on a voluntary basis since 2002, did not cover all European 
countries and had not always deviated from specific individual network charges on individual 
transactions for declared transits of electricity, in contrast to what had been previously agreed 
upon. Furthermore, it suggested that the lack of binding guidelines on the inter-transmission 
system operator compensation mechanism also hampered the adoption of binding guidelines 
on transmission tarification, given that Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 provided for the adop-
tion of binding rules on these two issues in a single set of guidelines. She concluded that it was 
“important for the development of the internal market to have the binding inter-transmission 
system operation compensation mechanism guidelines as soon as possible”.411 Similarly, an-
other ERGEG report monitoring compliance with Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 recom-
mended that the Commission “adopt and implement the inter-transmission system operator 
compensation mechanism and transmission tarification guidelines as soon as possible”.412 
Thus, these reports did not compare different approaches, but instead, monitored compliance 
with uniform policy solutions. In doing so, they emphasised the need for binding rules to aid 
in their implementation.   
The need for binding rules is also confirmed by the Commission itself, according to which 
“experience since the adoption of the Regulation, in particular the fact that national transmis-
sion system operators have indicated that they face increasing difficulty agreeing an inter-
transmission compensation mechanism amongst themselves, clearly indicate that voluntary 
agreement is unlikely to produce an agreed inter-transmission compensation mechanism. […] 
                                                
410Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Article 8.	  
411Compliance with Electricity Regulation 1228/2003. Presentation by Mrs A. Sihvonen-Punkka, Chair of 
ERGEG Electricity Focus Group, at the 14th European Electricity Regulatory Forum, 24-25 September 2007, 
slides 5-7.	  
412Regulation (EC) 1228/2003 - ERGEG Compliance Monitoring. Presentation delivered at the 15th European 
Electricity Regulatory Forum, 24-25 November 2008, slide 13.	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As long as inter-transmission system compensation remains an unresolved issue it will inevi-
tably occupy the time of senior individuals within the national regulatory authorities and trans-
mission system operators. This has been the experience to date in the development of the sev-
eral voluntary schemes. It is individually rational to commit these resources to the inter-trans-
mission compensation project as long as each transmission system operator and regulator con-
siders that it has to protect its own interests. Moreover, each stakeholder effectively holds a 
veto in what is, by itself, a “zero-sum”	  issue. The opportunity costs associated with the time 
dealing with inter-transmission compensation is important. There are only a limited number of 
areas that the most senior transmission system operators or national regulators can address at a 
time. In particular it distracts from other important work in the internal market. It is impossible 
to know with certainty the final outcome negotiations. […] However, a lack of agreement is 
very probable. This would at least frustrate the further integration of the internal market in 
electricity, and could even lead to regression if individual transmission system operators began 
to re-impose import and export fees or transit fees on the basis that they were entitled to com-
pensation for the costs of hosting cross border-flows. By contrast binding guidelines on the 
inter-transmission compensation mechanism, and on transmission tarification, will support 
completing the internal energy market and improving security of supply. They will help ensure 
full implementation of the Regulation. This is the clearly expressed view of all major stake-
holders –	  in particular those who would be responsible for designing a voluntary mechanism. 
It is reasonable to conclude that it is necessary for the Commission to introduce guidelines”.413 
Prompted by the need for binding rules, the Commission did not develop reforms with high 
stakeholder participation and on the basis of comparisons of different approaches pursued by 
Member States and regulated companies. It did not employ experimentalist architectures, such 
as the Florence Forum and the network codes procedure, involving the ACER, the ENTSO-E 
and stakeholders, even though these architectures were present, just as they were in the gas 
domain. Instead it asked its formal advisory body, the ERGEG, to elaborate draft guidelines on 
transmission tarification and inter-transmission system operator compensation, intended “to be 
adopted by the Commission as binding Guidelines as provided for in Regulation (EC) No. 
                                                
413COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying document to 
the Commission Regulation establishing a mechanism for the compensation of transmission system operators 
for the costs of hosting cross border flows of electricity and a common regulatory approach to transmission 
charging {COM(2008) xxx final} {SEC(2008) xxx}. Brussels, SEC(2010) XXX final, pp.26-27.	  
149	  
1228/2003”.414 For this purpose, the ERGEG only performed ad hoc public consultation and 
did not compare different approaches. In 2005, the ERGEG proposed some harmonisation of 
the transmission charges levied on generators to avoid distortions of competition between 
them, namely, through a harmonised range of charges defined between zero and a positive 
value.415 But, as seen in Chapter Four, this is exactly what had been agreed upon years before 
in the Florence Forum by a variety of actors, including the Commission.416 Furthermore, it 
reflected an already ongoing tendency towards generation transmission charges being set to 
zero.417  Analogously, with respect to inter-transmission system operator compensation, in 
2006, the ERGEG suggested specific methods for calculating the costs that transmission sys-
tem operators incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows. But these methods reflected 
the schemes agreed upon by the Commission and the other Florence Forum participants since 
a provisional inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism had initially been 
developed in 2002, and then progressively refined on an annual and voluntary basis by an in-
creasing number of transmission system operators.418    
Thereafter, rather than embarking on the whole network codes procedure, which could have 
led to experimentalist policymaking, the Commission favoured a faster and less inclusive pro-
cedure, by directly proposing rules to the Committee on Cross-Border Trade in Electricity, 
confined to Member State representatives and operating according to comitology. According 
to the Commission, stakeholders had asked it to develop binding Guidelines effectively as an 
“honest broker”	  without a direct stake in the final rules.419 Dr. Matti Supponen suggests that 





TIONS/ELECTRICITY/Inter-TSO%20Compensation%20Guidelines. Accessed on 12 August 2016. 
415 ERGEG GUIDELINES ON TRANSMISSION TARIFICATION. EXPLANATORY NOTE, 18 July 2005. 
416 Conclusions Tenth Meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum. Rome, 8-9 July 2003, p.4. 
417 See, for example, Compliance with Electricity Regulation 1228/2003. Presentation by Mrs A. Sihvonen-
Punkka, Chair of ERGEG Electricity Focus Group, at the 14th European Electricity Regulatory Forum, 24-25 
September 2007; and COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying document for the Inter 
Transmission System Operator Compensation Mechanism and Harmonization of Transmission Tariffs for 
Electricity. IMPACT ASSESSMENT, {COM(2008) xxx final} {SEC(2008) xxx}, Brussels, 3.7.2009, 
SEC(2008) yyy, pp.25-26. 
418 Cover note to ERGEG draft proposal on Guidelines on Inter TSO Compensation. E06-CBT-09-08a, 10 April 
2006. 
419 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying document to 
the Commission Regulation establishing a mechanism for the compensation of transmission system operators 
for the costs of hosting cross border flows of electricity and a common regulatory approach to transmission 
charging {COM(2008) xxx final} {SEC(2008) xxx}. Brussels, SEC(2010) XXX final, p.26.	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no experimentalist comparisons took place during the comitology procedure, which was pri-
marily focused on ensuring that no vital interests of Member States were threatened. This is 
also confirmed by Marco Foresti, Market Advisor at ENTSO-E.420 The comitology procedure 
resulted in Commission Regulation (EU) No. 774/2010, which set forth guidelines relating to 
inter-transmission system operator compensation and a common regulatory approach to trans-
mission charging. These guidelines detail how to calculate the costs for losses and for making 
infrastructures available to host cross-border flow of electricity, and how to set the value of 
transmission charges paid by producers to be within a precise range.421 Commission Regulation 
(EU) No. 774/2010 is important, because it ensures that transmission system operators receive 
compensation for the costs of hosting cross-border flow of electricity and that variations in 
charges applied to power generators for accessing transmission systems do not undermine the 
internal market. However as can be seen, this important reform was not developed with high 
stakeholder participation and on the basis of comparisons of different approaches pursued by 
Member States and regulated companies. Instead, the guidelines annexed to Commission Reg-
ulation (EU) No. 774/2010 reflect the draft guidelines produced by the ERGEG. Both were 
developed without comparing different approaches and with low stakeholder participation, and 
neither went beyond the already applied voluntary schemes and trends, in turn based on the 
voluntary agreements reached in the early 2000s in the Florence Forum, but not yet codified.  
Rather than granting discretion to Member States and regulated companies to pursue different 
approaches, Commission Regulation (EU) No. 774/2010 made uniform solutions binding. The 
Commission Regulation itself explains that, “valuable experience has been gained since the 
need for inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism was first recognized, in 
particular through voluntary mechanisms by transmission system operators. However, trans-
mission system operators have found it increasingly difficult to reach agreement on such vol-
untary mechanisms. Binding guidelines establishing an inter-transmission system operator 
compensation mechanism should provide a stable basis for the operation of the inter-transmis-
sion system operator compensation mechanism and fair compensation to transmission system 
                                                
420 Interview with Dr Matti Supponen, Policy Coordinator Unit B.2 Wholesale markets: electricity and gas 
European Commission Directorate General for Energy (DG ENER). Brussels, 19 May 2016; Interview with 
Marco Foresti, Market Advisor ENTSO-E. Brussels, 18 May 2016.	  
421 Commission Regulation (EU) No 774/2010 of 2 September 2010 on laying down guidelines relating to 
inter-transmission system operator compensation and a common regulatory approach to transmission charging. 
Annex Part A Guidelines on the establishment of an inter-transmission system operator compensation 
mechanism; and Part B Guidelines on a common regulatory approach to transmission charging. 	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operators for the costs of hosting cross-border flows of electricity”. Equally, it states that, “var-
iations in charges applied to producers of electricity for access to the transmission system 
should not undermine the internal market. For this reason average charges for access to the 
network in Member States should be kept within a range which helps to ensure that the benefits 
of harmonization are realized”.422 Thus, in the very same piece of legislation the Commission 
codified the voluntary agreements reached by the Florence Forum participants since the early 
2000s on a basic inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism and a harmo-
nised range of charges levied on generators, without adding any major innovation. By annexing 
guidelines on the establishment of an inter-transmission system operator compensation mech-
anism and on a common regulatory approach to transmission charging to the Commission Reg-
ulation (EU) No. 774/2010, it gave them binding power. 
Furthermore, it provided for the monitoring of compliance with such uniform policy solutions 
in a hierarchical fashion, by tasking the ERGEG to report to the Commission each year on 
implementation of the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism.423 When 
the ACER entered into operation in March 2011 and the ERGEG was dissolved, these moni-
toring responsibilities were passed on from the regulatory network to the EU agency.424 Since 
then, the ACER has been publishing monitoring reports assessing compliance with the uniform 
policy solutions adopted, notably overseeing and reporting to the Commission each year on the 
implementation of the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism and the 
management of the related fund.425 
 
 
                                                
422 Commission Regulation (EU) No 774/2010 of 2 September 2010 on laying down guidelines relating to 
inter-transmission system operator compensation and a common regulatory approach to transmission charging. 
Recitals (2), (3), (6), (7) and (9).	  
423 Commission Regulation (EU) No 774/2010 of 2 September 2010 on laying down guidelines relating to 
inter-transmission system operator compensation and a common regulatory approach to transmission charging. 
Annex Part A Guidelines on the establishment of an inter-transmission system operator compensation 
mechanism, Art.1.4.	  
424 Commission Regulation (EU) No 838/2010 of 23 September 2010 on laying down guidelines relating to the 
inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism and a common regulatory approach to 
transmission charging.	  
425 http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Infrastructure_and_network%20development/Pages/Inter-TSO-
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Observing experimentalist policymaking in the gas domain  
In contrast to the power domain, the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking in 
the gas domain. As shown in Table 17, Member States and regulated companies were granted 
the discretion to pursue common entry-exit tariff systems with different arrangements, includ-
ing different tarification methodologies. By using experimentalist architectures, such as the 
Madrid Forum and the network codes procedure, their different approaches were compared and 
agreements on reforms were developed on this basis with high stakeholder participation. This 
resulted in a Commission Regulation, which at the time of writing (i.e., November 2016), was 
about to be adopted. It defines a common language among regulators and regulated companies 
that had previously not existed, promotes transparency on the tarification methodologies used 
throughout the EU and identifies specific reference methodologies.426 
Table 17. Experimentalist policymaking to regulate tarification in the gas domain from 
the mid-2000s to the present day 
Indicator 	   Evidence 	  
Member States and/or 
regulated companies are 
granted the discretion to 
adopt different approaches  
Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 allows Member States and 
regulated companies to implement the common entry-exit system 
through distinct detailed arrangements, including alternative 
tarification methodologies (e.g., postage stamp, capacity-
weighted distance approach, virtual point based approach, and 
matrix approach) 
Different are approaches 
compared 
Comparisons of different tarification methodologies, notably 
through consultancy and academic studies (i.e., KEMA and 
REKK, Florence School of Regulation, KEMA and COWI)  
                                                
426 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/wholesale-market/gas-network-codes. 
Accessed on 26 October 2016.	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Agreements on reforms 
are developed based on 
comparisons  
Agreements in 2013 on ACER Framework Guidelines, which 
were followed by ENTSO-G Network Code and a Commission 
Regulation whose final adoption was pending as of November 
2016 
Agreements on reforms 
are developed with high 
stakeholder participation 
Agreements are developed within the Madrid Forum and the 
network codes procedure, which both feature high stakeholder 
participation	  
 
As seen in Chapter Four, in the early 2000s, the Commission engaged in experimentalist poli-
cymaking within the Madrid Forum, which led to the development of agreements on two im-
portant reforms, namely, the principle of cost-reflectivity and entry-exit tariff systems.427 
Thereafter, based on a Commission’s legislative proposal, the European Council and Parlia-
ment adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005, which ratified part of these agreements, by 
mandating tariffs to be cost-reflective.428  
In 2007, the Commission proposed another Regulation to the European Parliament and Coun-
cil, which was adopted in 2009. Regulation (EC) No. 715/2009 repealed Regulation (EC) No. 
1775/2005 and made entry-exit systems mandatory. The Regulation itself clarified that: “To 
enhance competition through liquid wholesale markets for gas, it is vital that gas can be traded 
independently of its location in the system. The only way to do this is to give network users 
the freedom to book entry and exit capacity independently, thereby creating gas transport 
through zones instead of along contractual paths. The preference for entry-exit systems to fa-
cilitate the development of competition was already expressed by most stakeholders at the 6th 
Madrid Forum on 30 and 31 October 2002”.429 If the Commission’s regulatory activities during 
the period from the mid-2000s to the present day ended here, then the type of policymaking it 
engaged in would be very similar across the gas and power domain. In both domains, the Com-
mission would have used hierarchical architectures to give, through hierarchical policymaking, 
                                                
427 Conclusions of the 5th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum. Madrid, 7-8 February 2002; 
Conclusions of the 6th Gas Regulatory Forum. 30/31 October 2002. 
428 Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. Art.3.1. 
429 Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions 
for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. Recital 19. 
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binding power to reforms previously agreed through experimentalist processes but not yet cod-
ified. But in fact, in contrast to the power domain, the Commission engaged in experimentalist 
policymaking in the gas domain. 
Regulation (EC) No. 715/2009 granted discretion to Member States and regulated companies 
to implement entry-exit systems through a variety of arrangements. Since Member States had 
been implementing entry-exit systems through distinct detailed arrangements, it was noted that, 
despite the common transition from the previously dominant point-to-point systems to entry-
exit systems, network users continued to face considerable variations in tarification approaches 
throughout Europe.430 A new question emerged about whether these differences could lead to 
barriers to entry for new players and distortions of cross-border trade and, if so, how these 
could be addressed through increased harmonisation.  
The Commission did not develop reforms on tarification harmonisation hierarchically, by di-
rectly proposing rules to the Gas Committee composed only of Member State representatives 
and operating according to comitology, as it did in the power domain. Instead, it engaged in 
experimentalist policymaking by employing experimentalist architectures such as the Madrid 
Forum and the network codes procedure. Through these architectures, it stimulated for a num-
ber of years the comparison of different approaches pursued by Member States and regulated 
companies and the development of reforms with high stakeholder participation.   
It began to do so by asking, in the context of the Madrid Forum, a consulting agency and 
university research centre to compare the main differences in the tarification models that Mem-
ber States and regulated companies had been adopting, in order to identify possible barriers to 
cross-border trade resulting from heterogeneity and offer a number of recommendations for 
harmonisation.431 From 2008 and 2009, KEMA and REKK were supported by ERGEG, the 
voluntary GTE, a research centre (Florence School of Regulation), a user survey, and a virtual 
test conducted in one of the Regional Initiatives. They produced a report of about 200 pages, 
containing a number of comparative figures and tables and accompanied by country fact sheets 
                                                
430 See, for example, ACER Public Consultation on Scope and main policy options for Framework Guidelines 
on Harmonized transmission tariff structures - Evaluation of responses. Available at: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Public_consultations/PC_2012_G_14/PC_2012_G_14_ACER%
20Public%20Consultation%20on%20Scope%20and%20main%20policy%20options%20for%20Framework%2
0Guidelines%20on%20Harmonised.pdf. Accessed on 23 June 2016.	  
431 Conclusions of the 15th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum. Madrid, 6-7 November 2008.	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of about 100 pages. This pointed to the significant differences existing in transmission tariff 
structures across Member States.432  
After this report was debated in the Madrid Forum,433 the Commission funded an additional 
study, coordinated by a research centre, the Florence School of Regulation. Organised around 
a multidisciplinary group of 23 experts from 14 countries, throughout 2010 and 2011 this re-
search project went through an expert hearing to seek views of the industry, a discussion meet-
ing with a scientific council composed of academics and a public consultation to gather stake-
holders’ views. By integrating evidence from previous studies with new comparisons of dif-
ferent approaches being carried out across Member States (e.g., Italy, UK, Portugal, Belgium, 
and Czech Republic), the Florence School of Regulation study confirmed the key findings 
emerged from the previous KEMA and REKK report. While differences in tariff levels were 
considered justifiable in light of national factors, such as policy priorities and historical evolu-
tions, heterogeneities in stage of implementation and concrete design of tariff structures in-
creased the risk of distorting the competition and cross-border trade.434   
By building upon these studies, in June 2012 the Commission asked the new ACER to develop 
Framework Guidelines on harmonised transmission tariff structures.435 Thus, rather than using 
its comitology powers to deal directly and exclusively with Member State representatives, the 
Commission favoured the lengthier and more inclusive rulemaking procedure for developing 
                                                
432 KEMA and REKK ‘Report - Study on Methodologies for Gas Transmission Network Tariffs and Gas 
Balancing Fees in Europe’. Submitted to the European Commission, Directorate-General Energy and Transport. 
Arnhem, December 2009; KEMA and REKK ‘Study on Methodologies for Gas Transmission Network Tariffs 
and Gas Balancing Fees in Europe - Annex’. Submitted to the European Commission, Directorate-General 
Energy and Transport. Arnhem, December 2009.	  
433 Conclusions Madrid Forum 21-22 March 2011.	  
434 Ruester, S., von Hirschhausen, C., Marcantonini, C.,  He, X, Egerer, J. and Glachant, J.M. ‘EU Involvement 
in Electricity and Natural Gas Transmission Grid Tarification’. THINK, European University Institute, Final 
Report, January 2012; see also ‘Need for EU involvement in natural gas transmission grid tarification?’. 
Presented by Sophia Ruester of THINK project at the 21st meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum. 
Madrid, 23 March 2012. 	  
435 European Commission Directorate General for Energy Invitation to start the procedure on a framework 
guideline on rules regarding harmonized transmission tariff structures for gas. Brussels, 29 June 2012, ENER 
B/JAV/TH/tj s(2012) 913468, Ref. Ares(2012)789016 –	  29/06/2012. Available at: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Gas/Framework%20guidelines_and_network%20codes/Documents/FG_TAR_Inv
itation.pdf. Accessed on 21 October 2016.	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network codes, which involves the ACER, the ENTSO-G and several rounds of consultations 
with other stakeholders.436  
Furthermore, the Commission supported the creation of an ad hoc informal group, composed 
of 10 representatives from distinct companies and associations, as well as 2 observers from 
ENTSO-G and the Florence School of Regulation, tasked to provide the ACER with expert 
advice in the development of the Framework Guidelines.437 The ACER sought dialogue with a 
variety of actors well beyond its formal requirements. In addition to the assistance of its infor-
mal group of experts, it undertook a number of public consultations and industry events 
throughout 2012 and 2013, including a consultation on the scope of the Framework Guidelines, 
a consultation on an initial draft, a workshop, an “open house” event in which it shared with 
stakeholders proposed changes to the initial draft, a consultation on a revised chapter, and a 
related “Q&A” session and workshop.438 
In parallel to the formal network codes procedure, the Commission asked two consulting firms 
to jointly elaborate upon an additional study, in order to further compare the implementation 
of entry-exit systems across Member States and to identify which choices in their design could 
lead to barriers for entry of new market players and cross-border trade. By defining a list of 
“best practices” and assessing the implementation approaches of several Member States against 
it (e.g., Estonia, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Belgium, Spain, Germany, 
Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Denmark, and Austria), KEMA and COWI delivered country fact sheets of about 300 pages to 
the Madrid Forum. They identified cross-national heterogeneities and typical deviations from 
best practices, including with regard to cost allocation regimes (e.g., applied entry/exit split, 
                                                
436 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing 
an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators; Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 2003/55/EC; and Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 




es/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed on 15 February 2016.	  
438 http://www.acer.europa.eu/Gas/Framework%20guidelines_and_network%20codes/Pages/Harmonised-
transmission-tariff-structures.aspx. Accessed on 15 February 2016. 	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capacity/commodity split, approach to locational pricing signals, and the methodology ap-
plied).439   
Thus, as can be seen and was suggested by Thomas Querrioux, Gas Officer at the ACER, 
consultants and academics were specifically employed to “get a picture” of the methods used 
across Member States, as well as for conceptual clarification.440 This is also confirmed by Tom 
Maes, Chairman of the ACER Task Force on Tariffs, Vice Chairman of ACER and CEER 
Working Group on Gas, and Principal Advisor at the Belgian regulatory authority, who sug-
gests that the academic and consultancy studies definitely gave an overview of the approaches 
used across Member States, and also helped the Commission to make a case for further harmo-
nization.441 As pointed out by Stephen Rose, there was much experimentalism because there 
was a lot of discussion and comparison of tarification methodologies.442 Furthermore, as seen 
and pointed out by Tom Maes and Stephen Rose, the comparison of different approaches and 
development of reforms with high stakeholder participation continued also during the elabora-
tion of the ACER’s Framework Guidelines.443  
These comparisons and high stakeholder participation led to the development of reforms. In 
November 2013, the ACER published Framework Guidelines on harmonized transmission tar-
iff structures. They made explicit reference to some of the previous studies, namely those by 
KEMA and REKK and by the Florence School of Regulation, and the comparisons therein 
contained. On this basis, the Framework Guidelines identified four distinct tarification meth-
odologies to be allowed (i.e., ‘postage stamp’, ‘capacity-weighted distance approach’, ‘virtual 
point based approach’ and ‘matrix approach’), and introduced the obligation to justify the 
choices taken at national level against specified criteria, publish the results of a cost allocation 
                                                
439 KEMA & COWI ‘Study on Entry-Exit Regimes in Gas. Part A: Implementation of Entry-Exit Systems’. By 
order of the European Commission –	  DG ENERGY. Groningen –	  The Netherlands, July 19 –	  2013; KEMA & 
COWI ‘Country factsheets’. July 19, 2013; and ‘Entry-Exit Regimes in Gas’. Presentation delivered by Bert 
Kiewiet of KEMA at the XXIV Madrid Forum, 15-16 October 2013.	  
440 Interview with Thomas Querrioux, Gas Officer ACER. Ljubljana, 9 June 2016.	  
441 Interview with Tom Maes, Chairman ACER Tariff Task Force, Vice-Chairman ACER and CEER Gas 
Working Group, and Principal Advisor CREG. Telephone, 27 May 2016.	  
442 Interview with Stephen Rose, Chairman of Eurelectric Working Group Gas to Power and Head of Gas 
Market Design at RWE. London, 25 May 2016.	  
443 Interview with Stephen Rose, Chairman of Eurelectric Working Group Gas to Power and Head of Gas 
Market Design at RWE. London, 25 May 2016; Interview with Tom Maes, Chairman ACER Tariff Task Force, 
Vice-Chairman ACER and CEER Gas Working Group, and Principal Advisor CREG. Telephone, 27 May 2016.	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test, and carry out a counter-factual exercise to ensure that the methodology chosen was the 
most adequate compared to the others provided for.444  
The Commission then requested ENTSO-G to elaborate, on the basis of the ACER Framework 
Guidelines, a draft Network Code. During 2014 and 2015, the ENTSO-G held stakeholder joint 
working sessions, workshops, meetings and a number of consultations.445 Thus similar to the 
ACER, the ENTSO-G also went beyond its formal consulting requirements. In July 2015, EN-
TSO-G submitted a draft Network Code, which narrowed down the tarification methodologies 
even further, from the four identified by the Framework Guidelines to only two (i.e., postage 
stamp and capacity-weighted distance methodology). At the same time, the prescriptiveness of 
these models was reduced, transforming them into “references”.446  
Thereafter, the Commission proposed the draft Network Code to the Gas Committee. At the 
time of writing (i.e., November 2016), its final adoption was pending.447 Once adopted, a Com-
mission Regulation establishing a Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff Struc-
tures for Gas will become directly binding on all cross-border exchanges. This Regulation de-
fines a set of common parameters for tariff setting and sets requirements on the publication of 
tariff setting data. It is important because it promotes transparency about the tarification ap-
proaches adopted throughout Europe, identifies two reference tarification methodologies (i.e., 
postage stamp, capacity-weighted distance methodology), and as suggested by Thomas Quer-
rioux, defines a common language among regulators and regulated companies which had not 
previously existed, as until recently, the same concepts were discussed with different words 
and vice versa.448 As can be seen, it stemmed from the Commission’s engagement in experi-
mentalist policymaking, which in turn, resulted from the employment of experimentalist archi-
tectures such as the Madrid Forum and the network codes procedure. 
 
                                                
444 ACER Framework Guidelines on rules regarding harmonized transmission tariff structures for gas. FG-
2013-G-01, 29 November 2013; see also ACER Assessment of Policy Options Justification document for 
Framework Guidelines on rules regarding Harmonized Transmission Tariff Structures. ACER-JD-2014-G-01, 
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Explaining the different identified patterns  
Further highlighting the limitations of the polyarchy and shadow of 
hierarchy viewpoints 
As seen in the previous sections, this Chapter found that during the period from the mid-2000s 
to the present day, to regulate tarification the Commission engaged in distinct types of policy-
making processes across the two domains, as found in Chapter Five with regard to the regula-
tion of congestion management during the same period. However, the types of policymaking 
the Commission engaged in to regulate tarification were, compared to those used to regulate 
congestion management, reversed across the two domains. In the power domain, the Commis-
sion favoured hierarchical policymaking, whereas in the gas domain, it engaged in experimen-
talist policymaking.  
The Commission’s engagement in hierarchical policymaking observed in the power domain is 
inconsistent with the shadow of hierarchy view. As seen in Chapters Two and Five, in the mid-
2000s the Commission was entrusted with the additional power to adopt implementing acts 
subject to the approval of committees, confined to Member States representatives only and 
operating according to comitology procedures. Since its formal rulemaking powers were ex-
tended from the ordinary legislative procedure to the comitology procedure, the Commission 
could cast a stronger shadow of hierarchy to induce parties to cooperate. Hence, from this per-
spective it is hard to explain why, in the power domain, the Commission did not engage in 
experimentalist policymaking despite its stronger ability to threaten parties to enact adverse 
legislation.  
One could consider that, even though the Commission could cast a stronger shadow of hierar-
chy, in power it still favoured hierarchical policymaking because in this domain parties had 
particularly conflicting policy preferences. The argument would then be that in the gas domain, 
by contrast, the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking because even if the 
shadow of hierarchy it could cast was very similar across the two domains, the degrees of 
conflicts across gas and power were different. However, in contrast to the regulation of con-
gestion management analysed in Chapter Five, in tarification regulation this Chapter found no 
evidence that one domain was characterized by stronger conflicts than the other. On the con-
trary, a number of interviewees representative of both domains suggest that it would be inap-
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propriate to consider tarification regulation more conflictual in either the power or the gas do-
main. These interviewees do not only include Edith Hofer, Assistant to the Director General 
for Energy of the Commission, but also Dr Margot Loudon, Stephen Rose and Dr Annegret 
Groebel.449   
In the power domain, regulatory policy documents such as the Commission’s impact assess-
ment and the draft guidelines put forward by the ERGEG show that national regulatory author-
ities debated extensively the appropriate form of an inter-transmission compensation mecha-
nism without reaching a consensus and that they hence proposed not to go beyond the status 
quo. The same evidence also tells that national transmission system operators faced increasing 
difficulty agreeing on such a mechanism amongst themselves.450 Indeed, interviewees such as 
Peter Styles point out that conflicts were implied: they did not explode but were clearly there. 
In very simple terms, the Commission decided not to pursue more ambitious levels of harmo-
nization because it was politically too difficult. Transmission system operators were at ease 
with the basic inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism agreed. This was 
a hard compromise which nobody wanted to disturb, starting from German generators and gov-
ernment, who would be among the main losers from the development of more harmonized 
tarification regulation.451  Peter Styles suggests that there was no impetus towards this direction 
also because it was hard to see clear competition and discrimination effects which would allow 
to make a case for further harmonization.452 This is confirmed by Tom Maes as well as by 
Mark Copley. Both share the opinion that it was hard to argue that further harmonization of 
                                                
449 Interview with Dr Margot Loudon, Deputy Secretary General of Eurogas. Brussels, 18 May 2016; Interview 
with Stephen Rose, Chairman of Eurelectric Working Group Gas to Power and Head of Gas Market Design at 
RWE. London, 25 May 2016; Interview with Dr Annegret Groebel, Vice-President of CEER and Head of the 
International Relations Department of the German regulatory authority. Telephone, 10 June 2016; Interview 
with Edith Hofer, Assistant to the Director General for Energy of the European Commission. Brussels, 19 May 
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450 Cover note to ERGEG draft proposal on Guidelines on Inter TSO Compensation. E06-CBT-09-08a, 10 
April 2006; Compliance with Electricity Regulation 1228/2003. Presentation by Mrs A. Sihvonen-Punkka, 
Chair of ERGEG Electricity Focus Group, at the 14th European Electricity Regulatory Forum, 24-25 September 
2007, slide 5; COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying 
document to the Commission Regulation establishing a mechanism for the compensation of transmission system 
operators for the costs of hosting cross border flows of electricity and a common regulatory approach to 
transmission charging {COM(2008) xxx final} {SEC(2008) xxx}. Brussels, SEC(2010) XXX final, p.26.	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they are in many cases equal to zero. German generators, in particular, would be among the main losers, given 
that the charges levied on generators in Germany are currently equal to zero.	  
452 Interview with Peter Styles, Chairman of the Electricity Committee of EFET. London, 28 July 2016.	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tariffs would be beneficial to the internal market, and that neither Member States nor the Com-
mission wanted more harmonization, as this would have brought on the agenda controversial 
issues, including the harmonization of subsidies to renewable energy sources.453 
Similarly, in the gas domain ideally the Commission would have favoured “full harmoniza-
tion”, i.e. a single tarification approach throughout the EU. But it met the resistance of the 
industry, suggests Dr Margot Loudon.454 In addition, the Commission also met the resistance 
of Member States and national regulatory authorities, interested in accommodating national 
sensitivities, suggest both Stephen Rose and Tom Maes.455 This is also reflected in regulatory 
policy documents such as the first version of the Framework Guidelines elaborated by the 
ACER, whose Board is composed of the Head of national regulatory authorities, which the 
Commission deemed not ambitious enough and formally asked to revise.456 Mark Copley 
points out that the compromise found in the revised ACER Framework Guidelines, which had 
identified four tarification models, was subsequently lost in the ENTSO-E Network Code, in 
which two methodologies became mere references.457 Indeed, the final text of the Regulation 
whose adoption is pending was significantly “watered down”	  so that it will impose more trans-
parency than harmonization of tarification regulation, conclude Alberto Pototschnig and Csilla 
Bartok.458  
Thus, from a shadow of hierarchy perspective, it is hard to explain why in the power domain 
the Commission did not engage in experimentalist policymaking as it did in the gas domain, 
despite the fact that both the shadow of hierarchy it could cast and the degree of conflicts 
among parties were similar across the two domains. In contrast, the Commission’s engagement 
                                                
453 Mark Copley, Vice-Chair Electricity Working Group ACER and Associate Partner Wholesale Markets 
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in hierarchical policymaking found in the power domain is consistent with the view emphasis-
ing the importance of polyarchy. From this perspective, the Commission did not engage in 
experimentalist policymaking precisely because its strengthened formal rulemaking powers 
had made the distribution of power less polyarchic. Yet this viewpoint does not explain why, 
in the gas domain, the Commission did engage in experimentalist policymaking, even though, 
as seen in Chapter Two, its formal rulemaking powers had been strengthened and the distribu-
tion of power had become less polyarchic very similarly across the two domains. Thus, neither 
the shadow of hierarchy nor polyarchy lenses explains why, despite being equipped with sim-
ilar formal rulemaking powers across the gas and power domains, the Commission engaged in 
distinct types of policymaking processes across the two domains.  
Providing additional support to the uncertainty perspective 
Once again, one may better understand the Commission’s policymaking through the lenses that 
emphasise uncertainty. From this perspective, the Commission’s engagement in distinct types 
of policymaking processes across the two domains can be explained in light of the different 
uncertainty that characterised the gas and power domains during the period from the mid-2000s 
to the present day. In the power domain, the Commission held specific policy preferences 
throughout the period analysed. Under these conditions of lower uncertainty, as seen, it fa-
voured hierarchical policymaking. In the gas domain, in contrast, the Commission was exposed 
to policy questions about which it did not have precise preferences. Under these conditions of 
higher uncertainty, it engaged in experimentalist policymaking. 
In the power domain, as shown in Chapter Four, by the early 2000s the Commission had de-
veloped specific policy preferences about how to set up an inter-transmission system operator 
compensation mechanism as well as how to harmonise transmission charges levied on genera-
tors. This is evidenced by the agreements it voluntarily agreed upon in the context of the Flor-
ence Forum, respectively the provisional inter-transmission system operators compensation 
mechanism established in February 2002 and the decision taken in July 2003 that transmission 
charges levied on generators had to be comprised within a range defined between zero and a 
positive figure.459     
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In contrast to the gas domain, the Commission was not exposed to new policy questions about 
which it did not have specific preferences in the power domain. The main regulatory policy 
documents that accompanied the development of reforms on tarification regulation show that, 
in the power domain, the Commission continued to maintain throughout the 2000s the specific 
preferences it had developed at the beginning of that decade. These documents comprise the 
draft guidelines on tarification and on inter-transmission system operators compensation mech-
anism put forward for consultation and the formal advices provided respectively in 2005 and 
2006 by the Commission’s formal advisory body, the ERGEG, upon request from the Com-
mission;460 the impact assessment carried out by the Commission from 2008 to 2010 accom-
panying the Commission Regulation;461 and the Commission Regulation (EU) No. 774/2010 
laying down binding guidelines on the establishment of an inter-transmission system operators 
compensation mechanism and on a common regulatory approach to transmission charging, as 
adopted via comitology based on the Commission’s proposal.462 In none of these documents 
the Chapter found that the Commission had broad rather than specific preferences about the 
precise methods to either establish an inter-transmission system operator compensation mech-
anism or harmonise transmission charging. On the contrary, all these regulatory policy docu-
ments indicate that it maintained its precise preferences unaltered throughout the period stud-
ied. This is also confirmed by interviewees such as Dr. Matti Supponen, who suggests that the 
Commission has considered that these specific methods have worked quite well.463 
The guidelines annexed to the Commission Regulation (EU) No, 774/2010 reflect the draft 
guidelines produced by the ERGEG, which did not go beyond the already applied voluntary 
schemes and trends, and were in turn, based on the voluntary agreements reached in the early 
2000s in the Florence Forum but that were not yet codified. Hence, this reform was based on 
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the specific policy preferences that the Commission developed in the early 2000s and main-
tained throughout the 2000s. Under these conditions of lower uncertainty, as previously seen 
in this Chapter, the Commission favoured hierarchical policymaking.  
This contrasts with the gas domain, where as seen the Commission engaged in experimentalist 
policymaking instead. As suggested by Edith Hofer, the lower uncertainty in the power domain 
contrasted with the surge of uncertainty in the gas domain.464 Indeed Stephen Rose points out 
that in the gas domain the Commission did not have a clear idea of how to proceed. It was 
frustrated by different detailed arrangements adopted by Member States to implement entry-
exit systems, which clearly risked threatening the internal market. It knew that something had 
to be done, but did not know exactly what.465  
That in the gas domain the Commission did not have precise policy preferences about how to 
regulate tarification is also suggested by the main regulatory policy documents accompanying 
the development of reforms. These comprise the minutes of the Madrid Forum meetings held 
throughout the 2000s;466 Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, adopted based 
on a Commission proposal;467 Regulation (EC) No. 715/2009 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005, also adopted on the basis of a Com-
mission proposal;468 the report carried out during 2008 and 2009 by KEMA and REKK upon 
                                                
464 Interview with Edith Hofer, Assistant to the Director General for Energy of the European Commission. 
Brussels, 19 May 2016.	  
465 Interview with Stephen Rose, Chairman of Eurelectric Working Group Gas to Power and Head of Gas 
Market Design at RWE. London, 25 May 2016.	  
466 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/madrid-forum-previous-meetings. Accessed on 21 October 
2016. 	  
467 Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks.	  
468 Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions 
for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005.	  
165	  
request from the Commission;469 the study conducted throughout 2010 and 2011 by the Flor-
ence School of Regulation, also upon request from the Commission;470 and the public consul-
tation carried out between 2011 and 2012, upon request from the Commission, by the ACER 
on scope and main policy options for Framework Guidelines on harmonised transmission tariff 
structures.471 In none of these documents, the chapter found that the Commission had precise 
policy preferences for specific tarification methodologies. Instead, regulatory policy docu-
ments such as the study elaborated by KEMA and COWI by order of the Commission and the 
ACER Framework Guidelines as approved by the Commission, which were both published in 
2013, show that the Commission developed specific policy preferences for well identified tar-
ification methodologies only in the early 2010s.472  
Since in the gas domain the Commission did not have precise policy preferences, this chapter 
considers that the Commission found itself in conditions of higher uncertainty. As seen, under 
these conditions, it did engage in experimentalist policymaking. As put it by Stephen Rose, to 
develop reforms on tarification regulation, in the gas domain the Commission had first to un-
derstand how tarification regulation was managed across Member States.473 
As noted, both uncertainty and the type of policymaking the Commission engaged in were 
reversed compared to those found in Chapter Five, with regard to the regulation of congestion 
                                                
469 KEMA and REKK ‘Report - Study on Methodologies for Gas Transmission Network Tariffs and Gas 
Balancing Fees in Europe’. Submitted to the European Commission, Directorate-General Energy and Transport. 
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and Gas Balancing Fees in Europe - Annex’. Submitted to the European Commission, Directorate-General 
Energy and Transport. Arnhem, December 2009.	  
470 Ruester, S., von Hirschhausen, C., Marcantonini, C.,  He, X, Egerer, J. and Glachant, J.M. ‘EU Involvement 
in Electricity and Natural Gas Transmission Grid Tarification’. THINK, European University Institute, Final 
Report, January 2012; see also ‘Need for EU involvement in natural gas transmission grid tarification?’. 
Presented by Sophia Ruester of THINK project at the 21st meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum. 
Madrid, 23 March 2012. 	  
471 Available at: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Public_consultations/PC_2012_G_14/PC_2012_G_14_ACER%
20Public%20Consultation%20on%20Scope%20and%20main%20policy%20options%20for%20Framework%2
0Guidelines%20on%20Harmonised.pdf. Accessed on 21 October 2016.	  
472 KEMA & COWI ‘Study on Entry-Exit Regimes in Gas. Part A: Implementation of Entry-Exit Systems’. By 
order of the European Commission –	  DG ENERGY. Groningen –	  The Netherlands, July 19 –	  2013; KEMA & 
COWI ‘Country factsheets’. July 19, 2013; and ‘Entry-Exit Regimes in Gas’. Presentation delivered by Bert 
Kiewiet of KEMA at the XXIV Madrid Forum, 15-16 October 2013; ACER Framework Guidelines on rules 
regarding harmonized transmission tariff structures for gas. FG-2013-G-01, 29 November 2013; see also ACER 
Assessment of Policy Options Justification document for Framework Guidelines on rules regarding Harmonized 
Transmission Tariff Structures. ACER-JD-2014-G-01, 31 March 2014.	  
473 Interview with Stephen Rose, Chairman of Eurelectric Working Group Gas to Power and Head of Gas 
Market Design at RWE. London, 25 May 2016.	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management. In congestion management, the Commission faced higher uncertainty and en-
gaged in experimentalist policymaking in the power domain, while it found itself in conditions 
of lower uncertainty and favoured hierarchical policymaking in the gas domain. In tarification 
regulation, on contrary, it found itself in conditions of lower uncertainty and favoured hierar-
chical policymaking in the power domain, while it faced higher uncertainty and engaged in 
experimentalist policymaking in the gas domain. This is useful because it shows that the type 
of policymaking observed did not depend on the specific sector. 	  
Conclusions 
This chapter has offered a final test to the argument that under conditions of higher uncertainty 
the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking, which was elaborated in Chapter 
Three and found support in Chapters Four and Five. It compared tarification regulation across 
the gas and power domains during the period from the mid-2000s to the present day. The Chap-
ter’s central findings were strikingly similar to those of Chapter Five, except that they were 
reversed across the two domains. The Commission engaged in different types of policymaking 
processes across gas and power. In the power domain, it did not employ experimentalist archi-
tectures even though they were present very similarly than in gas. Instead, it favoured hierar-
chical policymaking. It monitored compliance with uniform policy solutions and, by employ-
ing the hierarchical architecture of the comitology procedure, it developed reforms without 
conducting comparisons of different approaches and with low stakeholder participation, to im-
pose on all Member States and regulated companies uniform policy solutions and monitor their 
compliance. By contrast, in the gas domain the Commission engaged in experimentalist poli-
cymaking. Even though it could use hierarchical architectures, it used experimentalist archi-
tectures such as the Madrid Forum and the network codes procedure to stimulate comparisons 
of different approaches pursued by Member States and regulated companies and to facilitate 
the development of agreements on reforms on this basis and with high stakeholder participa-
tion.  
From the shadow of hierarchy perspective it is puzzling that in the power domain the Commis-
sion, despite its stronger ability to threaten adverse legislation to induce conflicting parties to 
cooperate thanks to its strengthened formal rulemaking powers, did not engage in experimen-
talist policymaking in the power domain. In contrast to congestion management regulation, this 
cannot be explained by different degrees of conflicts across the two domains, given that con-
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flicts were similar across gas and power. The Commission’s lack of engagement in experimen-
talist policymaking in the power domain is compatible with the view emphasising polyarchy, 
which explains it precisely in the light of the Commission’s stronger formal rulemaking pow-
ers. Yet, this view does not explain why, in the gas domain, the Commission did engage in 
experimentalist policymaking even though its formal rulemaking powers and hence polyarchy 
were very similar than in the power domain. Thus, these patterns of policymaking further show 
the limits of the polyarchy and shadow of hierarchy views. In contrast, they provide additional 
support to the argument centred on uncertainty. The patterns of policymaking found are con-
sistent with this explanation because in the power domain the Commission held throughout the 
2000s precise policy preferences for specific policies and hence faced lower uncertainty, while 
in the gas domain it was exposed to new policy questions about which it did not have precise 
policy preferences and thus found itself in conditions of higher uncertainty. Furthermore, since 
both uncertainty and the types of policymaking the Commission engaged in were reversed 
compared to those observed in Chapter Five with regard to congestion management regulation, 
the types of policymaking were not dependent on the domain.   
The following chapter provides the Conclusions. It begins by summarising the main findings 
of the thesis and answering the research question raised. It then puts these findings in perspec-
tive by comparing and contrasting them to the experimentalist and shadow of hierarchy theo-
ries, from which claims were derived. Finally, it discusses the implications of these findings 











Table 18 summarises the main findings of the thesis. It shows that, as seen in Chapters Three 
and Four, to regulate the issue areas of congestion management as well as tarification in both 
the power and the gas domains during the period from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, under 
conditions of higher uncertainty, even though the shadow of hierarchy was weaker, the Com-
mission engaged in experimentalist policymaking by granting discretion to Member States 
and/or regulated companies to pursue common goals through distinct means, comparing their 
different approaches, and developing agreements on reforms on this basis and with high stake-
holder participation. It also shows that, as seen in the same Chapters, to regulate congestion 
management and tarification in both the power and gas domains during the early 2000s, under 
conditions of lower uncertainty, despite the more polyarchic distribution of powers, the Com-
mission favoured hierarchical policymaking by monitoring compliance with uniform solutions 
and developing reforms without conducting comparisons of different approaches and with low 
stakeholder participation, to make uniform solutions binding on all Member States and regu-
lated companies. Furthermore Table 18 illustrates that, as seen in Chapters Five and Six re-
spectively, to regulate congestion management in the power domain and tarification in the gas 
domain from the mid-2000s to the present day (i.e., November 2016), under conditions of 
higher uncertainty the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking, even though the 
distribution of powers was less polyarchic. Finally it also highlights that, as seen in the same 
Chapters, to regulate congestion management in the gas domain and tarification in the power 
domain from the mid-2000s to the present day, under conditions of lower uncertainty the Com-
mission favoured hierarchical policymaking, even though the shadow of hierarchy was 
stronger. Thus, based on these findings the thesis answers the research question by arguing that 
the Commission engages in experimentalist policymaking under conditions of higher uncer-
tainty, regardless of whether the shadow of hierarchy to induce conflictual actors to cooperate 






Table 18. Commission’s policymaking in the selected subcases    
 Polyarchy (and shadow of hierarchy)	  







policymaking	  –	   in all issue 
areas and domains from the 
late 1990s to the early 2000s	  
Experimentalist policymaking –	   in 
congestion management in power and 
tarification in gas from the mid-2000s 




–	   in all issue areas and 
domains during the early 
2000s	  
Hierarchical policymaking –	   in 
congestion management in gas and 
tarification in power from the mid-
2000s to the present day	  
 
First of all, through in-depth comparative analysis of EU regulation of crucial issues (i.e., 
congestion management and tarification) in electricity and natural gas over the past two 
decades, this thesis advances empirical research on EU energy regulation. Its findings might 
have implications for the policies produced in the field of energy regulation, especially since 
in a number of instances key actors face considerable strategic uncertainty. The most obvious 
example is represented by the need to fight climate change through an increasing penetration 
of renewable energy sources, which in turn implies a paradigm change in the organisation of 
the energy sector. Another example are the novel efforts, at the crossroads of energy and 
financial regulation, to identify and penalize insider trading and market manipulation in 
wholesale energy markets across Europe under the Regulation on Energy Markets Integrity 
and Transparency (REMIT) adopted in 2011.474 
In addition, the thesis and its findings do have important implications that advance the study 
of experimentalist governance in a number of respects. By developing a set of indicators, the 
thesis offers a clearer distinction of experimentalist and hierarchical institutional architectures 
                                                
474	  http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/remit/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed on 12 July 2017.	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from policymaking processes than done thus far in the literature.475 It does so by elaborating 
indicators based on the key elements of experimentalist architecture as set out by its propo-
nents, but which shift the emphasis from institutional design to actual operation. Specifically, 
it defined and assessed experimentalist policymaking as a process whereby a) Member State 
public authorities and/or regulated companies are granted discretion to adopt distinct ap-
proaches, b) their different approaches are compared, and c) agreements on reforms are devel-
oped on this basis and d) with high stakeholder participation. These criteria are widely appli-
cation and therefore represent a useful contribution in its own right that might be used in future 
research. 
Furthermore, the thesis elaborated and employed original reconceptualisations and operation-
alisations of both strategic uncertainty and polyarchy. The core advantage of these formulations 
compared to existing alternatives is that they allow experimentalist theoretical arguments to be 
corroborated or challenged by empirical findings. As the indicators to distinguish between ex-
perimentalist and hierarchical forms of policymaking, also the reconceptualisations and oper-
ationalisations of strategic uncertainty and polyarchy can be directly used by other scholars in 
other contexts. By building on them, the thesis showed that the distribution of powers in the 
EU has not remained constantly polyarchic, as argued in the literature,476 but instead has be-
come relatively less polyarchic (or more hierarchical) over time. Equally, it showed that un-
certainty has not always been rising in the EU,477 but instead may vary across domains, issue 
areas and over time. In particular, it suggests an endogenous relationship between uncertainty 
and experimentalist policymaking whereby actors develop more specific preferences following 
experimentalist processes, but then face new problems about which they do not have specific 
                                                
475 Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327; Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2010) 
‘Learning From Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In (Eds.) 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP, pp.1-28.	  
476	  Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist govern-
ance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327; Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2010) ‘Learning 
from Difference: the New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin 
(Eds.) Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP, pp.1-
28.	  
477	  Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist govern-
ance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327; Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2010) ‘Learning 
from Difference: the New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin 
(Eds.) Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP, pp.1-
28.	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preferences and hence turn again to experimentalism. Such relationship should be further ex-
plored. 
By finding patterns of policymaking processes not based on polyarchy, shadow of hierarchy, 
time or sector but instead consistent with uncertainty, the thesis suggests that uncertainty is an 
individually sufficient condition for experimentalist policymaking. These findings contrast 
with shadow of hierarchy theory and, in part, also with experimentalist theory, from which the 
thesis derived claims about the conditions under which the Commission engages in experimen-
talist policymaking. By showing that the Commission did engage in experimentalist policy-
making despite the absence of a comparatively strong shadow of hierarchy supposedly needed 
to induce conflictual parties to cooperate,478 it suggests a different picture from that put forward 
by the major critics of new and experimentalist governance, who emphasize the importance of 
the shadow of the state for such modes of governance. This is significant not only for shadow 
of hierarchy arguments, because it suggests that, in fact, experimentalist policymaking does 
not require a comparatively strong shadow of hierarchy. But also as concerns experimentalist 
arguments, which present polyarchy and uncertainty jointly and do not explicitly clarify 
whether these are necessary or sufficient conditions.479 By finding that the Commission did 
engage in experimentalist policymaking even when the distribution of powers was compara-
tively less polyarchic (or more hierarchical), the thesis suggests a somewhat different view 
from that proposed by experimentalist theory, which has consistently stressed the importance 
of polyarchy.480 By contrast, by finding that the Commission engaged in experimentalist poli-
                                                
478 Heritier, A. (2002) ‘New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-Making without Legislating?’. In A. 
Heritier (ed.) Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance. Rowman & Littlefield; 
Heritier, A. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2008) ‘The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance’. Journal of 
Public Policy, 28: 1-17. The argument largely builds on Mayntz. R and Scharpf, F.W. (eds) (1995a) 
Gesellschaftliche Selbstregulierung Und Politische Steuerung. Campus, Frankfurt; F.W. Scharpf (1997) Games 
Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Westview Press; Borzel, T.A. and Risse, 
T. (2010) ‘Governance without a state: Can it work?’. Regulation & Governance, 4(2): 117.	  
479 Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist 
governance in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 280; Sabel, C.F. and Zeitlin, J. (2012) 
‘Experimentalism in the EU: Common ground and persistent differences’. Regulation & Governance, 6: 412.	  
480 Cohen, J. and Sabel, C.F. (1997) ‘Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy’. European Law Journal, 3(4):313-42; 
Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2008) Learning from difference: The new architecture of experimentalist governance 
in the European Union. European Law Journal 14: 271–327; Sabel, C. F. and Zeitlin, J. (2010) ‘Learning from 
Difference: the New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’. In C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (Eds.) 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: OUP, pp.1-28; 
Sabel, C.F. and Simon, W.H. (2011) ‘Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State’. 
Georgetown Law Journal, 100(1): 53-93; Zeitlin, J. (2016) “EU Experimentalist Governance in Times of 
Crisis”. West European Politics, 39(5): 1073-94.	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cymaking under conditions of higher uncertainty and favoured hierarchical policymaking un-
der conditions of lower uncertainty, the thesis supports the emphasis put by experimentalist 
theory on uncertainty.481 It hence suggests that uncertainty has significant influence not only 
on the diffusion of experimentalist architecture, but also on whether key actors such as the 
Commission engage in experimentalist policymaking by actually making use of such architec-
tures.  
Of course, these findings should be considered with caution, as the thesis has potential limita-
tions. Because of the thesis question and design, experimentalist decision-making procedures 
were always present, which however raises the question of whether the experimentalist archi-
tecture is a necessary but not sufficient condition for experimentalist policymaking or rather 
the latter might emerge even in the absence of the former,482 which in turn has implications for 
whether uncertainty really is an individually sufficient condition for experimentalist processes. 
Another limitation arises from the fact that the thesis adopted an inductive rather than a deduc-
tive approach. Induction means extrapolating from some information to make an inference 
about something else. In contrast to deduction, in induction conclusions do not necessarily 
follow from the premises. In inductive arguments, the truth of the premises cannot guarantee 
the truth of conclusions. In particular, although the thesis did use abduction to consider differ-
ent possible explanations, it is always possible that it did not consider other factors which might 
                                                
481	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have acted as “confounders”. Yet another potential limitation is that the analysis focused ex-
clusively on one case study, namely EU energy regulation. This raises familiar questions about 
external validity, in particular how generalizable the thesis’	  findings are. The distribution of 
power in the EU remains, in absolute terms, polyarchic, in energy just as in other sectors. This 
suggests caution, because polyarchy might still serve as an additional bulwark against hierar-
chical governance,483 which would imply the need to retain it as a secondary scope condition 
alongside strategic uncertainty. Furthermore, strategic uncertainty might be more prevalent in 
regulatory than in other types of public policies, as the emphasis on technical complexity in 
the literature on regulation might suggest,484 which in turn prompts questions about the argu-
ment’s validity for policy areas beyond regulation. In addition, since the need to coordinate 
divergent regimes which affect one other is particularly strong in the EU,485 the generalizability 
of the findings to instances which might be characterized by lower degrees of interdependence, 
such as global, might be called into question. Altogether, then, these potential challenges sug-
gest the need to test and refine by focusing on other empirical evidence the arguments devel-
oped in this thesis, which aimed at contributing to advance our understanding from the diffu-
sion of experimentalist architecture to its effects on policymaking processes.   
The thesis also constitutes a study of the regulatory process, and hence also offers contributions 
to the literature on regulation. In particular, experimentalist governance has some features sim-
ilar to what in the regulation literature is called ‘management-based regulation’, in that this 
mode of regulation seeks to “take advantage of private actors’	  understanding of the relationship 
between behaviours and their outputs, compelling regulated parties to conduct their own eval-
uations, find their own control solutions, and document all the steps they take”.486 By finding 
patterns of policymaking consistent with uncertainty and on that basis suggesting that uncer-
tainty may be an individually sufficient condition for experimentalist policymaking, the thesis 
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supports claims in the literature on modes of regulation that management-based regulation “ap-
pears to be a promising strategy available when regulation is needed to address some of the 
most intractable public policy problems”, for which governments are often unable to prescribe 
uniform fixes.487   
Finally and more broadly, by introducing a distinction between governance architectures and 
policymaking and defining the former as institutional arrangements and decision-making pro-
cedures and the latter as how decision-making actually occurs within such institutional archi-
tectures, the main premise of the thesis already offered an important conceptual innovation 
relative to the existing literature, which thus far has focused on documenting the diffusion of 
experimentalist architectures without differentiating between them and their operation. By 
finding patterns of policymaking not based on the existence of particular institutional architec-
tures, the thesis showed that there is no tight link between institutional architectures and poli-
cymaking processes, but rather that the type of policymaking can vary even if institutional 
architectures do not. The thesis’	  findings hence warn that institutional structures and policy-
making processes may well differ. In particular, the findings support claims that “systems with 
all the elements of the new governance architecture in place will remain architectures only if 
they do not also operate in an experimentalist way”.488 More generally, while in principle most 
scholars might well agree that actual policymaking may take distinct forms within a given set 
of institutional arrangements and decision-making procedures, in practice, often institutional 
characteristics are considered the determinants of policy outcomes and already known institu-
tional variables are eventually used as major explanatory factors due to lack of information on 
policy-level variables.489 Therefore, the thesis expands upon and reinforces the message that, 
in contrast to conventional practice, scholars need to look beyond institutional design to the 
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Appendix 
Sources of evidence  
As seen in Chapter One, the thesis relied predominantly on primary sources of evidence. These 
included publicly available regulatory policy documents and interviews. The specific regula-
tory policy documents employed in the thesis are listed in the Bibliography. They are notably 
conclusions of meetings of the Florence Electricity Regulatory Forum and the Madrid Gas 
Regulatory Forum, as well as the presentations therein delivered;490 “position papers”	  produced 
by the informal regulatory network CEER as well as a variety of trade associations, such as the 
ETSO,491 the EFET,492 EuroPEX493 and Eurelectric;494 impact assessments,495consultancy re-
ports and academic studies, conducted upon request from the Commission;496progress reports, 
notably of the formal European regulatory network ERGEG and the EU regulatory agency 
ACER, in particular about voluntary “Regional Initiatives”;497 the energy sector inquiry carried 
out by the Commission;498and drafts of rules put forward for public consultation, responses 
                                                
490 For the Florence Forum for electricity, for the more recent meetings, see https://ec.europa.eu/en-
ergy/en/events/meeting-european-electricity-regulatory-forum-florence; for previous meetings, see 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Florence_Fora. 
For the Madrid Forum for gas, for the more recent meetings, see https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/madrid-
forum; for previous meetings, see http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORK-
SHOP/Stakeholder%20Fora/Madrid%20Fora. For the very first meetings of the Florence and Madrid Fora, 
which are not publicly available directly online, I have successfully requested access to documents to the Secre-
tariat General of the Commission.  
The most important stakeholder advisory group is arguably the Project Coordination Group, which will be dis-
cussed in Chapter Five. See http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/Stake-
holder%20Fora/Florence_Fora/PCG. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
491 Available at: https://www.entsoe.eu/news-events/former-associations/etso/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed on 
11 July 2016.	  
492 Available at: http://www.efet.org/. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
493 Available at: http://www.europex.org/. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
494 Available at: http://www.eurelectric.org/. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
495 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/cia_2016_en.htm. Accessed on 11 
July 2016.	  
496 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/studies?field_associated_topic_tid=42. Accessed on 11 July 
2016. 	  
497 For an introduction to the Regional Initiatives, see http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/por-
tal/EER_HOME/EER_ACTIVITIES/EER_INITIATIVES; http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Re-
gional_initiatives/Pages/default.aspx and http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Gas/Regional_%20Intiatives/Pages/de-
fault.aspx.  For the ERGEG progress reports, see: http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/por-
tal/EER_HOME/EER_ACTIVITIES/EER_INITIATIVES/Progress_Reports. For the ACER progress reports, 
see http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Regional_initiatives/Pages/Reports.aspx and http://www.acer.eu-
ropa.eu/en/Gas/Regional_%20Intiatives/Pages/Reports.aspx. Accessed on 11 July 2016. 	  
498 See, for example: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/2005_inquiry/index_en.html. Accessed on 
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received and versions eventually adopted, notably non-binding guidelines of good practice of 
the CEER and the ERGEG,499 non-binding framework guidelines of the ACER,500 binding net-
work codes of the formal ENTSO-E501 and the ENTSO-G,502 and binding regulations of the 
Commission.503 
These regulatory policy documents were complemented by interviews, which were conducted 
between April 2015 and July 2016. Before starting his doctoral thesis, the author worked in 
Brussels, namely for the trade association Eurelectric, which represents the European electric-
ity industry. While this professional experience provided the author with precious technical 
expertise as well as contacts, and even though at that time he was not directly involved in any 
of the subcases selected and studied in the thesis, this could also represent an additional source 
of bias. To mitigate such risk, the author selected a sample of interviewees whom, in addition 
to being particularly knowledgeable and expert on the subcases analysed, is representative of 
a number of dimensions. This is shown in Table 19, which provides a list of the interviewees, 
describes their key characteristics and offers a brief profile for each of them.  
First, the 18 interviewees have 10 different European nationalities, namely Austrian, Belgian, 
British, Finnish, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Slovenian and Spanish. Second, their 
expertise and experience are balanced across the power and gas domains: 7 of the interviewees 
are particularly knowledgeable about gas, 8 about power, and the rest similarly about both 
domains. Third, while most of the interviewees are senior officials and representatives (e.g., 
Director, Chair, President, Head), a few interviewees are less senior (e.g., Officer, Advisor). 
Fourth, the interviewees represent both regulatory policymakers and regulatees, with ten and 
eight of them belonging to each category respectively. Furthermore, each of these two broad 
categories of actors is representative of distinct sub-categories. Within regulatory policymak-
                                                
499 Available at: http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT. Accessed on 11 July 
2016. 	  
500 Available at: http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/Pages/default.aspx; and 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Gas/Framework%20guidelines_and_network%20codes/Pages/default.aspx. Ac-
cessed on 11 July 2016.	  
501 Available at: https://www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/network-code-development/Pages/default.aspx. Ac-
cessed on 11 July 2016.	  
502 Available at: http://www.entsog.eu/publications/congestion-management-cmp; and http://www.en-
tsog.eu/publications/tariffs. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	  
503 See, in particular, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/consultations; https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/whole-
sale-market/electricity-network-codes; and https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/whole-
sale-market/gas-network-codes. Accessed on 11 July 2016.	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ers, interviewees are not only from the Commission, but also from European regulatory net-
works (CEER, ERGEG) and the EU agency (ACER), as well as from the national regulatory 
authorities composing their boards. Within the category of regulated companies, some inter-
viewees are representatives of transmission system operators, others of network users such as 
producers and importers, and still others of other types of companies such as power exchanges 
and traders, at both the individual company and the European trade association levels.  
Table 19. List of interviewees 
Name	   Institution / 
Company	  
Position(s) held	   Nationality	   Main ex-
pertise	  
Mode, place 












Spanish	   Power	   Face-to-face, 
Brussels, 17 
May 2016	  
Dr. Juan Jose Alba Rios is Chairman, Markets Committee, EURELECTRIC. He is also Vice 
President, Regulatory Affairs for Endesa, an Enel group company. Between 2000 and 2004 he 
was in charge of the European trading unit of Endesa, developed through a joint venture with 
Morgan Stanley. Prior to this he was in charge of regulatory affairs in the Endesa generation 
business. Between 1986 and 1997 he was a researcher at the Instituto de Investigación 
Tecnológica (IIT). He has served as a member of the board of directors of the European Feder-
ation of Energy Traders (EFET) and co-chairman of its working group  served as a member of 
the boards of the French and Polish power exchanges. 
Csilla 
Bartok 
ACER	   Team Leader 
Framework Guide-
lines	  
Hungarian	   Gas	   Face-to-face, 
Ljubljana, 9 
June 2016	  
Csilla Bartok is Senior officer, Team Leader for Framework Guidelines and Network Codes in 
the Gas Department of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) estab-






Head of Market 
Development	  
Italian	   Power	   Email, 7 
April 2015	  
Dr Guido Cervigni is an international economist specialized in the energy sector and he is Re-
search Fellow at the Institute for Energy and Environmental Economics (IEFE) at Bocconi Uni-
versity, Milan, and Research Fellow with the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE), Brus-
sels. Guido is a former Director at AF Mercados in Madrid, and former Director at LECG Con-
sulting in London and Head of LECG’s Italian office. Prior to joining LECG, he was Head of 
Economic Analysis and Regulatory Affairs at Enel S.p.A, Head of Business Development in an 
energy trading company and Head of Market Development at the Italian Power Exchange. 
Guido started his career at the Italian Energy Regulatory Authority where he was Head of Com-
petition and Markets. Guido holds a PhD in economics with a thesis in industrial organisation 











British 	   Power	   Face-to-face, 
London, 24 
June 2016	  
Mark joined Ofgem as associate partner, European markets and coordination in January 2014, 
following three years with the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Elec-
tricity (ENTSO-E) in Brussels. Mark leads projects on the development of European and British 
wholesale markets and is the vice chair of the Electricity Working Group of European Regula-
tors. He particularly focuses on the incentivisation of the system operator and the design and 
effective functioning of intraday, day ahead and balancing markets. An economist by back-
ground, Mark was previously an economic consultant with CEPA where he worked with clients 
across regulated sectors. He began his energy sector career with Ofgem in 2003. 
Marco For-
esti 




Marco is Market design specialist at ENTSO-E, the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity, a European association gathering 42 Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs) companies across 34 countries in Europe (then going beyond the borders of the Union). 
In 2009, the EU granted the association legislative mandate in order to coordinate the actions 
of those companies. The association has as a principal mandate to provide the EU with 10-
years investment plans for grids (including amortisation). The association has also a role 
in forecasting demand evolution in order to make it in adequacy with capacities (for instance in 
case of severe winter), up to 10-20 years. ENTSO-E has finally a function of network code 
drafting, which are then reviewed by the ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regu-
lators) and then validated by European institutions. Before joining ENTSO-E, Marco worked 









German 	   Gas 	   Telephone, 
10 June 2016	  
Dr. Annegret Groebel has studied economics at the University of Heidelberg and Paris-Dau-
phine and was a researcher at the University of Mannheim where she also got her doctorate in 
1996. Dr. Groebel has worked for the German Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications 
and Post since 1997 (renamed in 2005 to Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Tele-
communications, Post and Railway). Dr. Groebel has held the post of Head of Section "Inter-
national Co-ordination" in the German Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Post 
since 2001 and was promoted Head of Department International Relations/Postal Regulation in 
2009. She also holds key positions at the Independent Regulators Group (IRG). She is actively 
involved in the work of the European Regulators Group (ERG) and of the newly created Body 
of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC). She is responsible for all 
contacts to other European and non-European regulatory bodies as well as for the contacts with 
the European Commission, including CEER, ACER in the energy field, ERG-Post and IRG 
Railways. In March 2012, she was appointed Vice-President of the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and became the alternate member of the ACER Board of Regulators repre-
senting BNetzA at the BoR Plenary meetings. 
Thomas 
Holzer 
ACER	   Officer Framework 
Guidelines	  
German	   Gas	   Face-to-face, 
Ljubljana, 9 
June 2016	  
Thomas Holzer is Officer for Framework Guidelines and Network Codes in the Gas Department 
of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) established in 2009. Among 
his key responsibilities, there has been the development of rules on congestion management. 
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Edith Hofer Commission	   Assistant to the Di-
rector General for 
Energy	  






Edith Hofer studied law at the Johannes-Kepler University in Linz (Austria). From 1997 to 
2001, she worked as an assistant lecturer at the Institute for Public Law at the same university. 
Following the successful completion of a 1-year post-graduate study programme (Master of 
Laws) at King’s College London, Ms. Hofer worked in the legal department of E-Control, the 
Austrian energy regulatory authority, and from autumn 2003 to autumn 2004 as a seconded 
expert for CEER, the Council of European Energy Regulators. From October 2004 to Novem-
ber 2007, Edith Hofer worked as adviser in the Markets Unit of Eurelectric, the European elec-
tricity industry’s association, before returning to E-Control as senior adviser for European is-
sues in the International Relations department. Since January 2011, she works in the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for Energy. Ms. Hofer has extensive knowledge about the 
European electricity markets, including on the 3rd package, and experience in working in en-




Iberdrola	   Director of Brus-
sels’	  office	  
Spanish	   Power 	   Face-to-face, 
London, 23 
June 2016	  
Fernando Lasheras Garcia is since 2001 the Director of Iberdrola’s Representative Office in 
Brussels. He has a Degree on Electrical Engineering and a broad experience both in the Oper-
ation and Regulation of Electricity Sectors. He began his professional activity in Iberduero in 
1976 as responsible for the security functions in the Energy Management System. In 1986, he 
joined Red Eléctrica, the Spanish TSO, as Deputy Manager of the Northern Regional Centre. 
In 1996, he returned to Iberdrola as Director of Regulatory Development. He was involved in 
the design and development of the Spanish Electricity Market. His current duties are the insti-
tutional representation of Iberdrola in Brussels and the follow-up of the regulations that come 
from the EU institutions. 
Dr. Margot 
Loudon 
Eurogas 	   Deputy Secretary 
General 	  




Dr. Margot Loudon received a PhD in Humanities in 1983 from the University of London. After 
working with British Steel, and the Nationalised Industries Chairmen’s Group, she began her 
career with the gas industry in the capacity of Financial Analyst with British Gas plc. She was 
seconded by British Gas to Brussels in 1986, where she worked in the Secretariat of Comité 
d’Etudes Economiques Gaz, and was appointed Deputy Secretary General in 1990 of Eurogas, 
then the organization representing integrated gas sector interests. Today Eurogas mainly repre-
sents the interests of wholesale and retail suppliers. Ms. Loudon’s responsibilities within Euro-
gas focus on the internal market and related issues. 










Belgian	   Gas	   Telephone, 
27 May 2016	  
Tom is vice-chairman of the Gas Working Group within CEER and ACER. In these organiza-
tions, he is responsible for the development of the Framework Guidelines on harmonized gas 
transmission tariff structures. He has been working for more than 10 years for the Belgian fed-










Alberto Pototschnig is the first Director of the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER), established in 2010 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. Before 
joining the Agency, from January 2006 he was a Partner in Mercados EMI, a Madrid-based 
international consultancy specialising in the energy sector, where he served as CEO and Deputy 
Chairman. He previously worked at the Italian Transmission System Operators (from 2003 to 
2005), served as first CEO of the Italian Electricity Market Operator (from 2000 to 2003) and 
in the Italian Energy Regulatory Authority (AEEG, from 1997 to 2000), with his final position 
being Director of Electricity Regulation. Alberto started his professional career in 1989 with 
London Economics, an international economic consultancy, where he was eventually in charge 
of the industrial economic advisory practice. Between 2003 and 2005 Alberto acted as an ad-
viser to the Italian Government on environmental policy issues. Since 2004, he is an adviser at 
the Florence School of Regulation, where he regularly teaches on energy regulation and market 
design. Alberto holds a Degree in Economics from Bocconi University in Milan and an MSc in 





ACER	   Officer Framework 
Guidelines	  
Slovenian	   Power	   Face-to-face, 
Ljubljana, 9 
June 2016	  
Martin Povh obtained his university and Ph.D. degrees at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, 
University of Ljubljana, in 2001 and 2009, respectively. Between 2001 and 2006 he was a Re-
search Assistant at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, carrying out research and education 
projects at the Laboratory for Energy Policy. During 2007 - 2011, Martin Povh was employed 
at ELES (Slovenia’s Transmission System Operator) in the Market Monitoring Division. Now 
he works in the Electricity Department of ACER. 
Thomas 
Querrioux 
ACER	   Gas Officer	   French	   Gas	   Face-to-face, 
Ljubljana, 9 
June 2016	  
Thomas Querrioux is Officer for Framework Guidelines and Network Codes in the Gas Depart-
ment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Among his areas of 
expertise, there is the regulation of network tariffs. Before joining ACER, Thomas worked as 














Until 2008 Pippo was director of the Florence School of Regulation at the European University 
Institute in Florence. Before that, he was president of the Italian regulatory authority for elec-
tricity and gas for seven years (1996 – 2003), co-founder and vice-president of the Council of 
European Energy Regulators (2000-2003), and often a consultant to the Italian government 







Gas to Power and 
Head of Gas Mar-
ket Design	  
British 	   Gas	   Face-to-face, 
London, 25 
May 2016	  
Stephen Rose is an expert on gas regulation. He is Head of Market Design at RWE, as well as 
Chairman of the Working Group Gas to Power of Eurelectric, the Union of the European elec-
tricity industry.  
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Peter Styles EFET	   Chairman of the 
Electricity 
Committee 	  
British 	   Power	   Face-to-face, 
London, 28 
July 2016	  
Since 2000 Peter has been a Board Member of the European Federation of Energy Traders 
(EFET) and Chairman of the Electricity Committee of EFET. Since 2010 he has been an Hon-
orary Associate at Dundee University, where he is attached to the Global Faculty. His career in 
the 1980s and 1990s encompassed project work in upstream oil and gas, power plant develop-
ment, the management of a gas pipeline business and the establishment of the first and largest 
pan-European energy trading business. 
Dr. Matti 
Supponen 
Commission 	   Policy Coordinator 
Wholesale markets 
at DG ENER	  
Finnish 	   Power	   Face-to-face, 
Brussels, 19 
May 2016	  
Dr. Matti Supponen works in the European Commission in DG Energy on electricity market 
issues. His current topics are the future market design and implementation of the existing leg-
islation, in particular the electricity network codes. He has the degree of Doctor of Science in 
Technology from Aalto University in Espoo, Finland. 
 
Ahead of each interview, the author sent a brief note introducing the relevant academic debates; 
identifying the gap, research question and case study; describing the provisional findings of 
each empirical chapter (Chapters 3-6); and presenting the then emerging argument and its 
broader implications (see below).  Most of the interviews were conducted “face-to-face”, either 
in Brussels, Ljubljana (where the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators is 
based) or London. They lasted from thirty minutes to two hours, with an average of one hour 
and fifteen minutes. Interviews were “semi-structured”. After briefly reviewing the written 
material he had sent in advance, the author mainly asked open-ended questions, which were 
ordered flexibly. The main goal was to understand how far the author’s understanding that far 
emerged reflected the opinion of interviewees. This led to largely respondent-driven discus-
sions. In some instances, on their own initiative interviewees offered suggestions about addi-
tional people who could be interviewed. Although in order to facilitate the interviews inter-
viewees were offered the possibility of confidentiality or anonymity according to their own 
preferences, no interviewee decided to take advantage of either. 
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Note circulated ahead of interviews  
            May 2016 
 
Note aiming to facilitate interviews on doctoral research of Bernardo Rangoni (LSE), 
provisionally titled “Uncertainty and experimentalist policymaking by the European 
Commission: regulating the internal market – the cases of electricity and gas policy” 
 
Introduction to the relevant academic debates 
‘New modes of governance’ that diverge in various respects from standard hierarchical or 
'command and control' models have attracted considerable attention over the last two decades, 
both in academic debates and applications in practice.504 They involve a shift in emphasis away 
from command-and-control in favor of ‘regulatory’ approaches which are less rigid, less pre-
scriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in nature.505 A promising 
perspective for conceptualizing new governance is offered by the theory of ‘experimentalist 
governance’, defined in general terms as a recursive process of provisional goal-setting and 
revision based on learning from the comparison of alternative approaches to advancing them 
in different contexts.506 Experimentalist scholars understand the emergence and success of this 
novel form of governance as a response to a secular rise in volatility and uncertainty, which 
has overwhelmed the capacities of conventional hierarchical governance in many settings. Ex-
perimentalist architectures have thus spread across many domains and polities and are espe-
cially well-suited, experimentalists suggest, to heterogeneous but highly interdependent set-
tings like the European Union (EU), where they appear to have found their way more quickly 
and consistently. 507 There, local units face similar problems and can learn much from each 
another’s efforts to solve them, even though particular solutions will rarely be generalizable in 
any straightforward way. In this sense, experimentalism is said to be a normatively desirable 
machine for learning from diversity, thereby ‘transforming an obstacle to closer integration 
into an asset for achieving it’.508  
                                                
504	  For	  excellent	  reviews	  see	  Eberlein,	  B.	  and	  Kerwer,	  D.	  (2004)	  ‘New	  Governance	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  A	  
Theoretical	  Perspective’.	  JCMS,	  42(1):	  121-­‐42;	  and	  De	  Burca,	  G.	  and	  Scott,	  J.	  (2006)	  Law	  and	  New	  Governance	  
in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US.	  Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing.	  
505	  De	  Burca,	  G.	  and	  Scott,	  J.	  ‘New	  Governance,	  Law	  and	  Constitutionalism’.	  In	  de	  Burca,	  G.	  and	  Scott,	  J.	  (Eds.)	  
Law	  and	  New	  Governance	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US.	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2006.	  Draft	  available	  at:	  
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/clge/docs/govlawconst.pdf	  Accessed	  21st	  August	  2014.	  
506	  “Recursive”	  is	  used	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  output	  from	  one	  application	  of	  a	  procedure	  or	  sequence	  of	  opera-­‐
tions	  becomes	  the	  input	  for	  the	  next,	  so	  that	  iteration	  of	  the	  same	  process	  produces	  changing	  results.	  See	  C.F.	  
Sabel	  and	  J.	  Zeitlin	  (2012)	  ‘Experimentalist	  Governance’.	  In	  D.	  Levy-­‐Faur	  (Ed.)	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Govern-­‐
ance.	  Oxford:	  OUP,	  p.170.	  	  
507	  Sabel,	  C.	  F.	  and	  Zeitlin,	  J.	  (2010)	  ‘Learning	  from	  Difference:	  the	  New	  Architecture	  of	  Experimentalist	  Gov-­‐
ernance	  in	  the	  EU’.	  In	  C.F.	  Sabel	  and	  J.	  Zeitlin	  (Eds.)	  Experimentalist	  Governance	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  To-­‐
wards	  a	  New	  Architecture.	  Oxford:	  OUP,	  pp.9;	  C.F.	  Sabel	  and	  J.	  Zeitlin	  (2012)	  ‘Experimentalist	  Governance’.	  In	  
D.	  Levy-­‐Faur	  (Ed.)	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Governance.	  Oxford:	  OUP,	  pp.170-­‐184.	  
508	  Sabel,	  C.	  F.	  and	  Zeitlin,	  J.	  (2008)	  Learning	  from	  difference:	  The	  new	  architecture	  of	  experimentalist	  govern-­‐
ance	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  European	  Law	  Journal	  14:	  276.	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However, experimentalist concepts and new modes of governance have recently faced a major 
challenge from the literature on the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. Skeptical commentators suggest 
that the experimentalist architecture may just represent an ‘empty shell’, disguising for exam-
ple ‘policy transfer’.509 Others point out that ‘peer review’ means different things in different 
policies and the related processes can break down at several points.510 Still others recognize 
that Open Method of Coordination (OMC) processes, which have often been presented as an 
archetypal example of experimentalist architecture in the EU, actually vary considerably in 
their modalities and procedures.511 The core of this critique is that new modes of sectoral gov-
ernance in themselves do not contribute to the efficacy of policymaking. Instead, they require 
the shadow of hierarchy, i.e. legislative and executive decisions, in order to deal effectively 
with the problems they are supposed to solve.512 The experimentalism that emerges under the 
shadow of hierarchy is dependent on state authority for its existence - with the upshot that 
experimentalism is a complement or extension to traditional state authority, rather than an al-
ternative to it.513 Seen this way, the experimentalist architecture might be simply a capacity-
increasing extension of the formal hierarchical, principal-agent decision-making apparatus ra-
ther than a networked, deliberative alternative to it.514  
 
Gap, research question and case study 
Despite the wealth of contributions, images about experimentalist and new modes of govern-
ance more generally therefore remain different if not contrary. Questions regarding the effects 
of experimentalist architectures, rather than their diffusion, largely remain unsolved. In order 
to establish causal relations between background conditions and the actual use of experimen-
talist architectures (i.e., experimentalist policymaking), the thesis asks under what conditions 
the Commission engages in experimentalist policymaking. Experimentalist policymaking is 
conceptualized and measured as a process whereby 1) Member State public authorities and/or 
regulated companies are allowed to experiment distinct approaches, 2) their alternative expe-
riments are compared, and 3) agreements on reforms and/or performance metrics are developed 
based on such comparisons. A point of departure taken in the thesis is therefore that, in the 
course of regulatory policymaking, the Commission finds itself in a situation in which it can 
engage in distinct types of policymaking. 
                                                
509	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The thesis analyses four cases by looking at two specific issue-areas (i.e., congestion manage-
ment and tarification of cross-border exchanges) in both the electricity and gas domains, from 
the late 1990s to the early 2010s. Since the late 1990s, in both domains the regulation of these 
two issue-areas could rely on analogous experimentalist architectures, which developed in par-
allel (e.g., Florence and Madrid fora, regional initiatives). It has seen a similar decrease of 
conflicts over time, between incumbents and new entrants (i.e., due to progressive unbundling) 
as well as between EU and national policymakers (i.e., due to the gradual creation and empow-
erment of independent national regulators). It has been affected by an almost identical increase 
over time of the Commission’s formal rulemaking powers (i.e., first it could develop rules only 
by proposing EU legislation, since 2003 and 2005 it could also develop implementing acts 
through comitology, and since 2009 it could also produce network codes).  
As we shall see, initially, it has witnessed similar levels of uncertainty. At the very beginning 
of the liberalization and re-regulation process, the Commission had only vague policy prefer-
ences about how to regulate these issue-areas, but when agreement on reforms emerged, it 
developed more specific policy preferences. Since the mid-2000s, however, substantial varia-
tion in uncertainty emerged in both paired cases across the electricity and gas domains. For 
regulating congestion management, in the power domain the Commission was confronted with 
new policy questions about which it did not have specific preferences, while in the gas domain 
it continued to hold previously established preferences for specific policies. In the tarification 
of cross-border exchanges, conversely, in the power domain it maintained its existing prefer-
ences for specific policies, while in the gas domain a question emerged about whether further 
harmonization was needed and if so how it ought to be pursued, a policy about which the 
Commission did not have straightforward preferences (Table 1). 
Table 1. Variation in uncertainty in congestion management and the tarification of cross-border exchanges 
across the power and gas domains 
 Part One: late 1990s - early 2000s Part Two: mid-2000s - early 
2010s 
 Power domain Gas domain Power domain Gas domain 
Congestion management Strong and then 
weak 
Strong and then 
weak 
Strong Weak 
Tarification of cross-border ex-
changes 
Strong and then 
weak 





Provisional empirical findings 
The empirical analysis was organized into two parts. The first part covered the regulatory pol-
icymaking by the Commission from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, while the second part 




Congestion management from the late 1990s to the early 2000s (Chapter Three) 
In both the power and gas domains, at the very beginning of the liberalization and integration 
of the European markets in the late 1990s, the policy preferences of the Commission were 
broad, namely in favor of access to the system based on objective, transparent and non-dis-
criminatory criteria.515 Since the Commission did not have precise preferences about how to 
regulate the management of scarce interconnection capacity, uncertainty was strong. In these 
conditions of strong uncertainty, even in the absence of a strong shadow of hierarchy suppos-
edly needed to induce strongly conflictual parties to cooperate, the Commission employed ex-
perimentalist architectures to seek dialogue with Member State public authorities and private 
regulated companies, and this led to experimentalist policymaking by allowing actors experi-
menting distinct solutions, stimulating their comparison, and facilitating agreement on reforms 
on this basis. In the power domain, it used the Florence Forum to compare experiments of most 
experienced markets such as the UK, Spain and the Nordic countries, and on this basis Forum 
actors agreed in 2000 on voluntary Guidelines on Congestion Management suggesting market-
based approaches (i.e., auctions) rather than administrative-based methods (e.g., pro-rata, first-
come-first-served).516 In the gas domain, the Commission used the Madrid Forum and smaller 
Working Groups to compare experiments in the UK, Spain and the Netherlands, overview ar-
rangements adopted throughout Europe, and survey views of industry actors from a variety of 
Member States. On this basis, Madrid Forum participants voluntary agreed in 2002 on Guide-
lines for Good Practice emphasizing the importance of TPA to open markets to competition,517 
and in 2003 on revised GGP suggesting to free up unused transport capacity through market-
based approaches, namely ‘interruptible’	  Use-It-Or-Lose-It (UIOLI) rules and secondary trad-
ing.518 
By agreeing on these reforms, the Commission developed the much more specific policy pref-
erences just described. Compared to the previous phase, uncertainty therefore declined. In these 
conditions of weaker uncertainty, the Commission did not employ experimentalist architec-
tures even though still present. Instead, it assessed compliance with the voluntary reforms and 
on this basis formalized, through other than experimentalist policymaking, reforms previously 
agreed through experimentalist processes, making a single solution binding on all Member 
States and regulated companies. This contrasts with the hierarchy-based hypothesis, which ex-
pected the Commission to engage with experimentalist policymaking much, given its limited 
rulemaking powers. In the power domain, the Commission and CEER assessed implementation 
experiences for monitoring compliance with the voluntary Guidelines, rather than for compar-
ing alternative solutions; Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 was not developed based on compar-
isons of distinct experiments, but formalized the voluntary Guidelines previously agreed 
through experimentalist processes; and it did so precisely to make a single solution binding and 
avoid distinct approaches, instead of allowing distinct experiments. In the gas domain, simi-
larly, the Commission assessed implementation experiences for monitoring compliance, rather 
than for comparing alternative solutions; Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 was not developed 
based on comparisons of distinct experiments, but formalized the voluntary GGP previously 
                                                
515	  Directive	  96/92/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  19	  December	  1996	  concerning	  com-­‐
mon	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  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  electricity;	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  98/30/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  
Council	  of	  22	  June	  1998	  concerning	  common	  rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  natural	  gas.	  
516	  Conclusions	  of	  the	  6th	  Florence	  Forum,	  “Guidelines	  on	  Congestion	  management”,	  9-­‐10.11.2000.  
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  Conclusions	  of	  the	  5th	  Gas	  Regulatory	  Forum.	  7-­‐8	  February	  2002.	  
518	  Conclusions	  of	  the	  7th	  meeting	  of	  the	  European	  Gas	  Regulatory	  Forum	  Madrid,	  24-­‐25	  September	  2003.	  AN-­‐
NEX	  1	  The	  Guidelines	  for	  Good	  TPA	  Practice	  -­‐	  revised	  version,	  Art.8.1-­‐8.2.	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agreed through experimentalist processes; and it did so precisely to make a single solution 
binding on all Member States and regulated companies. 
 
Tarification from the late 1990s to the early 2000s (Chapter Four) 
In both domains, at the very beginning of the liberalization and integration of the European 
markets, the policy preferences of the Commission were broad, namely in favor of objective, 
transparent and non-discriminatory tariffs.519 Since the Commission did not have precise pref-
erences about how to regulate the tarification of cross-border exchanges, uncertainty was 
strong. In these conditions of strong uncertainty, even in the absence of a strong shadow of 
hierarchy hypothetically needed to induce strongly conflictual parties to cooperate, the Com-
mission employed experimentalist architectures to seek dialogue with Member State public 
authorities and private regulated companies, and this led to experimentalist policymaking by 
allowing actors experimenting distinct solutions, stimulating their comparison, and facilitating 
agreement on reforms on this basis. In the power domain, by employing for about six years the 
Florence Forum, a Working Group and a technical subgroup, it stimulated comparisons of ex-
periments of the most experienced markets such as the UK, Sweden, and US, which were com-
plemented by the Aachen study’s overview of national and cross-border transmission pricing 
arrangements. On this basis, Forum actors agreed in 1999 on voluntary Guidelines suggesting 
non-transaction based postage stamp tariffs and an associated inter-TSO compensation mech-
anism, in 2002 on the details of how to implement such inter-TSO compensation mechanism, 
and in 2003 on a harmonized range of G charges.520 In the gas domain, alternative experiments 
were compared notably by the Brattle Group, GTE, and CEER, and debated for about five 
years within the Madrid Forum and a smaller Joint Working Group. On this basis, Forum actors 
developed reforms based on cost-reflective tariffs and entry-exit systems, as reflected in the 
agreements reached in 2002.521 
After agreements on reforms emerged, however, the Commission developed much more spe-
cific policy preferences, precisely in favor of the content of the agreed reforms. In these con-
ditions of reduced uncertainty, the Commission did not continue to engage in experimentalist 
policymaking, even though the same experimentalist architectures remained available. This 
contrasts with the hierarchy-based hypothesis, which expected the Commission to keep being 
engaged with experimentalist policymaking, given its still limited hierarchical rulemaking 
powers. Instead, backed by specific policy preferences, the Commission pursued much more 
formalized, faster, and less inclusive other than experimentalist policymaking processes. In the 
power domain, the Commission did not compare implementation experiences, while in the gas 
domain it did so to assess compliance with the agreed reforms. In both cases, rather than al-
lowing Member States and companies to experiment alternative solutions, it formalized re-
forms previously agreed through experimentalist processes precisely to make them binding on 
                                                
519	  Directive	  96/92/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	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  Council	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  19	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all Member States and companies, namely through Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 and Regu-
lation (EC) No 1775/2005.  
 
Congestion management from the mid-2000s to the early 2010s (Chapter Five) 
The arguments that emerged from Chapters Three and were confirmed in Chapter Four were 
further tested in Chapters Five and Six, which looked at the period from the mid-2000s to the 
early 2010s, when substantial variation in uncertainty emerged in both paired cases across the 
electricity and gas domains, despite continuing similarities across them in terms of hierarchy 
and its shadow, as well as experimentalist architectures and degrees of conflicts. In both do-
mains, analogous experimentalist architectures were present and developed in parallel. Since 
the mid-2000s, in both electricity and gas the rulemaking powers of the Commission were 
strengthened very similarly (i.e., first with the power of adopting implementing acts through 
comitology and then with the network codes procedure), hence both hierarchy and its shadow 
grew stronger. By contrast, both the conflicts between EU and national policymakers and those 
between distinct types of regulated companies decreased (the creation of national regulatory 
authorities was made compulsory and their powers and independence strengthened; ownership 
unbundling became more common). Instead, heterogeneities across the two domains emerged 
in terms of uncertainty. In the power domain uncertainty grew stronger because the Commis-
sion was confronted with new policy questions about which it did not have specific preferences, 
namely what type of auctions be used and through which arrangements be implemented. In the 
gas domain, on the contrary, uncertainty remained weak, because the Commission continued 
to hold previously established preferences for specific policies, namely UIOLI provisions. 
The chapter’s central finding is that the heterogeneities in uncertainty that emerged since the 
mid-2000s made a difference in the prevailing type of policymaking, despite continuing simi-
larities across domains in hierarchy and its shadow, as well as in experimentalist architectures 
and degrees of conflicts. It has shown that in the power domain the Commission returned to 
have vague policy preferences by becoming exposed to new questions about what type of auc-
tions be used and through which arrangements; how in these conditions of uncertainty it em-
ployed experimentalist architectures such as the Mini-Fora and Regional Initiatives, Project 
Coordination Group and Florence Forum to seek dialogue with Member State public authori-
ties and regulated companies even in the presence of stronger hierarchical powers that it could 
have used to develop rules through other than experimentalist policymaking; and how this pro-
cess led to experimentalist policymaking by allowing actors experimenting distinct types of 
auctions and arrangements, stimulating their comparison, and facilitating agreement on re-
forms on this basis, namely in favor of implicit rather than explicit auctions and price rather 
than volume coupling arrangements for extending the target model from the Trilateral Market 
Coupling project to neighboring regions.522 By contrast, it has shown that in the gas domain 
the Commission continued to hold specific policy preferences for UIOLI rules and how in these 
conditions of enduringly weak uncertainty it did not employ experimentalist architectures even 





on	  18th	  April	  2010.	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though present. Instead, once it had assessed the inefficacy of the single policy solution im-
posed by Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 (i.e., interruptible UIOLI)523, notably through the 
Sector Inquiry,524 it made it stricter (i.e., firm UIOLI) and binding all over Europe, by adopting 
the Commission Decision 2012/490/EU.525 This finding runs contrary to the shadow of hierar-
chy hypothesis, which expected the Commission to engage with experimentalist policymaking 
more, given the larger shadow it could loom on parties to induce them to cooperate. 
 
Tarification from the mid-2000s to the early 2010s (Chapter Six) 
These arguments were eventually tested in Chapter Six, which kept looking at the Commis-
sion’s regulatory policymaking from the mid-2000s to the early 2010s in the power and gas 
domains, but shifted focus to the tarification of cross-border exchanges. In both domains, anal-
ogous experimentalist architectures were present and developed in parallel. Since the mid-
2000s, in both electricity and gas the rulemaking powers of the Commission were strengthened 
very similarly, hence both hierarchy and its shadow grew stronger. By contrast, both the con-
flicts between EU and national policymakers and those between distinct types of regulated 
companies decreased. Instead, heterogeneities across the two domains emerged in terms of 
uncertainty, reversely compared to the paired case of the management of scarce interconnection 
capacity analyzed in Chapter Five. In the power domain uncertainty remained weak because 
the Commission continued to hold throughout the 2000s previously established preferences for 
specific policies, namely the detailed methods for the inter-TSO compensation mechanism and 
the harmonized range of G charges. In the gas domain, by contrast, uncertainty resurfaced be-
cause the Commission was confronted with new policy questions about which it did not have 
straightforward preferences, namely whether the existing heterogeneities in arrangements used 
to apply entry-exit systems were distorting competition and cross-border trade and if so what 
kind of harmonization was best to pursue. 
The chapter’s central finding was the same but reserved compared to that of Chapter Five, and 
namely that the heterogeneities in uncertainty that emerged since the mid-2000s made a differ-
ence in the prevailing type of policymaking, despite continuing similarities across domains in 
hierarchy and its shadow, as well as in experimentalist architectures and degrees of conflicts. 
It has shown that in the power domain throughout the 2000s the Commission continued to hold 
the specific policy preferences it had developed at the beginning of the decade, namely for a 
harmonized range of G charges between 0 and a positive value and specific methods for the 
inter-TSO compensation mechanism as agreed in the Florence Forum in 2002 and 2003.526 It 
has shown how under these conditions of persistently weak uncertainty it did not engage in 
experimentalist policymaking, but rather formalized and gave binding power to the single, long 
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preferred approach on which Member States and regulated companies had converged, by 
adopting Commission Regulation (EU) No 774/2010 through its comitological powers.527 This 
finding runs contrary to the shadow of hierarchy hypothesis, which expected the Commission 
to engage with experimentalist policymaking more, given the larger shadow it could loom on 
parties to induce them to cooperate. By contrast, it has shown that in the gas domain the Com-
mission returned to have generic policy preferences by becoming exposed to new questions 
about whether the existing heterogeneities in tarification approaches were creating distortions 
to competition and cross-border trade, and if so through what kind of harmonization they could 
be addressed. It has shown how under these conditions of increased uncertainty, even in the 
presence of stronger powers it could have used to develop rules through hierarchical policy-
making, the Commission re-employed experimentalist architectures such as the Madrid Forum 
and an ad hoc informal group of experts advising ACER as well as support from members of 
the epistemic community (e.g., KEMA, Florence School of Regulation) to compare for about 
five years alternative experiments being carried out by Member States and regulated compa-
nies, and how reforms were developed based on and by making explicit reference to such com-
parisons, namely the ACER Framework Guidelines on harmonized transmission tariff struc-
tures introducing a set of common parameters for all aspects of tariff setting including cost 
allocation methodologies.528 
 
Currently emerging argument and implications 
The central finding emerging from the empirical analysis is that, over time, there is a persistent 
pattern of interactions between experimentalist and other types of policymaking: they regularly 
alternate with each other, with important reforms often being first agreed through the former 
and then being formalized and given binding power through the latter. It showed that when the 
Commission had vague policy preferences, it employed experimentalist architectures to seek 
dialogue with Member State public authorities and private regulated companies, and how this 
allowed actors experimenting distinct solutions, comparing them, and agreeing on reforms and 
performance indicators on this basis. By contrast, it showed that when the Commission had 
specific policy preferences, it did not employ experimentalist architectures even though pre-
sent, but instead used its powers to minimize dialogue with Member States and regulated com-
panies. It showed how this did not lead to distinct experiments, their comparison, and reforms 
based on them, but rather to the development of reforms through highly hierarchical and for-
malized, other than experimentalist policymaking. It also showed that, contrary to the hierar-
chy-based expectations, in conditions of uncertainty the Commission engaged in experimen-
talist policymaking even when it had the hierarchical powers to pursue other types of policy-
making and, contrary to the shadow of hierarchy expectations, it did so even in the absence of 
a strong shadow of hierarchy supposedly needed to induce actors with conflictual policy pref-
erences to cooperate. Moreover, neither the hierarchy-based nor the shadow of hierarchy hy-
pothesis can explain why the Commission engaged in distinct types of policymaking despite 
similarities in hierarchy and its shadow, and taking into account degrees of conflict and pres-
ence of experimentalist architectures.  
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The arguments emerging from the empirical analysis have important implications for the the-
oretical frameworks from which distinct hypotheses were drawn. First, by showing that the 
Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking despite the absence of a strong shadow 
of hierarchy supposedly needed to induce parties, especially if conflictual, to cooperate, they 
disconfirm the views put forward by the major critics of new and experimentalist governance, 
that emphasize the importance of the shadow of the state for their effectiveness. Second, by 
showing that the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking despite the presence 
of strong hierarchical rule making powers, they undermine the views put forward by some 
shadow of hierarchy scholars that interpret new and experimentalist modes of governance as 
attractive only in the absence of more traditional, hierarchical routes, as well as the views put 
forward by experimentalist scholars themselves, that have been stressing the importance of a 
polyarchic distribution of powers to avoid the most powerful actors imposing their preferred 
solution. Third, they strengthen the importance of uncertainty, showing that it has significant 
influence not only for the diffusion of experimentalist architectures, as argued by experimen-
talist scholars, but also for engagement in experimentalist policymaking through the use of 
those architectures.    
In turn, these findings allow us moving beyond the different if not contrary images about the 
new and experimentalist modes of governance. By identifying the conditions under which 
key actors, such as the Commission in the EU, do or do not engage in experimentalist policy-
making, these findings advance our understanding of the conditions under which new and ex-
















ACER –	  Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
CEER –	  Council of European Energy Regulators 
CEFIC –	  European Chemical Industry Council 
EFET –	  European Federation of Energy Traders  
ENTSO-E –	  European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
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  European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas  
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  European Transmission System Operators 
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  Voice of local Energy Distributors across Europe 
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  Gas Transmission Europe  
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Auctions	  –	  a market-based congestion management method. This contrasts with pro-rata and 
first come, first served  
Congestion management	  –	  the management of situations in which demand for network capacity 
exceeds the amount of available network capacity  
Cost reflectivity –	   the principle according to which tariffs reflect the underlying costs. This 
contrasts with cross-subsidization  
Cross-subsidization	  –	  the practice of charging higher prices to one group of consumers or com-
panies to subsidize lower prices for another group. This contrasts with cost-reflectivity  
Entry-exit system	  –	  a gas network access model which allows network users to book capacity 
rights independently at entry and exit points, thereby creating gas transport through zones ins-
tead of along contractual paths. This contrasts with the point-to-point system 
Explicit auctions	  –	  specific type of auctions in which transport rights and commodity are traded 
through distinct auctions. This differs from implicit auctions 
Firm capacity	  –	  transport capacity contractually guaranteed as uninterruptible by the transmis-
sion system operator. This differs from interruptible capacity 
First come, first served	  –	   traditional congestion management method in which requests for 
transport capacity are accepted until capacity limit is reached. This differs from auctions 
Implicit auctions	  –	  specific type of auctions in which transport rights are not explicitly auc-
tioned, but rather made available implicitly while participating to auctions concerning com-
modity. This differs from explicit auctions  
Interruptible capacity	  –	  transport capacity that can be interrupted by the transmission system 
operator according to the conditions stipulated in the transportation contract. This contrasts 
with firm capacity  
Inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism	  –	  a mechanism which ensures 
that transmission system operators are compensated for the costs of hosting cross-border flows 
on their networks  
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Natural monopoly	  – a situation in which the market can most cheaply be supplied by a single 
firm 
Point-to-point system	   –	   the traditionally used network access model which mandated gas 
transport to be based on contractual paths. This contrasts with the entry-exit system 
Postage-stamp	  –	  tarification method that provides access to the entire grid at a flat rate. This 
contrasts with transit fees  
Price coupling	  –	  a method to implement implicit auctions in which both flows and prices are 
determined by the coupler. This differs from volume coupling 
Pro-rata	  –	  traditional congestion management method in which all requested transactions are 
carried out and each transaction quantity is cut by the same percentage. This differs from auc-
tions 
Secondary market	  –	  the market of the transport capacity traded otherwise than on the market 
of the capacity traded directly by the transmission system operator 
Tarification –	  the regulation of prices for accessing and using network capacity 
Transit fees	  –	  traditional tarification method that imposes charges for each transactions network 
users engage in 
Use-it-or-lose-it	  –	  congestion management method that imposes the use of transport rights or 
else their loss  
Volume coupling	  –	  a method to implement implicit auctions in which only the flows between 
two markets are determined in the first stage, and prices are calculated subsequently by the 
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